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Summary 
What role do traditional governance structures play in countries’ internal peace and 
conflict dynamics? While dominant approaches in conflict studies understand 
governance mainly through the lenses of state capacities, governance scholars have 
increasingly payed attention to non-state governance structures. Particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa, traditional governance structures, e.g. traditional and indigenous 
leadership, chieftaincies, kings and headmen, are de facto relevant in providing 
governance and exercising political influence alongside and beyond the state. This 
thesis expands research on hybrid governance by examining comparatively how 
traditional forms of governance influence sub-Saharan African conflict dynamics. I 
argue that in order to understand this relationship, we need to discern the variation in 
the institutional context and internal composition of traditional institutions.  
Three chapters build on and develop this theoretical approach: The first chapter 
focuses on the institutional interaction between the state and traditional governance. 
The chapter builds a typology of this interaction and demonstrates that a country’s 
intrastate peace stands on a firmer ground when the state accommodates and integrates 
traditional governance structures. The second chapter zooms into local political 
dynamics and analyses the way contested traditional authority structures fuel local 
unrest by increasing grievances and providing opportunities to mobilise against the 
incumbent authorities. The third chapter maintains the disaggregated approach and 
looks at how local strength of customary institutions influences the vulnerability of a 
locality to armed violence against civilians.  
The thesis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of governance and 
conflict dynamics by 1) placing theoretical focus on the conditions shaping the 
contemporary role of traditional governance, 2) deploying novel data on traditional 
governance structures in sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa in particular, and 3) 
analysing the relationship between traditional governance and conflict at multiple 
levels of analysis.  
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1. Introduction 
This thesis examines the role of traditional governance in countries’ internal peace and 
conflict dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa.1 Specifically, it focuses on traditional 
authorities as rational political actors that have considerable governance and 
mobilisation potential. Key readings of Mamdani (1996), Ntsebeza (2005), Englebert 
(2002b, 2002a), Sklar (1999), Baldwin (2015), and others shed light on the broad 
political influence that traditional governance can have alongside the modern state. 
They also point to considerable ambiguity and variation in the societal implications of 
traditional authorities. However, the conditions leading to this variation in the role of 
traditional governance remain less explored. Moreover, thus far little comparative 
research has studied the political influence of traditional governance with regard to 
countries’ internal peace and conflict dynamics.2 Therefore, this dissertation 
investigates the varying empirical conditions under which traditional governance 
structures influence contemporary societies and the way these shape peace and conflict 
dynamics.  
To illustrate the complexity of the subject, consider South Africa (the country of 
focus in the third chapter). There are over 800 chieftaincies and approximately dozen 
kingships in the post-apartheid South Africa. These governance structures continue to 
shape both local and national politics (Oomen, 2005; LiPuma and Koelble, 2009; de 
Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018). Moreover, chiefs and headmen are often vital in a 
                                                          
1 As clarified later in this introduction, traditional governance is understood as institutions, rules, and 
authorities that derive their legitimacy from communities’ context-specifically constructed customs and 
norms, rather than from the modern state. See Holzinger, Kern, and Kromrey (2016) for a literature 
overview. 
2 Wig (2016) and Wig and Kromrey (2018) stand out as exceptions in this regard. Yet their focus is on 
hierarchical versus decentralised precolonial legacies in traditional governance structures while this 
dissertation captures contemporary systematic variation in traditional governance. 
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range of governance issues from land allocation to resolving theft, as reported by focus 
group participants during my field research in the country.3 Yet even more pronounced 
than the relevance of traditional governance are the ambiguities attached to its role. On 
the one hand, the state has formally accommodated traditional authorities and considers 
them crucial for local development. On the other hand, empirical accounts of traditional 
authorities in some parts of the country highlight the corrupted and conflict-inducing 
nature of individual chiefs and kings (Ntsebeza, 2005; Mnwana, 2015b). Depending on 
with whom one is talking or which accounts one reads, traditional governance 
structures are portrayed as either corrupted, irrelevant, instrumental for peace, or 
detrimental for democracy. 
It is this variation in the narratives concerning traditional governance in South 
Africa and more broadly in sub-Saharan Africa that forms the general puzzle for this 
thesis. An underlying argument that this thesis makes is that rather than their mere 
presence having a positive or negative effect on peace, the influence of traditional 
governance is more complex. One needs to consider which internal and external 
conditions shape the forms that traditional governance takes in contemporary societies 
and how this affects peace and conflict. In this thesis I identify and examine three of 
those conditions, each of which I focus on individually in the three chapters that form 
the collarbone of this thesis. First, I examine the institutionalised interaction between 
traditional governance and the state, i.e. whether and how the state recognises 
traditional authority. Second, I focus on the internal structural aspects of traditional 
authorities, namely whether they are contested. Third, I analyse the strength of 
traditional institutions, understood as their legitimacy and efficiency. In the dissertation 
                                                          
3 See chapter 3 and its Appendix A3.11 for more information on the conducted interviews and focus 
group discussions in South Africa, in April-June 2017. 
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I demonstrate that these conditions shape the way traditional governance structures 
affect internal conflict dynamics. 
This dissertation is motivated by the aims of 1) taking traditional governance 
theoretically and empirically seriously in conflict models, 2) disentangling the 
conditions that shape the way traditional governance structures influence peace and 
conflict dynamics, and 3) contributing to comparative research concerning the societal 
effects of different constellations of hybrid governance. As will be shortly clarified, 
employing the lenses of hybrid governance, i.e. acknowledging the simultaneous 
presence of multiple state and non-state governance structures and actors, is vital for 
understanding contemporary governance realities in the context of sub-Saharan Africa.  
This dissertation contributes to the study of conflict and governance by 
demonstrating that 1) traditional governance structures can have considerable influence 
on national and subnational conflict dynamics, and 2) this influence depends on the 
institutional context and internal composition of these structures, rather than their mere 
presence. Furthermore, the dissertation accumulates understanding of processes and 
consequences of elite interactions and the relationship between state and non-state 
governance in general. With regard to this the dissertation constructs and presents new 
data on the contemporary traditional governance structures and their institutional 
context in sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa in particular. This thesis also 
contributes to a growing awareness of local institutions and how these shape conflict 
processes. This is done by tackling the research problem at three levels of analysis: 
first, by comparing countries’ intrastate peace at a national level; second, by 
investigating low-intensity conflict outbreaks at a local level, and third by analysing 
the realities of local communities in an armed conflict context. Before outlining the 
chapters more carefully, I will proceed to motivate the thematic focus on traditional 
 10 
governance and conflict, clarify the main concepts, and outline the overarching 
theoretical framework adapted in each chapter. 
 
1.1.(Hybrid) governance and peace and conflict dynamics 
Governance capacity4 strongly influences countries’ internal peace and conflict 
dynamics. Thus far, research on this governance-conflict nexus has focused on the 
political, coercive, administrative, and economic capacities of the state (Hegre et al., 
2001; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009; Hendrix, 2010; Hegre 
and Nygård, 2015). The efficiency and integrity of a state’s bureaucratic and 
administrative apparatus, the stability of its political institutions, and the quality of its 
rule of law are seen as particularly critical for the prospects of peaceful societal 
relations. With regard to intrastate peace, stable and consolidated bureaucratic and 
political institutions are seen to alleviate both motivations and opportunities to rebel 
against the state. In turn, weak governance capacities are seen to endanger civil peace 
and heighten the risk of organised political violence (Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009; Hegre 
and Nygård, 2015). Whether through increasing the lucrativeness of joining an armed 
group or through eroding the capacity of the state to quell an emerging insurgency, 
regions and countries with limited state capacity are found to have relatively high risk 
of internal armed struggles. Locally, efficient governance institutions are seen to 
mitigate the adverse effects of other conflict-inducing factors, such as extreme weather 
patterns, and to help maintain a subnational region more secure from inter-communal 
                                                          
4 Governance capacity is understood as the capacity to enforce public order and provide public services, 
such as judicial and socio-economic services. As discussed in this introduction, while often connected 
solely to the state, governance is often provided by multiple state and non-state actors. 
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and other types of political violence (De Juan and Pierskalla, 2015; De Juan and 
Wegner, 2017; Witmer et al., 2017).   
The comparative research on state governance capacity and conflict has 
generated crucial insights on how states’ central and local institutions influence conflict 
vulnerability. Yet this strong focus on the modern state and its apparatus has saved little 
attention to other critical dimensions of governance realities in the contemporary 
nation-state. Particularly in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa there are multiple 
governance actors and structures, e.g. traditional authorities, that the existing measures 
of state capacity do not easily capture. It is here where the state emerged through a 
complex interplay between colonial and pre-colonial institutions and where the state’s 
administrative and bureaucratic capacities remain symptomatically limited 
(Mengisteab, 2017a). Concepts such as hybrid political order, mediated state, or 
governance without government have arose to better grasp the empirical reality in 
polities where multiple non-state and informal institutions govern alongside, within, or 
beyond the modern state (Menkhaus, 2008; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot, 
2008; Boege, Brown and Clements, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2011).  Notably, these ‘other’ 
governance structures vary in their capacities, historical trajectories, and relations to 
the state and therefore induce differing governance realities both within and across 
countries.  
Building on this notion of governance hybridity, this dissertation adopts a broad 
understanding of governance as ‘the various institutionalised modes of social 
coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, and/or to provide 
collective goods’ (Börzel, Risse and Draude, 2018, p. 8). Governance can be and is 
performed by a multitude of state and non-state actors whose relative capacities and 
interactions differ over time and space (Boege, Brown and Clements, 2009; Mac Ginty, 
 12 
2011; Risse, 2012; Krasner and Risse, 2014; Meagher, de Herdt and Titeca, 2014; 
Richmond, 2014). Notably, the concept of non-state actors is not to be equated here 
solely with actors aiming to replace or challenge the state (e.g. non-state armed groups). 
In this thesis non-state actors refer to governance agents, e.g. traditional chiefs, that 
have their origins outside the state’s apparatus but that co-exist with the state, often 
supporting and even cooperating with it. The concept of hybridity, then, refers to the 
nature of governance as constituted by various institutionalised modes of social 
coordination that include but are not limited to the formal state structures.5 
Some form of governance hybridity takes place even in the most consolidated 
Weberian states (Mac Ginty, 2011; Börzel, Risse and Draude, 2018). However, from a 
peace and conflict studies perspective, recognising the hybridity or mixed nature of 
governance is particularly important in countries where the state is weak, that is in the 
context of limited statehood (Sklar, 1999; Herbst, 2000; Hagmann and Péclard, 2010; 
Meagher, 2012; Fearon, 2013). Following Börzel, Risse, and Draude (2018, p. 5) 
limited statehood refers to areas ‘in which central authorities (governments) lack the 
ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/or in which they do not 
command a legitimate monopoly over the means of violence’. Within this framework 
a vast majority of countries in sub-Saharan Africa are defined as either limited or 
extremely limited in their statehood. As the state lacks the capacity to quell violent 
expressions of grievances and mobilisation, areas of limited statehood are considered 
to be at a higher risk of organised political violence (Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009; 
Fearon, 2013; De Juan and Pierskalla, 2015).  
                                                          
5 For a discussion on hybridity in peace and conflict dynamics, see Mac Ginty (2011) and Boege, Brown, 
and Clements (2009). Some authors define hybridity explicitly as the co-governance of liberal and 
illiberal institutions (Jarstad and Belloni, 2012). While traditional governance structures can be 
considered illiberal, I refrain from attaching any labels on the nature of the governance forms present in 
hybrid polities and rather focus on empirically capturing these.  
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Nevertheless, as the concept of hybridity allows us to acknowledge, countries 
with limited statehood can still differ considerably with regard to their governance 
capacities. Recognising the difference between statehood and governance enables one 
to see that state weakness does not necessarily equal failure of governance. Instead, the 
overall governance capacities in hybrid political orders depend on the interactions and 
different constellations of local, national, and sometimes also international forms of 
governance (Mac Ginty, 2013; Lee, Walter-Drop and Wiesel, 2014). Influencing the 
quality and effectiveness of governance, non-state actors and structures should be able 
to influence the grievances and opportunities that give rise to conflict and violence. A 
growing number of studies investigate the role of non-state actors, namely traditional 
and religious leaders, in shaping inter-group dynamics and conflict outcomes, 
particularly at a communal level (De Juan, Pierskalla and Vüllers, 2015; Wig, 2016; 
Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017; Wig and Kromrey, 2018).   This thesis contributes to 
this research field by focusing on the contemporary variation in the internal dynamics 
and institutional context of traditional governance and the influence of this on both 
national and local conflict dynamics. In doing so, this thesis strives to contribute to a 
more empirically grounded understanding of the nexus between governance capacities 
and conflict. 
 
1.2.Traditional governance 
The societal influence of traditional authorities – such as chiefs, queens/kings, and 
headmen – and institutions and norms – such as kinship rules, conflict resolution 
practices, and land management institutions – has gained considerable scholarly 
interest amid the broader trend to approach African governance and political 
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institutions as hybrid.6 Two perspectives can be identified in the previous literature 
concerning the role of traditional governance alongside the state. On the one hand, 
traditional governance structures are seen as essential components of hybrid political 
orders, often more salient in the everyday governance than the state structures 
(Williams, 2010; Baldwin, 2015; Mengisteab, 2017c). Rather than approaching 
traditional governance structures as necessarily incompatible with the modern state and 
democratisation, this perspective emphasises the intermediary role of traditional 
governance between the state and its citizens (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Ruiz-Euler, 
2014; Baldwin, 2015; Klick, 2016). On the other hand, some scholars see the continued 
salience of traditional governance as part of the problem of a weak state in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This perspective views the influence of traditional authorities as a continuum 
of despotic rule that erodes political accountability and stands in the way of 
democratisation (Mamdani, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2005).  
These competing frameworks can be extended to the existing literature on the 
influence of traditional governance on peace and conflict dynamics. Traditional 
governance structures are on the one hand found to facilitate bargaining processes 
within and between communities, thus supporting nonviolent resolution of conflicts 
(Krause, 2018; Wig and Kromrey, 2018). However, research also suggests that 
traditional authorities can serve to increase local grievances and decentralise political 
conflict (Bennett, Ainslie and Davis, 2013; Mnwana, 2015b; Boone, 2017). Pertinent 
in much of the previous research is an underlying assumption of the effects of 
traditional governance as somewhat static across contexts and groups, either as positive 
or negative with regard to the wider societies. This dissertation seeks to respond to a 
                                                          
6 For a general overview of the literature, see Holzinger, Kern, and Kromrey (2016). For recent 
comparative studies on the societal effects of traditional governance structures, see Goist and Kern 
(2018), Baldwin and Mvukiyehe (2015), and Henn (2018). 
 15 
demand for more nuanced empirical research that examines how different 
constellations of contemporary traditional governance structures alongside the state 
influence overall governance and outcomes of peace and conflict at different levels of 
analysis. 
 
Defining traditional governance and authority 
The term traditional governance is defined here as modes of governance that derive 
their legitimacy from historically and context-specifically constructed, albeit altered 
sociocultural customs (Ubink, 2008; Muriaas, 2011; Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 
2016). Traditional institutions can be understood as non-state in that they are highly 
institutionalised and guide social interactions without originating from the formal, 
state-codified system. Notably, this does not prevent traditional governance institutions 
from being recognised by and integrated into the state’s formal system, as shown in 
chapter 2. Nevertheless, even when integrated into the formal state structures, the mode 
of legitimisation of traditional governance remains distinct from the state. Further, even 
though traditional forms of governance often have their roots in precolonial forms of 
political organisation, traditional governance is not static but susceptible to change. 
The contemporary forms of traditional governance are constantly re-invented and 
adapted in a specific political context (Englebert, 2002b; Tieleman and Uitermark, 
2018). It follows that the core attribute in the definition is the identification of 
governance institutions as traditional rather than the ability to trace back the current 
institutions to the historical origins of the tradition (Ubink, 2008; Holzinger, Kern and 
Kromrey, 2016; Tieleman and Uitermark, 2018). The identification of an institution as 
traditional concerns both the actors performing an institution perceived as traditional 
and others making sense of it. 
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This dissertation focuses empirically on the institution of traditional authority, 
i.e. authority that derives its legitimation ultimately from context-specifically 
constructed customs and norms and that is identified first as traditional rather than as 
state-based.7  Traditional authorities considered in this thesis include chiefs and 
headmen (headmen are usually below chiefs in leadership ranks), kings, queens, and 
principal traditional leaders (the highest rank traditional authorities), as well as 
structures such as traditional leadership councils. The rationale behind the focus on 
traditional authorities stems from their pivotal role in implementing and enforcing 
customary rule and practices as the actors entrusted with authority within traditionally 
organised communities (Baldwin, 2015). I identify two sets of attributes that are critical 
in the conceptualisation of traditional authorities. First, I maintain that traditional 
authority is separable from albeit interrelated with the state, that it bases its legitimacy 
in customs, and that it is de facto relevant in the political organisation of societal groups 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, traditional authorities are rational and inherently 
political actors that, like other political actors, can have incentives to act in accountable 
or unaccountable ways. 
As defined above, traditional authority is primarily justified on the grounds of 
customs and political organisation of an indigenous, ethnic, or native group rather than 
the social contract between a state and its citizens. The evolution of state – particularly 
through colonialism –, parallel to the political organisation of indigenous groups, made 
traditional authority ‘traditional’ (Mamdani, 1996; ECA, 2007). That the institution of 
                                                          
7 As with traditional governance more broadly, I recognise traditional authorities as traditional even if 
they are formally recognised by the state, as long as they are perceived as traditional by their subjects, 
themselves, and the state empowering them. The definition here highlights the identification of 
something (and someone) as traditional (see Förster and Koechlin, 2018). This is also somewhat different 
from conceptualisations that see the institution of traditional authority to have lost its legitimacy (and 
customary basis) upon any co-option or empowering by the state (see Mamdani 1996). Traditional 
authorities can be state-empowered authorities without the institution losing its significance. 
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traditional authority resonates particularly strongly in countries with a history of 
European colonialism is no coincidence then, even when traditional governance is 
found across the world. The colonial period significantly shaped the subsequent role of 
traditional authority. It stripped existing authorities their autonomy by imposing an 
over-arching state structure on different groups, but it also often deployed traditional 
authority structures in governing the nascent states (Mamdani, 1996; Englebert, 2000; 
Beall and Ngonyama, 2009). As chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate, different colonial 
legacies with regard to the interaction between traditional authority structures and the 
state remain visible today. 
I approach traditional authorities as inherently political and not necessarily 
uniform actors. As representatives of communities whose customs their legitimacy 
ultimately builds upon traditional authorities can have strong incentives to safeguard 
the interests of their subjects in order to avoid grievances and negative repercussions 
against themselves. Simultaneously, traditional authorities can also have incentives to 
act in unaccountable and self-interested ways in their efforts to maintain political power 
and privileges. Underlying both scenarios is an assumption of the rational and political 
nature of traditional authorities (de Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018). Furthermore, 
traditional authorities are not uniform actors either across groups or within 
communities (Englebert, 2000). There are different types of traditional authority 
structures – hierarchical versus decentralized – and traditional authorities differ in 
terms of their internal cohesion and the influence and legitimacy they enjoy among 
their subjects. This dissertation pays special attention to this variation in the internal 
cohesion and local strength in explaining the role of traditional authorities in shaping 
local peace and stability. 
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Finally, a note on the terminology. The terms traditional and customary 
governance are often used inter-changeably within the field of political science.8 
Nevertheless, there are some differences in the connotation of these two terms that 
deserve a short discussion. Specifically, the term traditional is sometimes avoided for 
its reference to a long-established and even static or linearly developed institution. For 
example Boone (2017) refers to neo-customary leaders, with the emphasis on the 
changed nature of the institution. Also Hobsbawm (2012) draws a clear separation 
between the two terms and argues that while tradition is invariant customary is 
inherently variant.  
Despite its challenges, this thesis adopts the term traditional as the mode term to 
refer to governance institutions that draw their legitimacy from customs of societal 
groups rather than from the state. The term traditional is widely used both by academics 
and public officials in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, as the conceptualisation in this 
introduction clarified the term is not taken to signify a static, unaltered institution. 
However, in chapter 4 I draw from a broader discussion on civilians’ collective agency 
in conflicts and adopt the term customary institutions in an effort to emphasise the 
multitude of civilians’ local institutions that are based on customs and that shape the 
way armed actors interact with civilians.  
 
Traditional authority in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond 
As Holzinger et al. (2018) demonstrate, traditional governance and authority structures 
are not unique to the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Traditional authorities are 
                                                          
8 For example, Wig (2016, Wig and Kromrey, 2018) uses the term customary authorities to refer to the 
same political actors as the term traditional authorities in this dissertation. 
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persistent among indigenous groups in North and South America and other continents 
as well. For example, the Sámi in northern Europe (Finland, Sweden and Norway) 
adhere to traditional governance (Persson, Harnesk and Islar, 2017). While naming of 
these institutions differs from traditional and customary to indigenous or tribal, the 
differences remain semantical as long as the mode of legitimacy builds around context-
specific and historical customs that are identified as separate from the state or other 
alien structures.  
Nevertheless, this thesis restricts its empirical scope to traditional governance 
and traditional authorities in sub-Saharan Africa. This decision is partially pragmatic 
and driven by constrains in data collection process. More importantly, there are two 
interrelated factors that make focus on the continent justified. First, sub-Saharan Africa 
is identified as a region that is particularly prone to violent conflict; five out of ten most 
conflict-ridden countries between 1989 and 2017 are located in the region (Petterson 
and Eck, 2018). It is important to study variation in governance and conflict in sub-
Saharan Africa as its challenges with weak state institutions and for example climate 
change will likely induce further vulnerabilities in the future (Fjelde and von Uexkull, 
2012; Ansorg, 2014; Witmer et al., 2017). Second, and interrelatedly, the limited 
statehood in the region makes the study of the effects of non-state governance 
structures such as traditional governance structures especially important. As previous 
literature on the influence of traditional authority structures in sub-Saharan Africa 
demonstrates, traditional authorities play critical roles in land management, conflict 
resolution, and public administration of rural communities across sub-Saharan Africa, 
and they can yell considerable influence in national political arena (Beall and 
Ngonyama, 2009; Tronvoll and Hagmann, 2012; de Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018). 
The geographical and demographic relevance of traditional governance is also 
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particularly clear in sub-Saharan Africa where communities that maintain some form 
of traditional governance form majorities (Holzinger et al., 2018).9  
 
1.3.Peace and conflict 
This thesis is interested in how traditional governance influences peace and conflict 
dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa. As commonly used concepts, both peace and conflict 
require some clarification. Starting with the latter, conflict is understood as the presence 
of an incompatibility over an issue at stake between (at least) two adversaries 
(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005, p. 27). While conflicts can and often are 
interpersonal, the focus here is on conflicts that can be understood as political in that 
they involve parties mobilised around an incompatible political issue. Furthermore, 
excluding conventional political competition, I am interested in conflicts that involve 
the use of contentious and nonconventional means, particularly the use of political 
violence (Bosi and Malthaner, 2015).  
In chapters 2 and 4, this thesis is interested in countries’ internal armed conflicts. 
The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) defines armed conflict as a ‘contested 
incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed 
force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths’ (Gleditsch et al., 
2002, pp. 618–619). For an armed conflict to be considered countries’ internal, one of 
the parties needs to represent the state actor in the country while the other party is a 
formally organised non-state armed group (see Gleditsch et al., 2002; Croicu and 
Sundberg, 2015). In chapter 2, I am interested in comparing the risk of onset of 
                                                          
9 Again, this does not mean that traditional governance would be irrelevant outside this particular 
context. The conclusions discuss the relevance of the findings outside sub-Saharan Africa. 
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intrastate armed conflict, that is the onset of a country’s internal armed conflict as 
defined above. In chapter 4, rather than estimating conflict onset, I examine the 
determinants of the use of violence against civilians in an armed conflict context (see 
Fjelde, Hultman and Sollenberg, 2016). 
While chapters 2 and 4 define conflict perhaps more conventionally as the use of 
armed force either between rebel and government groups or by these against civilians, 
chapter 3 stretches the notion of conflict to include non-lethal and less organised means 
of political violence and conflict. Specifically, chapter 3 studies a more vertical conflict 
between informally organised constituents and their local administration (which in this 
case comprises of both state and traditional authorities). Here incompatibilities refer to 
perceived malfunctioning of the local governance institutions or injustices in the local 
authority-society relations and become expressed in protest and riot activity that targets 
the local state (Alexander, 2010; De Juan and Wegner, 2017). Admittedly, the chapter 
somewhat distances us from political violence both with regard to conflict intensity and 
in terms of the organised nature of groups involved in conflict. However, the chapter 
still deals with conflict processes, as the phenomena of interest consists of contentious 
and nonconventional means of striving one’s political cause (involving often also the 
use of non-lethal violence).  
These definitions of conflict bear important implications for our understanding 
of peace. This thesis is mainly interested in the maintenance and failure of negative 
peace, i.e. the absence of direct forms of violence (Galtung, 1969). Notably, the concept 
of peace could also be extended to include positive peace; the realisation of social 
justice, and the absence of structural violence (e.g. structures that impede welfare, 
equality, and development) (ibid.). It is important to recognise the observable 
implications of these two forms of peace: the absence of violent conflict does not equal 
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the realisation of positive peace. This means that any attempt to infer how traditional 
governance structures influence countries’ positive peace based on this dissertation 
(especially chapters 2 and 4) would be misleading. This is particularly important to 
acknowledge since, as implied in chapters 2 and 3, traditional governance in specific 
institutional context can have a systematic positive influence on negative peace at the 
intrastate level but still contribute to existing social injustices (failure of positive peace) 
at the local level. That said, failures of negative peace are often related to problems 
with positive peace, as the underlying grievances behind an outbreak of a conflict can 
be thought to imply some failure of positive peace (Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Nevertheless, the theorised effects of 
different constellations of traditional governance on the absence or presence of 
negative peace should not be conflated with their effects on realisation of positive 
peace. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that this thesis approaches countries’ internal 
(negative) peace as multi-layered, exhibiting different realities depending on the 
approach taken towards aggregation or disaggregation of the analysis. Peace measured 
as the absence of a violent conflict between organised state and non-state armed groups 
might not translate to peace (either negative or positive) at a subnational level, and vice 
versa. Theoretical and methodological advancements, including the development of 
georeferenced data projects and geocoded information systems in general, have 
enabled a more disaggregated approach countries’ internal conflict and the institutions 
shaping it (Raleigh et al., 2010; Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Raleigh and Linke, 
2018). I build on the insights of this research agenda in all three chapters focused on 
different levels of countries’ internal conflicts. 
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1.4.Theoretical argument 
This dissertation approaches conflict as a function of existing grievances and 
opportunities that give rise to overt challenges against the political status quo. The basic 
theoretical premise of this thesis is – given the hybrid nature of governance in sub-
Saharan Africa – that traditional governance structures can influence both of these 
dimensions giving rise to conflict and violence. More importantly, however, this thesis 
proposes that the way traditional governance influences the prospects for peace and 
conflict is conditional on the institutional context in which traditional governance 
structures find themselves as well as their internal dynamics and strength at the local 
level. These dimensions shape both the concrete governance capacities and political 
influence embedded in traditional governance as well as the rationale of traditional 
authorities. 
As outlined earlier in this introduction, traditional governance structures – and 
particularly traditional authorities – are argued to have considerable mobilisation and 
political influence. Studies demonstrate (in growing volume) the practical importance 
of traditional authority structures for the outcomes of development interventions (Díaz-
Cayeros, Magaloni and Ruiz-Euler, 2014; Klick, 2016) and general economic 
development (Englebert, 2000; Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson, 2014). Moreover, 
studies show the continuing adherence of communities to traditional authorities and 
institutions (Logan, 2009, 2013). Indeed, traditional authorities are found to have 
considerable mobilisation power among the people that adhere to traditional 
governance structures (de Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018; Goist and Kern, 2018). As 
rational actors trying to advance their own interests, traditional authorities can use this 
mobilisation potential and render it into political influence. Previous research finds 
traditional governance to be particularly pertinent in rural areas, mobilising people and 
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providing crucial public goods and services in areas such as land management and 
dispute resolution (ECA, 2007; de Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018). More recent 
research further acknowledges that traditional governance structures are not trivial in 
more urban areas either (Mengisteab, 2017b; Tieleman and Uitermark, 2018). 
However, the way this practical relevance and political mobilisation power of 
traditional governance demonstrates itself should not be approached as static or 
invariable across contexts (or over time to that matter). While the presence of 
traditional governance is ubiquitous in sub-Saharan Africa, it differs in regard to its 
institutional interaction with the state (chapter 2), its historically modified unity 
(chapter 3), and the strength it has within a specific subnational area (chapter 4). These 
conditions induce variation that helps us understand the complex role that traditional 
governance structures take in countries’ internal peace and conflict dynamics. 
First, the institutional context of traditional governance structures can enable or 
hinder their contribution to the overall governance capacities and make them more or 
less inclined to use their political influence in support or against the central state. While 
the state is often limited in its own capacities to provide effective governance, it 
nevertheless remains the primary rules-setting actor with regard to the structures and 
actors participating in de facto governance. It follows that the state’s approach to 
traditional governance institutions influences the way traditional governance can be 
practiced. Simultaneously, however, the way traditional governance structures can 
function influences the overall governance capacities and the mobilisation 
opportunities among the population. 
When traditional governance structures exist in parallel to the state – without any 
institutional recognition of their role – the concrete governance capacities of traditional 
governance structures are less likely to benefit the state’s efforts to govern. This is 
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because the two forms of governance perform in parallel without any guarantees of 
coordination and cooperation. Moreover, traditional authorities embedded in this 
context are less bound to the state and therefore less obliged to support it. In fact, being 
left out of the state-recognised governance framework can induce grievances among 
traditional authorities and make them adversarial towards the central state. In contrast, 
accommodation of traditional governance structures alongside the state can facilitate 
coordination on the ground between the limited state structures and traditional forms 
of governance. More so, the state’s positive approach to traditional authority can 
convince traditional authorities to support the central state by giving them stakes in 
maintaining state stability. 
As chapter 2 demonstrates, there are different ways the institutional context of 
traditional governance can be set in a state’s constitutional framework, thus creating 
different state–traditional governance interactions. I argue that this variation has 
implications for intrastate peace via the mechanisms of shaping the overall governance 
capacities and inducing mobilisation in support or against the central state. I propose 
that intrastate peace can be expected to stand on a firmer ground when a (limited) state 
accommodates traditional governance structures and facilitates concrete governance 
coordination and cooperation between the state and traditional authorities. By leaving 
traditional governance structures outside the constitutional framework the state risks to 
alienate traditional authorities from its grip and lose their concrete governance 
capacities.  
However, the theorised positive implications of this type of institutional context 
for traditional governance are not expected to automatically spread from an intrastate 
level to a local level. In fact, outsourcing of governance functions to territorial 
authorities such as traditional leaders can decentralise political tensions and direct these 
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against the local rather than central authorities (Claassens, 2011; Boone, 2014). This 
dissertation argues that when studying the role of state-recognised traditional 
governance structures at the local level, one needs to consider the internal cohesion of 
the traditional governance structures being accommodated.  
Specifically, chapter 3 explores how internally contested traditional authority 
structures can decrease the accountability and efficacy of the local administration – in 
particular when traditional governance structures are state-recognised. The incumbent 
traditional leaders that are contested have stronger incentives to act in a way that 
maximises their own private interests even if this means acting in an unaccountable 
way towards their communities. This weakens the quality of governance at the local 
level by fostering inter-elite alliance and elite capture of public goods. Simultaneously, 
the contested nature of traditional leadership induces mobilisation potential against the 
current local power holders, as the contesting authority candidates are incentivised to 
mobilise against each other. These processes increase local grievances and 
opportunities that give rise to outbursts of local unrest. Thus, while the theorised 
influence of institutionally accommodated traditional governance structures on 
intrastate peace is positive, at the local level this institutionalised hybridity can 
ultimately contribute to conflict-inducing processes.  
A third element considered in more detail in this dissertation is variation in the 
local strength of traditional authorities, understood as their efficiency and their 
legitimacy among their subjects. Even more directly than the two other conditions, this 
dimension reflects the concrete governance capacities and mobilisation potential of 
traditional governance on the ground. This thesis considers the strength of traditional 
authorities in all chapters. However, I place special emphasis on its variation in chapter 
4 when investigating the spatial variation in violence against civilians in armed 
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conflicts. The general importance of local strength of traditional authority can become 
accentuated during times of violent conflict, when the state’s capacities to provide 
order and maintain social cohesion are evermore undermined. Specifically, I argue that 
while the mobilisation potential and the concrete capacities of efficient and legitimate 
traditional authorities are generally beneficial for local communities during civil 
conflicts, they attract strategic civilian victimisation as a means to weaken local 
alternatives to armed groups’ control.  
 
1.5.Outline of the dissertation 
The three main chapters employ the theoretical premises set in this introduction and 
examine how traditional governance influences peace and conflict dynamics in sub-
Saharan Africa. Chapter 2 extends the literature on countries’ intrastate peace by 
bringing in the role of traditional governance in estimating the risk of conflict onset. 
Departing from the binary debate of positive versus negative implications of traditional 
governance, I argue that the effect on national peace is dependent on the type of 
institutionalised interaction between the state and traditional governance. Building on 
previous research on hybrid governance, I construct a typology of state-traditional 
governance interaction and build a theoretical framework on the expected implications 
of concordant and discordant interactions. A statistical analysis of sub-Saharan African 
countries supports my theoretical argument that concordant interaction in the form of 
integration of traditional authorities into the public administration fosters peace. 
Accommodation of traditional authorities can strengthen the concrete governance 
capacities and buy in the minimal support of traditional authorities. The results also 
highlight the significance of colonial legacies in influencing countries’ intrastate peace 
and the role of traditional governance structures. Aside its theoretical contribution, the 
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chapter contributes to empirical knowledge of hybrid governance structures more 
generally by introducing new data on state-traditional authority interaction in sub-
Saharan Africa.  
In chapter 3 I focus on South Africa, a country characterised by institutional 
hybridity (e.g. accommodation of traditional authorities). I zoom into the subnational 
level where, I argue, internal dynamics of a traditional authority structure should make 
a difference. Challenging the notion that competition over political power increases 
accountability, I suggest that internally contested traditional authority structures 
struggle with weakened accountability and credibility. This, again, leads to increased 
grievances and opportunities that give rise to protests against the local administration. 
I test the theoretical framework through a statistical analysis of South Africa’s 
municipalities, using new data on the contested versus uncontested nature of traditional 
authorities and local protest data. The results support the theoretical claims: 
municipalities with contested traditional authority structures have experienced higher 
protest rates. The theoretical mechanisms are further explored using qualitative data 
from semi-structured interview and focus group discussions in South Africa. The 
chapter contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the local political dynamics in 
contexts where traditional leaders yield public authority alongside the local state. The 
chapter also highlights the spatial variation in local authority structures, which have 
their roots in historical continuities and discontinuities of local forms of governance.  
Chapter 4 maintains the disaggregated focus but moves to examine governance 
dynamics during periods of armed conflicts. Contributing to and extending the 
literature on wartime governance institutions, this chapter examines the effects of 
customary institutional strength on civilian victimisation during intrastate conflicts. 
Thus far, the focus of the wartime governance literature has been on the emerging rebel 
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governance structures as a result of different types of local institutions. My interest is 
in the outcome of violence against civilians as a function of the strength of existing 
customary institutions, e.g. traditional authority structures. Specifically, I posit that the 
mobilisation potential and capacity to govern more effectively renders localities with 
strong customary institutions more threatening and harder to co-opt from the 
perspective of armed groups. This leads to increased use of one-sided violence in the 
area. I use the newly geocoded Afrobarometer survey data to capture the strength of 
traditional authorities and use multivariate statistical analyses to estimate the 
relationship between this measure and one-sided violence in a locality. The results 
indicate that non-state armed groups use one-sided violence in areas with relatively 
strong traditional authority structures. The chapter demonstrates the significance of 
civilian agency in shaping armed groups’ strategies during conflict. While making 
communities generally more cohesive and resilient, strong customary institutions can 
make a locality increasingly vulnerable to violent targeting by groups that wish to 
weaken their enemies.  
Finally, chapter 5 returns to the main theoretical discussions and the empirical 
findings of the dissertation. It identifies the contribution of the dissertation, discusses 
the main limitations in this research project, and suggests areas of future research. 
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2. Including chiefs, maintaining peace? Examining the 
effects of state–traditional governance interaction on 
civil peace in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
2.1.Abstract 
The continued influence of traditional governance in sub-Saharan Africa has sparked 
increasing attention among scholars exploring the role of non-state and quasi-state 
forms of governance in the modern state. However, little attention has been given to 
cross-country and over-time variation in the interaction between state and traditional 
governance structures, particularly in regard to its implications for intrastate peace. 
This chapter examines the conditions under which traditional governance contributes 
to state capacity to maintain peace. The chapter argues that the type of institutional 
interaction between the state and traditional authority structures influences a country’s 
overall governance dynamics and its capacity to maintain peace. By combining new 
data on state–traditional authorities’ interaction in sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 
2012 with intrastate armed conflict data, I conduct a systematic comparative analysis 
of whether concordant state–traditional authorities’ interaction strengthens peace. The 
empirical results support the argument that integrating traditional authorities into the 
public administration lowers the risk of armed conflict in comparison to when they 
remain unrecognised by the state. Moreover, the analysis suggests that the added value 
of this type of interaction is conditional on the colonial history of a country.10 
 
                                                          
10 A version of this chapter is published in the Journal of Peace Research, 2019, 56(2). 
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2.2.Introduction 
State capacity is found to be among the key components contributing to the 
maintenance or collapse of intrastate peace (Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 
2003; Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010). Existing research has 
focused on examining state governance capacities (e.g. economic, bureaucratic and 
administrative) as well as their formal political institutions and ability to coerce order 
(Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009; Hendrix, 2010; Hegre and Nygård, 2015). Yet besides the 
modern state structures, other actors and structures often influence a country’s 
governance realm. Traditional governance – defined as context-specifically 
constructed and identified authorities, rules, and institutions – continues to influence 
society amid other non-state and quasi-state governance forms; particularly in post-
colonial sub-Saharan Africa. In Malawi, local chiefs contributed to maintaining 
stability in the country’s transition from a one-party rule to multi-party political order 
(Eggen, 2011). In South Africa, while the recognition of traditional authorities has 
faced criticism from the perspective of democratisation (Mamdani, 1996; Ntsebeza, 
2005), it also played a role in restoring intrastate peace in the post-apartheid political 
order (Beall, Mkhize and Vawda, 2005; Beall and Ngonyama, 2009). Overall, in many 
regions there is a growing perception of political reality as a hybrid system of different 
forms of governance, rather than as an unchallenged prominence of the state.  
Despite the increased awareness of the role of traditional governance alongside 
the state, its impact on the maintenance of intrastate peace has so far received little 
systematic and comparative academic scrutiny.11 Therefore, this chapter investigates 
                                                          
11 Wig (2016)’s article is an exception, yet his focus is on the implications of different types of pre-
colonial governance structures. Eck (2014) finds that the coexistence of customary and formal legal 
systems makes countries more prone to conflict. However, her focus is on communal conflict and she 
does not consider the relationship between state and traditional authority systems. 
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traditional governance in sub-Saharan Africa by asking: under what conditions does 
traditional governance contribute to state capacity to maintain intrastate peace? 
Specifically, I argue that the type of institutional interaction between the state and 
traditional governance shapes the overall governance framework of a country and the 
odds for peace.  
Drawing upon research on the contemporary role of traditional governance 
(Oomen, 2005; Goodfellow and Lindemann, 2013; Baldwin, 2015), I test a theoretical 
framework proposing that a concordant interaction between the state and traditional 
governance reduces the risk of intrastate armed conflict. This is argued in relation to 
discordant types of interactions that are defined by lack of accommodation and clear 
recognition of traditional governance. Specifically, I advocate the relative advantage 
of institutional hybridity where traditional authorities are incorporated into the public 
administration. This theory is tested on new data that cover sub-Saharan African 
countries between 1989 and 2012. The empirical results provide support for the 
hypotheses. They also highlight the variation in the effects of concordant interaction 
subcategories and the conditioning influence of colonial legacies in particular.  
This chapter contributes to the literatures on intrastate peace, mixed governance 
and traditional governance. Recent research on traditional governance has shed light 
on its resilience but lacked in comparative approaches to examine the effects of mixed 
governance on particular outcomes. In response, this study draws inferences from 
systematic, cross-country and over-time observations investigating one specific 
outcome. By doing so, the chapter offers a novel perspective to the study of intrastate 
peace. Moving the focus beyond pure state capacity, the chapter introduces a typology 
on state–traditional governance interaction and investigates the role of non-state actors 
(specifically traditional authorities) in shaping a country’s civil peace. 
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2.3.State governance capacity and peace 
The potential influence of traditional governance in a state’s capacity to maintain peace 
has attracted little systematic attention. Most studies have focused on the central state 
and its political, economic, and security capacities to maintain peace (Hegre et al., 
2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010; Hendrix, 2010). This 
state-centric approach has linked well-governed, bureaucratically and economically 
efficient states with a lower risk of armed conflicts.12 Similarly, past research has 
identified unconsolidated and unstable political regimes (Gates et al., 2006; Gleditsch 
and Ruggeri, 2010), past armed conflicts (Thies, 2010), reliance on primary 
commodities (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Humphreys, 2005), and unequal access to 
state power (Cederman and Girardin, 2007; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 
2011) as factors that challenge a country’s stability. Even with the emphasis on good 
governance (i.e. bureaucratic and administrative quality and the state’s capacity to 
implement policies that benefit the larger society), the scholarly focus has been 
constrained to the state apparatus (Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 
2010; Hendrix, 2010; Thies, 2010; Hegre and Nygård, 2015).  
However, recent literature on governance emphasises the presence of multiple 
forms of governance that co-exist with the state without constituting the modern state 
itself (Levi-Faur, 2012). The lack of scrutiny on the role of these (e.g. traditional 
governance) in shaping intrastate peace is problematic in contexts such as sub-Saharan 
Africa, where the formal state capacity is often relatively low and other forms of 
organisation have remained resilient alongside the state (Englebert, 2000; Herbst, 
                                                          
12 The relationship between military strength and conflict onset is more dubious: Large military spending 
correlates with corruption and lower state capacity (Henderson and Singer, 2000; Gupta, de Mello and 
Sharan, 2001) and bureaucratic and political institutions are found to better proxy capacity to coerce 
order (Sepp, 2006). 
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2000). Despite the challenges related to state capacity, many of these countries with 
‘limited statehood’ also remain peaceful.13  The state capacity and conflict onset 
literature explains convincingly why bureaucratically strong and democratically 
governed states should remain peaceful. Yet, the challenge is to explain why many 
states with limited economic and political institutions also maintain their civil peace.  
Nevertheless, one should not equate the continued salience of traditional 
governance solely with the notion of weak states. Evidence from different parts of 
developing countries suggest that traditional governance remains resilient across 
contexts (Englebert, 2002b; Oomen, 2005; Eggen, 2011; Baldwin, 2015; Klick, 2016). 
Generally governance is performed by a hybridity of state and non-state actors whose 
relationships vary from competition to collaboration and integration (Boege, Brown 
and Clements, 2009; Levi-Faur, 2012).14 While the impact of state strength on intrastate 
peace is not questioned here, the chapter expands the focus to the interaction between 
the state and traditional governance and contributes to a broader understanding of a 
country’s capacity to maintain intrastate peace. 
 
2.4.Traditional governance in sub-Saharan Africa 
Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey (2016, p. 2) define traditional governance as ‘a form of 
governance understood and validated through narratives or procedures deemed 
“traditional” by constituents’. Accordingly, while traditional forms of governance have 
roots in the pre-colonial period, the concept does not rely on an untransformed or linear 
                                                          
13 Risse (2012) conceptualises limited statehood as reduced state capacity to provide governance across 
the sovereign territory. A majority of nation-states are limited in terms of their capacities and hybrid 
with regard to the impact of non-state structures. 
14 In this light governance is understood as ‘social coordination to produce and implement collectively 
binding rules, or to provide collective goods’ (Risse, 2012, p. 700). 
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historical evolution of governance. Instead it focuses on people’s perceptions of certain 
rules, institutions, and authorities as traditional (Ubink, 2008). The concept refers to a 
wide variety of public authority figures (e.g. chiefs, kings and headmen) and 
procedures and institutions (e.g. conflict resolution mechanisms and land management 
practices). This chapter restricts its empirical focus to the role of traditional authorities. 
Traditional governance remains relevant in the majority of contemporary nation-
states.15 Yet in sub-Saharan Africa the colonial and post-colonial periods have shaped 
societies in ways that make the study of state–traditional governance interaction 
particularly urgent. The colonial period both marginalised and re-authorised traditional 
institutions, triggering tensions between the different governance systems while also 
assigning powers to traditional authorities (Mamdani, 1996). Traditional governance 
continues to play a de facto role across sub-Saharan Africa today (Englebert, 2002b; 
Baldwin, 2015). Chiefs, kings, and headmen yield significant influence; particularly in 
rural areas and on issues regarding the allocation of land, resolving local conflicts, 
running customary courts, enforcing contracts, and maintaining cultural values and 
practices (Herbst, 2000; ECA, 2007; Baldwin, 2015). Crucially, what varies is how the 
state interacts with traditional governance and defines its institutional role (Ubink, 
2008; Muriaas, 2011). For example, in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire traditional authority 
structures largely exist in parallel to the state without clear recognition or 
accommodation by the state. However, in countries such as Malawi, Ghana, and 
Mozambique, chiefs have constitutionally recognised roles within the state-steered 
governance system.16 
                                                          
15 Citing JuriGlobe (2016), Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey (2016) note that 57% of the world’s population 
live in countries where customary law coexists with other types of legal systems. 
16 See the research design and Appendix A2.14 for clarification of the empirical data. 
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There is considerable scholarly debate surrounding the sources and implications 
of the resilience of traditional governance. Proposed explanations on the former range 
from the continuation of colonial indirect rule (Mamdani, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2005) and 
state weakness (Herbst, 2000; Koelble and Siddle, 2013) to democratisation (Baldwin, 
2015), decentralisation (Koelble and Li Puma, 2011) and the recognition of group 
rights (Oomen, 2005). While Logan (2009, 2013) and Williams (2010) emphasise the 
continued trust towards traditional governance, Mamdani (1996) and Ntsebeza (2005) 
contend that, similar to the colonial period, traditional governance structures are used 
to spread undemocratic state control. Oomen (2005) posits that both its continued 
practical relevance and political incentives have influenced the resilience of traditional 
governance. 
The research field is equally divided over the societal implications of maintaining 
a role for traditional governance alongside the state. For some, the recognition of 
traditional governance structures contributes to jeopardising democratic accountability 
at the local level (Mamdani, 1996; Lund, 2003). Scholars emphasise the threat of 
unaccountable chiefs that abuse their authority at the expense of the constituents 
(Ntsebeza, 2005; Buur and Kyed, 2007b). The seminal work of Boone (2014) suggests 
that traditional authorities’ rule can contribute to decentralising political tensions and 
inducing local-level grievances.  
Others align with Sklar (1994) who maintains that cooperative, mixed 
governance between state and traditional governance structures can contribute to 
stability. Baldwin (2015, p. 5) suggests that self-interested traditional authorities can 
act as intermediaries between the state and its constituents in their capacity to ‘organise 
responses to rural problems that elected politicians and state institutions lack in weak 
states’. Comparing the implications of coordination versus competition between state 
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and traditional governance structures, Pula (2015) and Klick (2016) suggest that 
cooperation is beneficial for development and peace.  
The majority of past research stresses the empirical relevance of traditional 
governance while acknowledging the challenge of its democratic accountability 
(Osaghae, 2000; Herbst, 2000; Menkhaus, 2000). The relevance of traditional 
governance can make its neglect backfire on the state itself (Pula, 2015). Notably, 
Englebert (2000) and Wig (2016) show that the type of traditional governance structure 
can influence its relevance and strength. Englebert (2000) finds that consolidating state 
power has been a challenge for countries with more heterogeneous and centralised 
traditional authority structures. Wig (2016)’s results suggest that centralised pre-
colonial institutions give groups better capacity to negotiate with the state.  
Existing literature recognises the continuing influence of traditional governance 
in sub-Saharan Africa but differs in its implications. I suggest that this can be partially 
explained by the differences in the outcome variable (democratic ideals or intrastate 
peace) and limited scrutiny towards the variation in the institutional conditions under 
which traditional governance operates vis-à-vis the state. Disentangling the 
implications of the different types of state–traditional governance interactions for 
intrastate peace can help to understand the competing findings in previous literature.  
 
2.5.Theory: state–traditional governance interaction and intrastate peace 
Building on the assumption that traditional governance matters de facto in the countries 
of interest, I argue that the type of state approach vis-à-vis traditional governance 
influences the risk of intrastate conflict onset. The argument rests on a notion that even 
in the context of limited statehood the state has a profound influence on other forms of 
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governance. The state’s institutional design influences the manner in which traditional 
institutions can operate (i.e. entrench customs), justify authority, and provide order. 
Simultaneously, the relevance of traditional governance means that the state’s approach 
to traditional governance structures influences its own capacities to govern and 
maintain peace.  
The theory views a country’s formal institutional design as an important element 
in defining state–traditional governance interaction. The act of allocating roles and 
functions to certain actors in the institutional design is regarded as a process of 
‘recognition and enforcement [that] strengthen the institutions that play these roles’ 
(Claassens, 2011, p. 178). While this does not imply that the institutional design would 
run uninterrupted from the constitution to the grassroots of governance,  it nevertheless 
shapes the public space in which different actors and institutions make claims for power 
and participation (see Horowitz, 2002). 
Post-apartheid South Africa is a case in point. When analysing the 
democratisation process, scholars have noted that the institutional status of traditional 
authorities has had tangible consequences on the stability of the governance realm 
(Beall, Mkhize and Vawda, 2005; Oomen, 2005; Koelble and Siddle, 2013). Negative 
consequences (e.g. interruptions of local elections) have occurred at times when the 
status of traditional authorities has been unclear (Oomen, 2005, pp. 51–59). In reverse, 
the recognition and incorporation of traditional authorities into the state administration 
has contributed to gaining minimal support of traditional authorities for the post-
apartheid state and restoring peace in volatile regions (e.g. Kwazulu-Natal) (Beall and 
Ngonyama, 2009). 
Mozambique’s pre-civil war period represents a different type of institutional 
design. The Frelimo-led government that came to power in 1975 formally abolished 
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the institution of traditional authority (Seibert, 2003, p. 276). The alienation of 
traditional authorities is suggested to have contributed to the emergence of the rebel 
movement Renamo as some of the alienated chiefs turned to support it (Ntsebeza, 2005, 
p. 273). Post-war Mozambique has instead re-integrated traditional authorities into the 
state-recognised governance realm. 
Post-apartheid South Africa and pre-war Mozambique represent different types 
of state–traditional governance interactions. The interaction in the former is 
characterised by recognition and integration, whereas the latter represents a system of 
exclusion. Adapting Goodfellow and Lindemann (2013)’s conceptual framework, the 
two examples can be categorised into concordant and discordant interactions. Figure 
2.1 displays four types of state-induced interactions that are expected to shape a 
country’s intrastate peace differently: Exclusion and symbolic recognition under 
discordant interaction and institutional multiplicity and institutional hybridity under 
concordant interaction. 
 
Figure 2.1. State–traditional governance interaction types 
 
State–traditional 
governance 
interaction types
Concordant
Institutional 
hybridity
Institutional 
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Symbolic 
recognition
Exclusion
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Four types of state–traditional governance interactions 
Concordant interaction refers to institutional designs in which traditional governance 
is either synthesised into the state-steered system or its authority is recognised and 
demarcated as a parallel structure in certain functional areas. The core of concordant 
interaction is that the relationship is cooperative and demarcated (Goodfellow and 
Lindemann, 2013), whereas discordant interaction is defined as interactions without 
integration or state recognition regarding the functions of traditional governance. 
Under concordant interaction, institutional hybridity refers to the incorporation 
of traditional governance into the state realm by integrating traditional authorities into 
the local and/or national public administration (e.g. by allocating seats in local councils 
or permitting representation in the national administration). Besides South Africa, 
examples of countries that have been characterised by institutional hybridity include 
Angola, Botswana, and Cameroon. Institutional multiplicity refers to the recognition of 
traditional governance as a separate governance realm with legitimacy in certain areas 
of governance (Goodfellow and Lindemann, 2013, pp. 6–8). Namibia, Uganda, and 
Burkina Faso are examples of institutional multiplicity. Under discordant interaction, 
exclusion of traditional governance refers to a situation such as Mozambique during 
the 1970s with a total absence of recognition for traditional governance.17 Symbolic 
recognition refers to the recognition of the presence of traditional forms of governance 
without defining their relationship to the state (e.g. Burundi and Sudan).  
The drawback of discordant interaction is that it fails to deal with parallel and 
competitive claims over authority (Goodfellow and Lindemann, 2013). Discordant 
                                                          
17 Exclusion refers to situations where traditional authorities are either formally abolished or where there 
is no reference to them in the institutional design. While the former is arguably a more hostile approach, 
the latter also excludes traditional governance effectively from the recognised governance realm. 
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interaction does little to guarantee coordination between different realms of 
governance. The influence of traditional authorities is left outside the state-recognised 
realm. As a consequence, discordant interactions can increase the risk of conflict 
through two mechanisms. First, the lack of coordination with traditional governance 
implies a failure to take advantage of the intermediary role of traditional authorities in 
the provision of public goods and services (see Baldwin, 2015). This makes the country 
more vulnerable to grievances caused by ineffective governance. Second, leaving 
traditional governance outside the state realm leaves the country more vulnerable to 
tensions between the two competing forms of governance (see Englebert, 2000). This 
can encourage traditional authorities to turn against the state (e.g. Mozambique).  
Concordant interaction alleviates both of these problems. First, as implied by 
previous studies (Eggen, 2011; Baldwin, 2015; Klick, 2016) coordinating with 
traditional governance can add to a state’s concrete governance capacities and enhance 
its efficacy in providing public goods and services. This decreases grievances and 
motivations to mobilise against the state. Second, concordant interaction can reduce 
the risk of conflict by decreasing the opportunities for traditional authorities to compete 
with the state or potentially even support a rebellion against it. This proposition 
underlines the power-seeking nature of traditional authorities that become less 
threatening towards the state when recognised by it rather than left unchecked 
(Mamdani, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2005). Concordant interaction is argued to stimulate a 
system that can ‘increase the intervention capacity of the state by bringing non-state 
actors into the making and implementation of public policy, thus making the latter more 
efficient and less fallible’ (Offe, 2009, p. 555). A first hypothesis follows:  
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H1: Concordant state–traditional governance interaction leads to lower risk of 
intrastate armed conflicts than discordant state–traditional governance interaction. 
 
Furthermore, institutional hybridity can be theoretically expected to better 
guarantee the added value of recognising traditional governance.18 Institutional 
multiplicity has equal theoretical potential to add to a country’s governance capacities 
by institutionalising coordination between the two parallel governance structures. Yet 
it leaves more room for competition and confrontation between the state and traditional 
authorities (as traditional authorities remain outside the state realm). Institutional 
hybridity binds traditional authorities more closely to the state and gives them stakes 
in the maintenance of state stability. Thus, an addendum to the first hypothesis concerns 
the two concordant interaction types in relation to the discordant relationships: 
 
H2: Institutional hybridity decreases the likelihood of conflict onset more than 
institutional multiplicity relative to the discordant interaction types.  
 
2.6.Research design 
Dependent variable 
In order to measure the continuance or collapse of intrastate peace I turn to the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version 4-2015 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Petterson 
and Wallensteen, 2015). The dataset covers all onsets of intrastate armed conflicts, 
defined as armed conflicts that take place between a government and at least one armed 
                                                          
18 The two discordant interaction types are not expected to differ in terms of their influence in conflict 
likelihood for the reasons outlined in the theoretical discussion.  
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group and result in a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year 
(Petterson and Wallensteen, 2015).19 The dichotomous variable receives the value 1 if 
there is an onset of intrastate armed conflict during a specific year and 0 otherwise. As 
the focus is on a country’s overall capacity to maintain peace (and avoid conflict 
onsets), the ongoing conflict years after the onset are dropped from the models. A new 
conflict outbreak is coded if the same conflict has fallen below the threshold of 25 
battle-related deaths for the period of two years before a new onset. There are 53 
conflict outbreaks in the data used in the main analyses.20 
 
Independent variable 
Regarding the state–traditional governance interaction types, new cross-sectional time-
series data have been compiled that code the formal constitutional role of traditional 
authority in 44 sub-Saharan African countries in the period of 1989–2012.21 Traditional 
authorities are the general focal points of traditional governance (Ubink, 2008; Logan, 
2013; Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2016). As a tangible institution, traditional 
authority can be similarly identified across the studied region even when different 
countries and communities use different names and have different types of authorities. 
As discussed in the theoretical section, the formal institutional design is argued to set 
the basis upon which traditional authorities build their claims regarding their role vis-
à-vis the state. The constitutional and legal status of traditional authorities is assumed 
                                                          
19 For a more detailed description of the dataset, see the UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence 
Dataset codebook (2017).   
20 These 53 conflict onsets are out of the 835 country-years after the on-going conflict years have been 
dropped out. 
21 See Appendix A2.14 for clarification on the coding for the independent variable. I have excluded the 
small island states that have less than 1 million inhabitants and do not have traditional governance 
structures present.  
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to have similar systematic implications on the relationship across the country even 
when local realities would influence the concrete roles of individual authorities. 
The data for the independent variable have been systematically collected and 
coded through reviewing the constitutions and other relevant legal instruments that 
were in place and/or became adopted during the time period in the countries under 
analysis. Other relevant legal instruments refer to local government acts and chieftaincy 
acts that specify the principles of the constitution. Secondary sources such as the Food 
and Agriculture Organization’s database on gender and land rights and case specific 
studies have been triangulated for background knowledge and case-specific 
understanding.22 The coding is based on calendar years, meaning that a constitution 
adopted in December 1996 is coded as having taken place in 1996. In order to take into 
account the time lag between changing the institutional design and its effects on the 
governance framework the independent variable is lagged one year. 
The coding process proceeds in two stages. First, a binary variable of concordant 
interaction takes the value 1 if there is a constitutionally explicit recognition of 
traditional authorities as a parallel structure of governance or part of the public 
administration, and 0 otherwise. The term constitutionally explicit refers to an 
emphasis on the constitution in a situation where a new constitution raises ambiguities 
in relation to older legal documents: If a new constitution lacks all explicit reference to 
the role of traditional authorities (or to the legal instruments guaranteeing their role) 
the interaction is coded as discordant even if it has been concordant in the past.23  
                                                          
22 See FAO (2016) http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/country-profiles/en/. 
23  For example, in Nigeria the constitution of 1989 recognises the institution of traditional authority as 
a parallel governance institution and calls for the establishment of traditional councils, outlining the 
functions of these councils. However, in the absence of any further clarifying legal instruments the 1999 
constitution is silent on the role of traditional authorities and Nigeria moves from concordant to 
discordant interaction. 
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Table 2.1. Definitions and number of observations of different state–traditional authority 
interactions 
Discordant 
vs. 
concordant 
Sub-category Definition of the type of interaction N= 
835* 
D
is
co
rd
an
t 
Exclusion 
No constitutionally explicit formal recognition of 
traditional authorities 
402 
Symbolic recognition 
Constitutionally explicit recognition of the 
institution of traditional authorities. No definition of 
the functions or role within public administration 
present.  
84 
C
o
n
co
rd
an
t 
Institutional 
multiplicity 
 
Constitutionally explicit recognition of traditional 
authorities as responsible for certain governance 
functions, separate from the public administration 
organs 
42 
Institutional hybridity 
 
Constitutionally explicit recognition of traditional 
authorities, including role/representation in the 
public administration 
307 
*The number of observations is the number of country-years after the on-going conflict years have 
been dropped from the data. 
 
Second, in order to grasp the specific subcategories within concordant and 
discordant interactions, all country-year observations have been coded according to the 
four groups of exclusion, symbolic recognition, institutional multiplicity, and 
institutional hybridity. Following the theoretical framework, the subcategories 
constitute a series of mutually exclusive binary variables taking the value 1 according 
to the definitions in Table 2.1. The difference between the two concordant categories 
derives from the presence versus absence of integration into the public administration. 
Therefore, a case of institutional hybridity can include traits of institutional multiplicity 
(but not vice versa). For example, in South Africa traditional authorities have both their 
own formally recognised bodies as well as allocated roles to participate in the public 
administration. Post-Apartheid South Africa is coded as institutional hybridity. In 
Uganda prior to 2005, the institution of chieftaincy was recognised, and chiefs were 
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treated as cultural leaders with functions defined outside the state administration, 
making this a case of institutional multiplicity.24 Figures 2.2-2.3 illustrate the 
categorisation of the examined countries into the specific state–traditional authority 
categories in three time points. 
 
 
  
Figure 2.2. State–traditional authority interaction in sub-Saharan Africa, 1991 (left) and 2001 
(right) 
                                                          
24 In the 2005 constitution, traditional leaders are made titular heads of the regional governments, and 
the coding changes from institutional multiplicity to institutional hybridity.  
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Figure 2.3. State–traditional authority interaction in sub-Saharan Africa, 2011 
 
Control variables 
I control for a number of covariates that can influence the likelihood of intrastate 
conflict outbreak and can be argued to influence the conditions under which specific 
state–traditional governance interaction takes place.25  
First, the legacies of different colonial powers with their distinct approaches to 
the pre-colonial (e.g. traditional) governance hierarchies can intervene in the 
relationship between state–traditional governance interaction and intrastate peace. 
Research suggests that the British indirect rule left traditional authority structures and 
                                                          
25 Some of the control variables can be regarded as post-treatment controls (i.e. GDP per capita, polity 
score, ethnic exclusion) as these are mostly measured after a change in the state–TA interaction. 
Including post-treatment control can induce estimator bias and Appendix A2.13 reports model 
specifications that exclude these variables. However, since the same variables can also influence the 
independent variable in a later time period, they are included in the main models to avoid omitted 
variable bias.  
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existing governance structures more resilient than elsewhere in colonial Africa (Ubink, 
2008; Englebert, 2002). In the indirect rule traditional authorities were relied upon in 
maintaining order and implementing colonial policies. This differed from, for example, 
the more direct French rule, which paid less attention to the correspondence between 
the colonial administrative boundaries and the boundaries of the pre-colonial 
communities (Ubink, 2008). Consequently, traditional authority structures in the 
former British colonies may have remained more intact and accustomed to 
collaborating with state actors than elsewhere in colonial Africa. In order to control for 
the colonial legacies, I include a binary variable that captures whether a country is a 
former British colony. The additional analysis further examines the conditioning 
influence of colonial legacies. 
Moreover, the regime type can influence the effect of concordant state–
traditional governance interaction for intrastate peace, while also affecting the 
likelihood of intrastate conflict. The hypothesised added value of traditional authorities 
builds upon their concrete governance capacities and support to the state that 
complement the states’ own governance capacities. However, there might be less of a 
need to utilise these capacities of traditional governance structures in more 
consolidated democratic countries as these states are better able to govern the entire 
sovereign territory. Subsequently, the effect of concordant interaction might be 
conditional on the type of political institutions and the absence of consolidated 
democracy in particular.  
In order to control for the influence of political institutions, I use the Polity IV 
project’s polity2 score that ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly 
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democratic) (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2016).26 I include a squared polity2 score to 
capture the difference between consolidated and unconsolidated regimes in 
consideration of the risks facing unconsolidated regimes that lack both the capacity to 
enforce order and the capacity to appease potential challengers (Hegre et al., 2001; 
Fearon and Laitin, 2003). In the additional analysis I use a binary measure of 
democratic regimes in order to examine whether the influence of the independent 
variable changes in this regime type. I also use the polity index to construct a decay 
function of time since a major institutional change to grasp the influence of past 
political instability (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006, p. 521).27 
I include a log of per capita gross domestic product which is taken from the 
expanded trade and GDP data by Gleditsch (2002b). Per capita GDP is systematically 
reported across countries and its negative correlation with conflict onset is found fairly 
robust in large-N studies.28 As with stable political institutions, per capita GDP can be 
argued to influence the context in which the state formulates its approach towards 
traditional authorities. In order to control for the potentially destabilising effects of state 
dependence on primary commodities (see Humphreys, 2005), I use a dichotomous 
variable that receives the value 1 if more than one-third of a country’s export earnings 
come from oil, and 0 otherwise.  
Furthermore, I control for the (log) population size. Previous research has found 
more populous countries to be at higher risk of armed conflict (Hegre and Sambanis, 
2006; Bruckner, 2010). Populous countries might also rely more on the presence of 
                                                          
26 See Appendix A2.1 for the descriptive statistics of the control variables. All time-variant control 
variables are lagged one year in the analyses. 
27 A major institutional change is defined as a three-point change in the polity index between two years. 
The decay function is formulated as follows: 2^(-durable/0.5). 
28 However, while GDP per capita is strongly correlated with many other measures of economic and 
bureaucratic capacity, its causal link to peace remains contested (Hendrix, 2010). 
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traditional authorities in the rural areas. I also include a measure of the share of people 
belonging to ethnic groups excluded from power. Inter-ethnic tensions over political 
power increase the risk of conflicts (Cederman and Girardin, 2007) and they can 
influence the way the state interacts with traditional authorities. The variable comes 
from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) country-year data (Cederman, Wimmer and 
Min, 2010). For similar reasons and following Fearon and Laitin (2003) I include a 
measure of ethnic fractionalisation as well as its squared term. I also control for the log 
share of mountainous terrain of a country since rough terrain is argued to be conflict 
prone as it offers potential rebels cover (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). 
With regard to the capacities of traditional governance structures, I follow Wig 
(2016) and control for the level of centralisation of the pre-colonial governance 
structures. The variable receives the value 1 if the average pre-colonial centralisation 
score, which ranges from 0 (stateless society) to 4 (centralised society), for the ethnic 
groups in a country is above the overall mean, and 0 otherwise.29  
Finally, following Carter and Signorino (2010) I control for a country’s conflict 
history by including the duration and polynomials of years since the last conflict onset. 
Moreover, considering the findings on conflict diffusion (Gleditsch, 2002a) I include a 
measure of conflict incidents in the neighbouring countries. I also control for the time 
since independence.  
 
 
 
                                                          
29 I also consider the informal strength of traditional authorities as a robustness check. See the results 
section and Appendix A2.12.  
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2.7.Results 
 
Table 2.2. Discordant versus concordant state–traditional authority interactions and conflict 
onsets in sub-Saharan Africa in 1989–2012 
Interaction type No onset Conflict onset Total 
Discordant 441 45 486 
Concordant 341 8 349 
Total 782 53 835 
The number of observations here is the number of country-years after the on-going 
conflict years have been dropped from the data. Chi-square test p-value < 0.001.. 
 
 
Table 2.2 presents a simple tabular relationship of intrastate conflict onset and 
discordant versus concordant state–traditional authorities (hereafter state–TA) 
interactions. Approximately 9.2% of the discordant interaction years have escalated 
into armed conflict. Only 2.3% of the concordant interaction observations have 
experienced conflict onset. This variance is different from null at the 99% confidence 
level. Disaggregating the independent variable into the four subcategories reveals a 
more nuanced picture: 8.5% of the exclusion observations have escalated into conflict 
compared to only 2.0% of the institutional hybridity observations. On the other hand, 
4.8% of the institutional multiplicity cases and 13% of the symbolic recognition years 
have experienced conflict outbreak. First, this suggests that conflict onsets are rare in 
every interaction type. Second, while there is a negative correlation between 
concordant interaction and conflict onset, examining the subcategories suggests 
interesting variation among the concordant and discordant groups.  
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Table 2.3. Logit-regressions of intrastate conflict onset in sub-Saharan Africa, 1989–2012 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Concordant interaction -1.296* -1.192*   
 (0.538) (0.502)   
Institutional hybridity   -1.379* -1.145* 
   (0.687) (0.552) 
Institutional multiplicity   -0.498 -1.190 
   (0.796) (1.010) 
Symbolic recognition   0.360 0.0976 
   (0.554) (0.537) 
Polity2 score, t-1  0.0221  0.0213 
  (0.0353)  (0.0341) 
Polity2 squared, t-1  0.00705  0.00689 
  (0.00801)  (0.00805) 
Regime past instability  1.077*  1.075* 
  (0.494)  (0.495) 
(log) GDP/capita, t-1  -0.231  -0.223 
  (0.270)  (0.282) 
Oil  1.011*  0.998* 
  (0.490)  (0.500) 
(log) Population, t-1  0.297†  0.304† 
  (0.153)  (0.161) 
Ethnic exclusion  -0.0440  -0.0483 
  (0.610)  (0.596) 
Ethnic fractionalisation  7.252†  7.308† 
  (4.408)  (4.330) 
Ethnic fractionalisation, sq.  -7.034†  -7.110† 
  (4.218)  (4.117) 
(log) Mountainous  0.349†  0.341† 
  (0.195)  (0.194) 
Neighbour conflict incidents  1.442**  1.460** 
  (0.485)  (0.467) 
Time since independence  0.00681  0.00645 
  (0.00435)  (0.00460) 
British colony  -1.225*  -1.214* 
  (0.577)  (0.558) 
Pre-colonial centralisation  0.649†  0.632† 
  (0.356)  (0.371) 
Constant -1.336*** -6.939* -1.409*** -7.071* 
 (0.346) (2.974) (0.338) (3.087) 
AIC 374.0 349.4 376.2 353.4 
Log-pseudolikelihood -182.0 -155.7 -181.1 -155.7 
Wald chi2 30.86 (4) 50.84 (18) 31.20 (6) 52.46 (20) 
Pseudo-R2 0.0780 0.178 0.0826 0.178 
Countries 43 42 43 42 
Observations 835 795 835 795 
Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses; † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001; peace years, peace years2, peace years3 excluded from the table. 
 
Table 2.3 reports the main logit-regression models of intrastate conflict onset 
with the coefficients and clustered standard errors of the explanatory variables. Models 
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1 and 2 treat the key independent variable as a binary variable of concordant versus 
discordant interaction, while models 3 and 4 examine the effects of the different state–
TA interaction sub-categories with exclusion as the baseline category.  
Models 1 and 2 give cautious support for the first hypothesis. Concordant 
interaction is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of conflict onset, with its 
coefficient statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. In terms of the 
substantive effects, estimates based on the full Model 2 imply that concordant state–
TA interaction – ceteris paribus – decreases the likelihood of conflict onset from 11% 
to 4%, in relation to discordant interaction.30  
 However, when we move to the subcategory models, notable variation emerges. 
Supporting both hypotheses, the coefficient of institutional hybridity is negative and 
statistically significant.31  Based on the estimates of Model 4, institutional hybridity 
decreases the probability of onset by more than 60%, from 0.113 (11.3%) to 0.042 
(4.2%), holding everything else constant. However, contrary to the expectations 
Models 3 and 4 demonstrate that institutional multiplicity does not have a significant 
influence on conflict onset likelihood. A model specification that includes the two 
concordant interactions against a baseline of discordant interaction further 
demonstrates that institutional multiplicity is no different from discordant interaction 
in its relation to conflict onset likelihood. The different model specifications imply that 
the distinct effect of specific state–TA interactions derives from the conflict-reducing 
effect of institutional hybridity in relation to the discordant types.32  
                                                          
30 The predicted probabilities are estimated with the Clarify software program (King, Tomz and 
Wittenberg, 2000). 
31 Removing the variable decreases the explanatory power and fit of the model. See Appendix A2.2. 
32 See the model specifications in Appendix A2.3. 
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Figure 2.4. First difference estimates of main explanatory variables 
 
Figure 2.4 portrays the estimated effects of a number of key explanatory 
variables, holding other variables at their median values. The figure exemplifies the 
variation in the effects of the different state–TA interaction types. While institutional 
hybridity is significant and negative, both institutional multiplicity and symbolic 
recognition are insignificant. As expected, recognising traditional authorities 
symbolically without defining their role is found to have no effect in relation to the 
baseline of exclusion. Moreover, countries seem to gain the added value of traditional 
authorities only by incorporating them into the state administration rather than 
recognising their authority alongside the state administration (e.g. institutional 
multiplicity). While surprising in terms of the first hypothesis, this supports the 
theoretical consideration of institutional multiplicity’s vulnerability towards 
competition between the different governance realms.  The results corroborate 
Goodfellow and Lindemann’s (2013) account of the problems associated with 
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institutional multiplicity in the context of Uganda. There ambiguities concerning the 
frontiers of traditional authorities’ powers and their grievances against the state for not 
having access to public power have induced disputes and confrontation rather than 
better coordinated and cooperated governance (Goodfellow and Lindemann, 2013).  
With regard to the control variables, the only directly governance-related, 
statistically robust variable is the decay function measuring proximity to past regime 
instability. The results support earlier findings implying that proximity to a major 
institutional change increases the likelihood of conflict onset (Hegre and Sambanis, 
2006). The probability of conflict in the wake of a major change – ceteris paribus – is 
0.27 (27%), more than 15 percentage points higher than the median onset risk. In a 
country with institutional hybridity the estimated conflict risk decreases. Figure 2.5 
presents the conditional effects of institutional hybridity as proximity of regime 
instability grows. The closer the institutional change the larger the estimated effect of 
institutional hybridity. 
 
Figure 2.5. Conditional marginal effects of institutional hybridity 
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The case of institutional hybridity in Malawi and the country’s peaceful transition 
from one-party rule to multiparty democracy in the mid-1990s supports these findings. 
Chiefs whose recognition had already supported the stability of the one-party rule were 
instrumental in maintaining order during the transition as the dissolution of the old state 
structures and the malfunctioning of the new local government structures created a 
governance vacuum at the local level (Chiweza, 2007; Eggen, 2011). Interviewing 
Malawians on the country’s stability, Eggen (2011) found many to name traditional 
authorities as a primary reason behind the maintenance of peace. Institutional hybridity 
in Malawi portrays both of the mechanisms expected to strengthen intrastate peace. 
While it has helped the state to co-opt and gain the support of traditional authorities, 
chiefs seem to have also added to the country’s concrete governance capacities as the 
intermediaries between the state and the constituents in policy implementation 
(Chiweza, 2007). 
Concerning the other control variables, the results are mostly in line with earlier 
findings. Conflict incidents in neighbouring countries increase the risk of conflict 
outbreak. However, a country’s own conflict history (peace years) is not significant in 
the full model. Countries appear to be more vulnerable to instability in their 
surroundings than trapped in their own conflict history. Time since independence does 
not significantly influence the risk of conflict outbreak. 
There is evidence for a conflict-inducing effect of oil dependency. The risk of 
conflict increases from around 11% to 26% in oil dependent countries, keeping 
everything else constant. Also in line with earlier research, mountainous terrain and 
ethnic fractionalisation correlate positively with the risk of conflict outbreak, yet both 
of the measures are significant only at the 90% confidence level. Moreover, the latter 
shows a curvilinear effect on conflict onset implying a greater risk of conflict in 
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ethnically polarised societies. The coefficients of logs of per capita GDP and 
population size have theoretically anticipated signs; yet they do not have statistically 
significant explanatory power.  
Pre-colonial centralisation has a positive and weakly significant coefficient (p < 
0.1). This can reflect the capabilities of highly centralised (e.g. hierarchically 
structured) traditional authorities to confront the state or even mobilise against it (see 
Englebert, 2000), increasing the odds of (armed) challenges against the state. However, 
the low confidence in this finding renders it speculative at best. Moreover, while pre-
colonial centralisation has been used to capture the bargaining strength of traditional 
leaderships vis-à-vis the state (Wig, 2016), the informal aspect of traditional authority 
strength (e.g. the relevance of and trust towards traditional leaders within their 
communities) should also be considered.33 Accordingly, I compile a measure of 
informal strength of traditional authority using the Afrobarometer data (round 4). 
Similar to pre-colonial centralisation, traditional authorities’ informal strength has a 
positive and significant coefficient, which nevertheless becomes weaker when the 
state–TA interaction types are excluded from the model. While this might imply that 
states with strong traditional authorities that are not given public recognition are more 
conflict-prone, the lack of data on this variable for many conflict-ridden countries 
introduces systematic bias that renders the results ambiguous.34 
Finally, the coefficient for British colonies is negative and significant across the 
models. Former British colonies appear to have a lower risk of intrastate conflict than 
countries with other colonial histories. In light of this and the theoretical consideration 
on the potential interference of colonial histories in the relationship between the 
                                                          
33 Stronger authorities can be expected to have a greater overall influence in the governance realm. 
Informal strength can also influence the relationship between traditional authorities and the state actors. 
34 See Appendix A2.12 for the variable description and the model specifications. 
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independent variable and conflict onset likelihood, the chapter now turns to additional 
analyses that further test the theoretical propositions. 
 
2.8.Additional analyses and further discussion 
Table 2.4. Colonial history interaction terms and conflict onset 
 Model 5 Model 6 
Concordant TA interaction -0.945†  
 (0.516)  
Symbolic recognition (SR)  0.405 
  (0.611) 
Institutional multiplicity (IM)  -0.288 
  (0.843) 
Institutional hybridity (IH)  -1.019 
  (0.659) 
Former British colony -0.938 -0.682 
 (0.656) (0.762) 
Concordant TA * British colony -0.906  
 (1.062)  
SR*Former British colony  0 
  (.) 
IM*Former British colony  0 
  (.) 
IH*Former British colony  -0.490 
  (1.253) 
Pre-colonial centralisation 0.692† 0.594 
 (0.357) (0.399) 
Regime past instability 1.088* 1.096* 
 (0.489) (0.499) 
Oil 1.010* 1.189* 
 (0.511) (0.534) 
Ethnic fractionalisation 6.954 8.711† 
 (4.297) (4.669) 
Ethnic fractionalisation, sq. -6.812 -8.708† 
 (4.161) (4.657) 
(log) Mountainous 0.308 0.296 
 (0.204) (0.195) 
Neighbour conflict incidents 1.380** 1.501** 
 (0.475) (0.468) 
Constant -6.637* -6.506* 
 (3.013) (3.070) 
AIC 350.6 350.0 
Log pseudolikelihood -155.3 -153.0 
Wald Chi2 (df) 44.44 (19) 46.36 (21) 
Pseudo-R2 0.180 0.186 
Countries 42 42 
Observations 795 773 
Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses; † p < 0.10, * 
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; in an effort to save space the 
remaining control variables (also included in the model 4 are not 
shown in the table). 
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Table 2.4 presents two models interacting the different state–TA categories with the 
former British colony variable. Model 5, which interacts the colonial history variable 
with the concordant binary variable, shows a weakened negative effect for concordant 
state–TA relationships. The interaction term itself is not significant. However, Model 
6 changes the results considerably. Interacting the former British colony variable with 
institutional hybridity renders both variables insignificant in their coefficients, while 
the interaction term is negative but insignificant. Moreover, the interactions between 
institutional multiplicity and symbolic recognition with former British colonies are 
omitted as these have not experienced any conflict onsets. A pairwise comparison 
shows that while institutional hybridity correlates positively with former British 
colonies, there are relatively few observations of institutional multiplicity and symbolic 
recognition in former British colonies. This selection bias, while interesting with regard 
to the continuities between colonial and post-colonial periods, blurs the relationship 
between state–TA interaction and intrastate peace and calls for closer examination.  
Accordingly, I investigate subsets of former British colonies and other colonies.35 
A subset of former British colonies indicates a conflict-decreasing effect of institutional 
hybridity. Thus, while former British colonies seem to present a preferable context for 
institutional hybridity to evolve in the first place, this has a decreasing effect on conflict 
onset when it does take place. Excluding traditional authorities has a significant 
conflict-inducing effect in former British colonies. However, as anticipated the 
robustness of the effect of institutional hybridity diminishes in countries with other than 
British colonial history.36 Examples such as Niger, a former French colony with a 
                                                          
35 See Appendix A2.5 for the model specifications. 
36 With the control variables included, institutional hybridity’s coefficient is negative at the 90% 
confidence level. Model specification with concordant interaction binary variable estimates a negative 
and significant (p<0.05) coefficient. 
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history of both conflict and institutional hybridity, exemplify this ambiguity in the 
relationship between recognition of traditional authorities and civil peace. In Niger, the 
institutional recognition of traditional authorities (from symbolic to institutional 
hybridity) introduced considerable discontinuity from the French’ colonial rule that had 
stripped traditional leaders of their authority and later explicitly politicised them 
(Miles, 1993). This considerable discontinuity in the institutional role of traditional 
governance structures in many countries outside Anglophone Africa may have altered 
the necessity and potential of institutional hybridity in the post-colonial era. 
Besides the colonial context, we have considered democratic regimes as potential 
interveners in the relationship between state–TA interactions and intrastate peace. 
Concordant interaction’s effect may differ in consolidated democracies and the 
recognition of traditional authorities can be part of a democratisation process. In order 
to better control for the relationship between concordant interactions and democratic 
regimes, I interact the state–TA interactions with a binary measure of democratic 
regime type.37 Crucially, the pacifying effect of institutional hybridity grows stronger 
in this model specification, while the interaction term does not have a significant effect 
on conflict onset. Institutional hybridity appears to have a significant conflict-reducing 
effect in non-democratic states. Yet validating the theoretical concerns, its effect seizes 
to be separable from the null hypothesis in democratic regimes. Figure 2.6 illustrates 
this. 
                                                          
37 See Appendix A2.6 for the model specification. 
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Figure 2.6. Marginal effect of institutional hybridity in non- democratic versus democratic 
regime types 
 
Finally, I test the strength of the results with further robustness checks.38 First, in 
order to examine the possibility that the effect of institutional hybridity is explained by 
a generally more inclusive society, the state–TA interaction types have been interacted 
with the ethnic exclusion variable. Institutional hybridity remains significant and 
negative in this model specification. Notably, the interaction terms of institutional 
multiplicity and symbolic recognition with ethnic exclusion are positive and 
significant. Recognising traditional authorities symbolically or defining their role 
outside the state administration might be an (often unsuccessful) effort to accommodate 
the elites of politically discriminated groups in states with higher levels of ethnic 
exclusion.  Considering the relatively low share of ethnic exclusion in institutional 
hybrids, I have also excluded all observations with a value higher than the 75th 
                                                          
38 Model specifications available in Appendix A2.7-11. 
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percentile in ethnic exclusion.  Institutional hybridity remains negatively correlated 
with conflict onset (p-value < 0.01). 
In order to scrutinise potential biases brought by outlier cases I have dropped 
every country in the data one by one from the analysis and the results remain fairly 
robust. The results remain unaltered when using a skewed-y logit model and when 
relaxing the operationalisation of conflict onset to include all onsets after one year of 
ceased conflict. A measure of the heterogeneity of the pre-colonial communities has 
also been added to the models without significant changes to the interpretation of the 
main results.  
 
2.9.Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the role of traditional governance in maintaining intrastate 
peace alongside, within, or parallel to the state in sub-Saharan Africa. The results 
indicate that recognising and incorporating traditional authorities into the public 
administration can be beneficial for peace, particularly in the midst of politically 
unconsolidated periods. I find support for the claim that institutional hybridity 
decreases the likelihood of intrastate conflict onset. However, this pacifying effect is 
not seen with the second concordant interaction, institutional multiplicity. Recognising 
the legitimacy of traditional governance structures as parallel institutions does not bring 
about additional value from that of disregarding them.  
The results contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of a country’s 
governance capacities and intrastate peace. Deploying the capacities of traditional 
governance structures can strengthen the state’s capacity to prevent violent conflict, 
particularly when traditional authorities are given incentives to support the state. The 
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empirical findings also suggest that colonial legacies influence the context in which 
different types of state–TA interactions emerge and operate. This highlights the 
importance of understanding the continuities between colonial and post-colonial 
governance institutions. Institutional hybridity is more frequent in former British 
colonies and its decreasing effect on conflict onset is only robust in Anglophone Africa. 
To what extent this variation is explained by the relative strength of traditional 
governance structures in former British colonies and their relative weakness and 
corruption in other environments should be examined.  
Furthermore, research should examine the over-time development of the benefits 
of institutional hybridity. The findings suggest that giving traditional authorities a say 
in public administration pacifies non-democracies. Yet the added value becomes 
unclear with democratic countries. How the benefits and risks of institutional hybridity 
and other concordant and discordant interactions evolve when a state becomes more 
consolidated is a crucial question in democratising countries where traditional 
authorities continue to claim their right to govern.   
The results in this chapter suggest that governments interested in preventing 
armed conflict may want to consider incorporating traditional governance more 
explicitly to the state. However, as the next chapter demonstrates, the accommodation 
of traditional governance structures does not automatically transfer to peaceful state-
society relations at a local level. Furthermore, this chapter has pointed to the potential 
influence of grassroots level strength of traditional authorities. Chapter 4 returns to this 
topic and examines how customary institutional strength influences civilian 
victimisation in armed conflicts. 
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2.10. Appendices 
A2.1 Descriptive statistics of the control variables 
 
 
* Wig (2016) constructs this variable for Sub-Saharan African ethnic groups using the 
Ethnographic Atlas (Gray, 1999) and the EPR data. The variable ranges from 0 
(stateless society) to 4 (centralised society). In order to grasp the average level of pre-
colonial centralisation in a country, I have calculated the mean score of pre-colonial 
centralisation for all ethnic groups in a given country. A dichotomous variable, “pre-
colonial centralisation”, receives the value 1 if the average pre-colonial centralisation 
score for the ethnic groups in a country is above the mean value of the variable. Hence, 
pre-colonial centralisation = 1 if pre-colonial centralisation score for the country is 
>1.46657. 
 
 Min  Max Mean St.Dev. Source 
Polity IV score -10 +10 .453125 5.85897 Marshal et al. 2016 
Polity IV score, 
^2 
0 100 34.4916 26.368 Marshal et al. 2016 
Past political 
instability 
0 1 .167803 .350701 Marshal et al. 2016 
(log) GDP per 
capita 
4.8889948 9.5548091 7.24758 .899443 Gleditsch 2002 
Oil dependency 0 1 0.1034 0.3046742 Fearon and Laitin 2003 
(log) Population 6.2163666 11.947872 8.80004 1.24694 Gleditsch 2002 
Ethnic Exclusion 0 0.91500002 .133992 .221478 Cederman et al. 2010 
Ethnic 
fractionalis. 
.00126101 .85568929 .472278 .22373 Fearon and Laitin 2003 
Mountainous 0 4.421247 1.41377 1.36192 Fearon and Laitin 2003 
Pre-colonial 
central.* 
0 1 0.4526946 .0172359 Wig 2016 
Former British 
colony 
0 1 0.424 0.4944791 Author’s own data 
Peace years 0 52 20.2862 13.3916 Petterson and 
Wallensteen 2015 
Neighbouring 
conflict 
0 1 0.5882 0.4924697 Petterson and 
Wallensteen 2015 
Time since 
independ. 
1 165 41.2623 23.5527 Gleditsch 2002 
Informal strength 
of TA 
.87923437 1.8280885 1.44514 .277862 Afrobarometer 2008 
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A2.2 Model 4 without institutional hybridity39 
 Model without IH 
Institutional multiplicity -0.825 
 (0.912) 
Symbolic recognition 0.444 
 (0.499) 
Polity score 0.0174 
 (0.0341) 
Polity score squared 0.00310 
 (0.00796) 
Prox. regime instability 1.031* 
 (0.494) 
(log) GDP per capita -0.162 
 (0.260) 
Oil dependency 0.967* 
 (0.476) 
(log) Population size 0.327† 
 (0.171) 
Share of ethnically excluded 
population 
0.0615 
 (0.589) 
Ethnic fractionalisation 6.336 
 (4.301) 
Ethnic fractionalisation sq. -6.514 
 (4.167) 
(log) Mountainous 0.296 
 (0.186) 
Neighbour conflict 1.702*** 
 (0.480) 
Time since independence 0.00392 
 (0.00476) 
Former British colony -1.317* 
 (0.515) 
Precolonial centralisation 0.313 
 (0.319) 
Constant -7.460* 
 (2.945) 
AIC 356.2 
Log pseudolikelihood -158.1 
Wald Chi2 (df) 72.36 (19) 
Pseudo-R2 0.165 
Countries 42 
Observations 795 
 
- Area under the ROC curve without institutional hybridity = 0.7958 < Area 
under the ROC curve in Model 4 = 0.8046 
                                                          
39 In all models presented in the Appendix, standard errors, clustered by country, are presented in 
parentheses; † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; peace years, peace years2, peace years3 
sometimes excluded from the tables to save space. 
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- Likelihood ratio test assuming the model without institutional hybridity is 
nested in Model 4: Prob > chi2 =  0.0282 
A2.3 Different state–TA interaction subcategory model specifications (coefficient of the 
sub-categories only 
 Model 
4 
IH only IM only SR only IH 
excluded 
IH and IM 
Institutional hybridity -1.145* -1.037*    -1.180* 
 (0.552) (0.513)    (0.526) 
Institutional 
multiplicity 
-1.190  -0.936  -0.0442 -1.221 
 (1.010)  (0.844)  (0.944) (0.918) 
Symbolic recognition 0.0976   0.529 1.243†  
 (0.537)   (0.482) (0.642)  
Exclusion     1.145*  
     (0.552)  
 
 
A2.4 Models 5 and 6 with all covariates (interaction terms with British colonial history) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Concordant TA interaction -0.945†  
 (0.516)  
Former British colony -0.938 -0.682 
 (0.656) (0.762) 
Concordant TA* Former 
British colony 
-0.906  
 (1.062)  
Symbolic recognition (SR)  0.405 
  (0.611) 
Institutional multiplicity (IM)  -0.288 
  (0.843) 
Institutional hybridity (IH)  -1.019 
  (0.659) 
SR * Former British colony  0 
  (.) 
IM * Former British colony  0 
  (.) 
IH * Former British colony  -0.490 
  (1.253) 
Polity score 0.0222 0.0110 
 (0.0363) (0.0358) 
Polity score squared 0.00773 0.00900 
 (0.00816) (0.00812) 
Prox. regime instability 1.088* 1.096* 
 (0.489) (0.499) 
(log) GDP per capita -0.234 -0.366 
 (0.273) (0.300) 
Oil dependency 1.010* 1.189* 
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 (0.511) (0.534) 
(log) Population size 0.269† 0.316† 
 (0.160) (0.172) 
Share of ethnically excluded 
population 
0.0918 -0.0484 
 (0.651) (0.654) 
Ethnic fractionalisation 6.954 8.711† 
 (4.297) (4.669) 
Ethnic fractionalisation sq. -6.812 -8.708† 
 (4.161) (4.657) 
(log) Mountainous 0.308 0.296 
 (0.204) (0.195) 
Neighbour conflict 1.380** 1.501** 
 (0.475) (0.468) 
Time since independence 0.00724† 0.00519 
 (0.00431) (0.00501) 
Precolonial centralisation 0.692† 0.594 
 (0.357) (0.399) 
Constant -6.637* -6.506* 
 (3.013) (3.070) 
AIC 350.6 350.0 
Log pseudolikelihood -155.3 -153.0 
Wald Chi2 (df) 44.44 (19) 46.36 (21) 
Pseudo-R2 0.180 0.186 
Countries 42 42 
Observations 795 773 
 
A2.5 All colonial history subsets: 
 British 
colonial 
history 
British 
colonial 
history 
Other than 
British col. 
history 
Other than 
British col. 
history 
Institutional hybridity -4.011*** -6.261*** -0.455 -1.137† 
 (0.796) (1.670) (0.788) (0.666) 
Institutional multiplicity 0 0 -0.213 -0.632 
 (.) (.) (0.789) (0.758) 
Symbolic recognition 0 0 0.892 0.422 
 (.) (.) (0.549) (0.585) 
Neighbour conflict -2.142* -1.802† 2.159*** 2.208*** 
 (0.974) (1.008) (0.648) (0.604) 
Polity score  0.0593  0.00956 
  (0.111)  (0.0423) 
Polity score squared  0.00846  0.0110 
  (0.0130)  (0.0100) 
Prox. regime instability  0.948  0.777 
  (1.460)  (0.623) 
(log) GDP per capita  -0.332  0.411 
  (0.811)  (0.366) 
(log) Population size  -0.992  0.633** 
  (0.741)  (0.208) 
Share of ethnically 
excluded population 
 4.219†  0.193 
  (2.321)  (0.748) 
(log) Mountainous  -0.514  -0.0216 
  (0.489)  (0.161) 
Time since independence  -0.00318  0.0135* 
  (0.0455)  (0.00653) 
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Precolonial centralisation  1.155  0.989† 
  (1.044)  (0.531) 
Constant 0.649 11.90 -3.529*** -13.49** 
 (0.967) (10.63) (0.684) (4.210) 
AIC 76.43 86.86 278.6 270.6 
Log pseudolikelihood -32.21 -28.43 -131.3 -118.3 
Wald Chi2 (df) 40.45 (5) 254.9 (14) 20.22 (7) 48.37 (16) 
Pseudo-R2 0.208 0.301 0.108 0.168 
Countries 17 17 25 25 
Observations 308 308 481 478 
 
A2.6 Intrastate conflict onset model specifications: interacting the independent 
variable with democracy binary variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Concordant TA interaction -1.556*  
 (0.610)  
Democratic regime -0.417  
 (0.719)  
Concordant TA interaction * 
Democratic 
1.480  
 (1.002)  
Institutional hybridity  -1.745* 
  (0.811) 
Institutional multiplicity  -0.514 
  (0.956) 
Symbolic recognition  0.877† 
  (0.532) 
IH * Democracy  1.551 
  (0.968) 
IM * Democracy  0 
  (.) 
SR * Democracy  0 
  (.) 
Democratic regime  0.363 
  (0.560) 
Prox. regime instability 0.937† 1.023* 
 (0.496) (0.498) 
(log) GDP per capita -0.246 -0.0506 
 (0.271) (0.264) 
Oil dependency 0.955† 0.866† 
 (0.519) (0.468) 
(log) Population size 0.352* 0.356* 
 (0.153) (0.153) 
Share of ethnically excluded 
population 
-0.294 -0.792 
 (0.570) (0.634) 
Ethnic fractionalisation 6.438 5.532 
 (4.181) (3.962) 
Ethnic fractionalisation sq. -6.339 -5.663 
 (4.080) (3.740) 
(log) Mountainous 0.341† 0.471** 
 (0.186) (0.172) 
Neighbour conflict 1.415** 1.440*** 
 (0.468) (0.434) 
Time since independence 0.00526 0.000433 
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 (0.00458) (0.00461) 
Former British colony -1.333* -1.652** 
 (0.548) (0.502) 
Precolonial centralisation 0.609† 0.427 
 (0.332) (0.324) 
Constant -6.654* -7.811** 
 (2.880) (2.826) 
AIC 348.1 339.0 
Log pseudolikelihood -155.1 -148.5 
Wald Chi2 (df) 49.40 (18) 74.70 (20) 
Pseudo-R2 0.181 0.202 
Countries 42 41 
Observations 795 748 
 
A2.7 Interacting state–TA categories with ethnic exclusion variable + excluding 
observations with high values of ethnic exclusion (higher than the 75 percentile value 
of 0.14) 
 TA categories and 
ethnic exclusion 
Excluding ethnic 
exclusion if >0.14 
Symbolic recognition -1.401† -2.253* 
 (0.758) (1.011) 
Institutional multiplicity -5.052† 0 
 (2.756) (.) 
Institutional hybridity -1.373* -1.607** 
 (0.684) (0.531) 
Share of ethnically excluded 
population 
-1.286 5.690 
 (0.852) (4.709) 
Symbolic recognition * Share 
of ethnically excluded 
population 
5.494*  
 (2.198)  
Institutional multiplicity * 
Share of ethnically excluded 
population 
8.059**  
 (2.957)  
Institutional hybridity * 
Share of ethnically excluded 
population 
0.408  
Symbolic recognition * Share 
of ethnically excluded 
population 
(2.156)  
Polity score 0.0356 0.0437 
 (0.0351) (0.0330) 
Polity score squared 0.0112 0.0144 
 (0.00796) (0.0120) 
Prox. regime instability 1.145* 1.069 
 (0.494) (0.705) 
(log) GDP per capita -0.256 -0.643† 
 (0.272) (0.357) 
Oil dependency 1.000* 1.140* 
 (0.471) (0.557) 
(log) Population size 0.181 0.123 
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 (0.146) (0.190) 
Ethnic fractionalisation 6.310 6.298 
 (4.472) (4.269) 
Ethnic fractionalisation sq. -6.212 -7.166 
 (4.325) (4.359) 
(log) Mountainous 0.422* 0.395* 
 (0.169) (0.188) 
Neighbour conflict 1.473*** 1.853** 
 (0.447) (0.712) 
Time since independence 0.0124* 0.0111† 
 (0.00556) (0.00586) 
Former British colony -1.082* -1.076** 
 (0.540) (0.375) 
Precolonial centralisation 0.438 0.757* 
 (0.412) (0.373) 
Constant -5.728† -2.737 
 (3.245) (3.823) 
AIC 345.6 223.1 
Log pseudolikelihood -148.8 -91.57 
Wald Chi2 (df) 265.0 (23) 138.9 (19) 
Pseudo-R2 0.214 0.219 
Countries 42 37 
Observations 795 566 
 
A2.8 Excluding individual countries 
 
Gambia 
exclude
d 
Sierra 
Leone 
exclude
d 
Liberia 
exclude
d 
Niger 
exclude
d 
South 
Africa 
exclude
d 
Sudan 
exclude
d 
Nigeria 
exclude
d 
Malawi 
exclude
d 
IH -1.129* -1.401* -1.110* -1.881* -1.090* -1.137* -1.361* -1.082* 
 (0.555) (0.580) (0.536) (0.812) (0.534) (0.545) (0.679) (0.535) 
         
IM -1.187 -1.239 -1.132 -1.149 -1.206 -1.149 -0.393 -1.211 
 (1.012) (1.018) (1.107) (1.013) (1.000) (1.006) (0.750) (1.026) 
         
SR 0.102 0.0422 0.118 0.111 0.0882 0.0865 0.0238 0.104 
 (0.536) (0.551) (0.675) (0.589) (0.537) (0.541) (0.576) (0.536) 
Constant -6.990* -8.175* -5.813 -7.564* -7.772* -5.942* -5.976† -6.934* 
 (3.113) (3.221) (3.589) (3.345) (3.364) (2.948) (3.159) (3.093) 
AIC 353.2 339.4 334.6 325.4 352.5 348.7 336.1 352.5 
Log 
pseudolikeliho
od 
-155.6 -148.7 -146.3 -141.7 -155.3 -153.4 -147.1 -155.2 
Wald Chi2 (df) 
50.13 
(20) 
73.10 
(20) 
138.6 
(20) 
39.17 
(20) 
52.10 
(20) 
51.85 
(20) 
45.45 
(20) 
52.52 
(20) 
Pseudo-R2 0.171 0.200 0.199 0.188 0.173 0.178 0.194 0.173 
Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Observations 771 781 775 773 771 794 773 771 
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A2.9 Skewed-y logit models (scobit) 
 scobit model 2 scobit model 4 
Concordant TA -1.143*  
 (0.478)  
Institutional hybridity  -1.068* 
  (0.517) 
Institutional multiplicity  -1.127 
  (0.984) 
Symbolic recognition  0.170 
  (0.487) 
Polity score 0.0228 0.0211 
 (0.0335) (0.0323) 
Polity score squared 0.00656 0.00630 
 (0.00722) (0.00723) 
Prox. regime instability 1.009* 1.007* 
 (0.474) (0.474) 
(log) GDP per capita -0.198 -0.185 
 (0.257) (0.265) 
Oil dependency 0.986* 0.962* 
 (0.470) (0.476) 
(log) Population size 0.271* 0.288† 
 (0.133) (0.148) 
Share of ethnically excluded 
population 
-0.0115 -0.0221 
 (0.564) (0.554) 
Ethnic fractionalisation 6.449† 6.642† 
 (3.852) (3.669) 
Ethnic fractionalisation sq. -6.193† -6.420† 
 (3.678) (3.476) 
(log) Mountainous 0.314† 0.302† 
 (0.174) (0.167) 
Neighbour conflict 1.368** 1.400** 
 (0.465) (0.453) 
Time since independence 0.00506 0.00456 
 (0.00384) (0.00379) 
Former British colony -1.178* -1.161* 
 (0.579) (0.556) 
Precolonial centralisation 0.611† 0.577 
 (0.339) (0.357) 
Constant -19.75*** -20.02*** 
 (2.907) (3.183) 
Lnalpha 13.03*** 13.02*** 
 (1.114) (1.132) 
AIC 350.3 354.1 
Log-pseudolikelihood -155.1 -155.1 
Countries 42 41 
Observations 795 795 
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A2.10 Intrastate conflict onset model specifications: pre-colonial heterogeneity 
included 
 Including precolonial 
heterogeneity 
Institutional hybridity -1.170* 
 (0.559) 
Institutional multiplicity -1.306 
 (1.032) 
Symbolic recognition 0.0769 
 (0.537) 
Polity score 0.0190 
 (0.0354) 
Polity score squared 0.00626 
 (0.00797) 
Prox. regime instability 1.054* 
 (0.511) 
(log) GDP per capita -0.225 
 (0.278) 
Oil dependency 1.033* 
 (0.490) 
(log) Population size 0.300† 
 (0.174) 
Share of ethnically excluded 
population 
-0.0246 
 (0.590) 
Ethnic fractionalisation 6.963 
 (4.467) 
Ethnic fractionalisation sq. -7.053† 
 (4.228) 
(log) Mountainous 0.326† 
 (0.195) 
Neighbour conflict 1.341** 
 (0.498) 
Time since independence 0.00850 
 (0.00542) 
Former British colony -1.281* 
 (0.590) 
Precolonial centralisation 0.673† 
 (0.363) 
Precolonial heterogeneity 0.321 
 (0.343) 
Constant -6.987* 
 (3.241) 
AIC 354.7 
Countries 42 
Observations 795 
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A2.11 All onsets after one peace-year: 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Concordant TA interaction -1.441***  
 (0.414)  
Institutional hybridity  -1.422** 
  (0.468) 
Institutional multiplicity  -1.437 
  (0.888) 
Symbolic recognition  0.0424 
  (0.428) 
Polity score -0.00696 -0.00741 
 (0.0322) (0.0315) 
Polity score squared 0.00143 0.00140 
 (0.00734) (0.00720) 
Prox. regime instability 0.779† 0.778† 
 (0.403) (0.401) 
(log) GDP per capita -0.0826 -0.0785 
 (0.309) (0.320) 
Oil dependency 0.697 0.691 
 (0.558) (0.570) 
(log) Population size 0.376* 0.379* 
 (0.164) (0.167) 
Share of ethnically excluded 
population 
-0.404 -0.406 
 (0.582) (0.572) 
Ethnic fractionalisation 4.589 4.602 
 (3.868) (3.827) 
Ethnic fractionalisation sq. -4.234 -4.255 
 (3.842) (3.794) 
(log) Mountainous 0.334† 0.329 
 (0.197) (0.201) 
Neighbour conflict 0.668 0.676 
 (0.425) (0.416) 
Time since independence 0.00311 0.00297 
 (0.00489) (0.00488) 
Former British colony -1.244* -1.238** 
 (0.493) (0.479) 
Precolonial centralisation 0.680† 0.673† 
 (0.370) (0.367) 
Constant -6.498* -6.555* 
 (2.815) (2.926) 
AIC 419.8 423.8 
Log pseudolikelihood -190.9 -190.9 
Wald Chi2 (df) 72.71 (18) 74.76 (20) 
Pseudo-R2 0.174 0.174 
Countries 42 42 
Observations 811 811 
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A2.12 The influence of traditional authority strength on intrastate conflict onset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TA strength 
included Model 
1 
TA strength 
included Model 
2 
TA strength 
included Model 
3 
TA strength 
included Model 
4 
Concordant TA -2.981** -13.947†   
 (1.017) (7.214)   
Institutional hybridity   -2.857** -56.714* 
   (1.074) (28.923) 
Institutional 
multiplicity 
  0.000 0.000 
   (.) (.) 
Symbolic recognition   0.398 -48.814† 
   (1.296) (27.755) 
TA strength 2.454 35.446† 2.696 40.799** 
 (2.216) (19.950) (2.182) (13.817) 
Polity score  0.027  0.046 
  (0.155)  (0.149) 
Polity score squared  0.076**  0.087* 
  (0.024)  (0.038) 
Prox. regime 
instability 
 0.959  0.838 
  (1.235)  (1.224) 
(log) GDP per capita  9.454  13.759** 
  (5.973)  (4.617) 
Oil dependency  40.520†  118.913** 
  (23.612)  (38.767) 
(log) Population size  -3.297  -16.396** 
  (2.146)  (6.343) 
Share of ethnically 
excluded population 
 -32.422  -1.117 
  (24.598)  (21.289) 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
 10.872  107.599 
  (34.553)  (197.060) 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation sq. 
 -6.947  -129.009 
  (34.491)  (171.205) 
(log) Mountainous  4.084  19.466** 
  (3.018)  (6.361) 
Neighbour conflict  1.716  4.612** 
  (1.367)  (1.581) 
Time since 
independence 
 0.255†  0.594* 
  (0.132)  (0.254) 
Former British colony  -18.187†  -41.096*** 
  (10.229)  (11.168) 
Precolonial 
centralisation 
 1.882  -28.161 
  (3.473)  (18.885) 
Constant -5.853 -122.712† -6.327† -62.902 
 (3.659) (69.100) (3.736) (56.946) 
AIC 102.049 68.427 103.716 56.212 
Log pseudolikelihood -45.024 -22.214 -44.858 -18.106 
Wald Chi2 (df) 24.923 (5) . (11) 24.555 (6) . (9) 
Pseudo-R2 0.171 0.591 0.158 0.660 
Countries 19 19 19 19 
Observations 413 413 380 380 
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The data for traditional authority strength come from the Afrobarometer data round 4 
in 2008.40 The round 4 data merges Afrobarometer surveys in 20 African countries in 
2008. All the country surveys are based on the principles of random selection and 
representativeness of the sampling in relation to the wider population of a country. For 
more information about the Afrobarometer surveys, visit 
http://afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/sampling-principles.  
I have compiled the measure of traditional authority strength using four specific 
questions in the surveys. The first question (Q27b) concerns the salience of traditional 
authorities and asks how often the respondent has contacted their traditional authority 
over the past year (0 = never  3 = often). The second question (49I) captures the 
respondent’s trust towards traditional authorities (0 = not at all  3 a lot). The third 
question (Q65) asks how much influence traditional authorities have in the local 
community (1= none  4 = a great deal) while the fourth question (Q54C) inquires 
how well traditional leaders listen to the constituents (0 = never  3 = always). The 
variables traditional authority strength is the mean score of these four variables, 
aggregated into a country level. The variable ranges from 0.88 to 1.83 in the sample 
data and has the mean 1.44 and standard deviation of 0.28. Mali has the highest average 
score for traditional authority strength while Tanzania and South Africa have the 
lowest.  
 
                                                          
40 Afrobarometer data and questionnaires (2019), available at http://afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-
methods/questionnaires. 
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A2.13 Intrastate conflict onset model specifications: excluding post-treatment control 
variables: 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Concordant TA interaction -1.225*  
 (0.517)  
Institutional hybridity  -1.145† 
  (0.592) 
Institutional multiplicity  -1.114 
  (0.803) 
Symbolic recognition  0.294 
  (0.513) 
(log) Mountainous 0.174 0.166 
 (0.158) (0.156) 
Ethnic fractionalisation 3.340 3.938 
 (3.479) (3.460) 
Ethnic fractionalisation sq. -3.195 -3.854 
 (3.287) (3.145) 
Time since independence 0.008* 0.007† 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Former British colony -1.179* -1.148* 
 (0.556) (0.518) 
Precolonial centralisation 0.720† 0.669† 
 (0.380) (0.363) 
Neighbour conflict 1.400** 1.456** 
 (0.490) (0.491) 
(log) Population size 0.356** 0.378** 
 (0.128) (0.144) 
Constant -7.290*** -7.643*** 
 (1.624) (1.815) 
AIC 353.394 356.949 
Log pseudolikelihood -163.697 -163.475 
Wald Chi2 (df) 82.211 (12) 79.064 (14) 
Pseudo-R2 0.164 0.165 
Countries 42 42 
Observations 811 811 
 
A2.14 Coding Rules for State–Traditional Authority Interaction Types 
This part of the Appendix explains the coding rules for the variable state–traditional 
authority (TA) interaction in the chapter ‘Including Chiefs, Maintaining Peace? 
Examining the Effects of State–Traditional Governance Interaction on Civil Peace in 
Sub-Saharan Africa’. The Appendix moves from clarifying the coding of discordant 
versus concordant interactions and explaining the general data collection process to 
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specifying the sub-categories under these two main interaction types and discussing the 
main challenges of the coding process. 
The variable state–TA interaction is coded on the basis of the status of the 
institution of TA in the constitutional framework of a country. The reliance on this 
formal status of TAs is justified on two grounds. Firstly, TAs are the general focal 
points of traditional governance (Ubink, 2008; Logan, 2013; Holzinger, Kern and 
Kromrey, 2016; Muriaas, 2011). TA is a tangible institution that can be similarly 
identified across the studied region even when different countries and communities use 
different names and have different types of authorities. Secondly, while it is recognised 
that the formal, constitutional role of TAs does not determine the variation in the actual 
interaction in different sub-national regions, it does set the basis upon which traditional 
leaders build their claims regarding their role within and alongside the state. The 
constitutional and legal status of TA is assumed to have similar systematic implications 
for the relationship across the country, even when local realities would influence the 
concrete roles of individual authorities. This macro-level operationalisation of the 
interaction types suits analysis on the nature and implications of the role of TAs at the 
national and inter-elite level, while a more disaggregated approach to the role of TAs 
is required to study variation in local-level conflict dynamics. 
Operationalisation of discordant versus concordant interaction binary variable: 
0 = Discordant interaction 
 
No constitutionally explicit recognition of the institution of traditional authority that 
would define its role vis-à-vis the local and/or national state actors. 
- A new constitution is either silent on the institution of TA or refers to it in vague 
terms without defining the role and authority of TAs. Moreover, local 
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government or traditional authority acts that recognise the role of TAs are 
absent after the constitution has been introduced.  
- The interaction is also coded as discordant if the constitutional framework 
formally abolishes the institution of TA. 
 
1 = Concordant interaction 
Constitutionally explicit recognition of the institution of traditional authority that 
defines its role either within the public administration or as a parallel structure of 
governance. 
- A new constitution recognises the institution of TA and defines its role vis-à-
vis the state  
- And/or legal framework on local governance and/or TAs defines a role for the 
institution of TA vis-à-vis the state within the constitutional framework.  
 
The binary variable of discordant versus concordant state–TA interaction is 
coded based on public legal documents of the countries under examination, most 
importantly their constitutions. For each country, the constitutions in place or adopted 
during the examined period have been analysed using a set of key words referring to 
the institution of TA. These key words are traditional, customary, local, authority, 
chiefs and chieftaincy.41 When applicable, specific terms for TA institutions, such as 
the Council of Bashingantahe in Burundi, have been utilised in analysing the 
constitutions. Using these key words, the constitutions have been closely studied with 
                                                          
41  French and Portuguese equivalents have been used when English translations of the constitutions 
were unavailable. In the actual search, the key words have been cut (e.g. tradi?, custom?) in order to 
capture all forms of their appearance in the text. 
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regard to the presence versus absence of reference to the institution of TA and in the 
case of presence, the type of this reference. 
If a constitution lacks any reference (e.g. explicit mentioning) to the institution 
of TA, the country is coded as discordant from the next calendar year onwards until a 
new constitution (or an amendment to the constitution), local government act, or law 
regarding traditional authorities specifically recognises the role of TA. The term 
constitutionally explicit refers to the primacy of the constitutions in setting the basis 
for the coding of the variable. A new constitution modifies the institutional design of a 
country and, thus, sets a new ground also for the country’s state–TA interaction. In 
practice this means that if a new constitution lacks all explicit reference to the role of 
TA (or to the legal instruments in place to define this), the interaction is coded as 
discordant even if it has been concordant in the past.  
In the event that a new constitution mentions the institution of TA but does not 
define its role within or in relation to the state’s public administration (and does not 
refer to a law in place that does this) the interaction is coded as discordant from the 
next calendar year onwards until a new constitution (or an amendment to the 
constitution), local government act, or law concerning TA specifically changes the 
coding.  
For example, the 1992 constitution of Angola refers to TA (while the country’s 
first constitution in 1975 is silent on the topic). However, this is done in terms of 
authorising the legislative assembly to settle the role of TA later in law: “Participation 
of traditional authorities and citizens in local government” is mentioned in Article 30 
as belonging to matters under the legislative powers of the National Assembly. The 
local government law in 2007 then recognises TA and gives it representation in the 
local government bodies. The constitution in 2010 recognises the role of TA more 
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clearly and refers to the legal framework defining its role. Thus, Angola moves from 
discordant to concordant interaction in 2007 and remains there after the constitution in 
2010. 
In some cases, the constitution itself defines the role of TA and sets the value of 
state–TA interaction as concordant. For example, in the 1992 constitution of Ghana the 
institution of TA is recognised and empowered both in terms of its independent organs 
(National House of Chiefs) as well as its inclusion in the public administration (both at 
the national and regional level).  
A majority of the constitutions have been retrieved from the Constitute Project 
website42 that maintains a large database for constitutions around the world. National 
legislation websites, international organisations’ websites and non-governmental 
organisations’ websites have also been used as sources for the constitutions. With 
regard to the secondary laws used in the coding process, the focus has been restricted 
to local government and TA-related acts. These legal instruments are directly linked 
with the governing role of TAs. Moreover, these acts are widely used across countries 
under examination as institutional spaces to define the relations of different governance 
actors. The relevant secondary laws that have been adopted in-between constitutional 
acts and amendments have been identified using national legislation websites and 
internet search engines, using the key words local government act/law, local 
administration act/law, chieftaincy act/law, traditional authorities act/law. Databases 
such as the Gender and Land Tenure Database by the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation, Landwise, and the USAID Land Portal43 as well as secondary sources, 
such Country Profiles of Land Tenure by Bruce (1998) and country-specific studies 
                                                          
42 https://www.constituteproject.org/ 
43 FAO: http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/en/; Landwise: 
http://landwise.resourceequity.org/; USAID: https://www.usaid.gov/land-tenure.  
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have been used as a help in identifying, collecting information about and interpreting 
the secondary laws.  
 
Clarifying subcategories of discordant and concordant state–TA interactions 
Discordant (0 = Exclusion, 1 = Symbolic Recognition): 
0 = No recognition: No constitutionally explicit formal recognition of TA 
- A new constitution is entirely silent on the institution of TA 
1 = Symbolic recognition: Constitutional recognition of the institution of TA. No 
further formal specification of the role of TA 
- A new constitution or a local government act refers to TA but does not assign 
it any clear role 
 
Concordant (2 = Institutional Multiplicity, 3 = Institutional Hybridity): 
2 = Institutional multiplicity: Constitutionally explicit recognition of TA as a 
parallel structure to the public administration that has authority over specific 
realms of governance. 
- A new constitution and/or local government/traditional authority act (that is in 
line with the constitution) recognises the institution of TA and defines its role 
outside the local and/or national state administration. TAs have recognised 
authority in certain governance functions, such as communal land or properties. 
3 = Institutional hybridity: Constitutionally explicit recognition and definition of 
TA as an integrated institution within the public administration 
- A new constitution and/or local government/traditional authority act (that is in 
line with the constitution) recognises the institution of TA and defines its role 
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within the public administration by giving it some level of representation in 
national and/or local bodies. 
 
The concordant and discordant state–TA interaction types have been further 
coded into the four sub-categories in order to capture the empirical variance within the 
two main groups of interactions. The resulted typology that moves beyond a binary 
variable of discorant versus concordant interaction produces a more nuanced tool for 
empirical analyses concerning the role of TA.  
Out of the four categories, exclusion is the baseline category with the most 
observations. A country-year is coded to fall under exclusion if the constitution in place 
does not mention the institution of TA and if there are no relevant secondary laws (in 
line with the constitution) that would recognise the role of TA. In Côte d’Ivoire, for 
example, TAs do not enjoy any formal, institutional recognition from the state despite 
their practical importance at the local level (Crook et al., 2007). Again, the primacy of 
constitutions should be emphasised. A new constitution sets the basis for the 
institutional design and thus old legal instruments that are in controversy with the 
constitution are outweighed.  
Symbolic recognition differs from the baseline of exclusion in that TA is not 
entirely absent from the constitutional framework, but the constitutional framework 
mentions the institution. However, unlike the two concordant interactions, symbolic 
recognition is coded to be present when the reference to TA does not involve definition 
of its role within or parallel to the state. On this basis, Niger, for example is coded as 
symbolic recognition between 1989-1993, before the adopted legislation concerning 
the role of TA in 1993. In Niger, the 1987 National Charter recognised TA and outlined 
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the options for its involvement in the governance structures and the 1991 constitution 
referred to traditional leaders without defining their role.  
With regard to coding of the two concordant interactions, the core line of 
demarcation is drawn between constitutional frameworks that give representation to 
the institution of TA within the public administration and those that keep the 
chieftaincies and their organisational bodies (such as the National or Regional House 
of Chiefs) outside the state system. For example, the 1995 constitution in Uganda 
recognises TA as a parallel authority/governance system that has authority over the 
customary communities’ affairs as assigned to it by customs. However, in 2005 the 
constitution gives representation to TA also in the state organs, thus transferring the 
country into institutional hybridity. Notably, as in the case of Ghana or South Africa, 
institutional hybridity can include traits of institutional multiplicity, as traditional 
leaders have both their own, recognised governing bodies and representation in the 
public administration. It should not be interpreted, however, that institutional hybridity 
signifies a more substantive recognition of TA than institutional multiplicity. Indeed, 
it is emphasised here that the four categories are designed to be analysed as nominal 
categories rather than as an ordinal scale.  
 
Challenges 
Difficulties in accessing the primary sources and drawing clear distinctions between 
the different forms of recognising TA in a few cases are identified as the main 
challenges in the coding process. While all country-years have been coded along the 
four categories, in a couple of instances this has been done on the basis of secondary 
material providing information on the constitutional framework. For example, the years 
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1989-1991 in Niger, with its rapidly changing regimes and constitutional frameworks 
presented challenges to identify the institutional design concerning TA. In this case, 
secondary literature on the constitutional frameworks during these years was used to 
determine the value of the independent variable.  
Furthermore, a few institutional designs have presented challenges in 
determining which type of recognition of TA the case belongs to. In the case of Uganda, 
for example, TA is recognised in the 1995 constitution as having authority “in 
accordance with the culture, customs and traditions or wishes and aspirations of the 
people to whom it applies” (Article 246). Traditional authorities are seen as the leaders 
of their communities with the capacity to hold assets and properties in trust for the 
community they represent. The 1995 denies any public administrative powers for TA 
and thus recognises TA as a parallel system of governance, in charge of the customary 
communities. However, the amended constitution in 2005,  while identical in its 
understanding of the role of TA, also makes traditional authorities titular heads of the 
regional governments. Although TA is still explicitly denied any administrative or 
executive powers within the state, the constitutional framework in 2005 changes 
Uganda’s status to institutional hybridity, since there is some level of representation 
given to traditional authorities as the titular heads of the regional state bodies. In 
Burundi, a TA institution, the Council of Bashingantahe, is recognised constitutionally 
from 1998-2005 with the function of contributing to peace and unity in consultation 
with the president. On the basis of the transitional constitution in 1998 Burundi is coded 
as institutional multiplicity for this time period. However, it can be questioned whether 
the Council of Bashingantahe in this case falls under the institution of TA, as the 
Bashingantahe are nominated by the President and no explicit mentioning to their 
nature as traditional leaders is present. However, as the institution of Bashingantahe 
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does derive its legitimacy from traditional governance, the institutional design is seen 
to constitute an attempt to utilise traditional forms of governance and TA in the search 
for national coherence.  
Finally, an issue of information bias that has rendered the coding of some 
countries more straightforward than others should be acknowledged. With regard to 
countries such as South Africa, Ghana, Mozambique and Botswana the integration of 
TA into the modern state has attracted a fair amount of previous research and reports. 
This has helped the author in identifying and analysing the source material, particularly 
in terms of the secondary legislation. However, countries such as Mali, Chad or 
Cameroon have received considerably less attention in previous studies. Indeed, the 
data collected and coded present valuable new material that cover also these previously 
less studied countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, the imbalance in the 
material available may have led the author to miss-read or miss out some relevant 
material, such as secondary legislation, concerning countries that have received less 
attention earlier. While a tedious data collection process and careful reading and 
triangulating of a wide range of sources have been undertaken to avoid this problem, 
the author is aware of the challenges related to this data imbalance.  
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Coding map for state–traditional governance interaction 
 
 
  
 87 
3. Game of thrones? The implications of traditional 
authority (TA) contest for local-level stability – 
Evidence from South Africa 
 
3.1.Abstract 
How do state-recognised traditional authorities (TAs) influence local-level stability? 
Policies that recognise and give TAs public authority, particularly in many sub-Saharan 
African countries, have attracted growing scholarly interest in TAs. However, much 
disagreement prevails over the virtues and risks of maintaining a role for TAs alongside 
the state. This chapter proposes that the unity of traditional leadership is an overlooked 
but important factor in determining how TAs shape local governance and the prospects 
for stability. Drawing empirical evidence from South Africa, I test a proposition that 
contested TA structures contribute to local-level grievances and opportunities that give 
rise to outbreaks of social unrest. The statistical analysis combines spatial data on 
municipality and TA structures with local protest data and new data on contested and 
uncontested traditional leaderships. The results support the theoretical argument. 
Municipalities with contested TAs have experienced a higher rate of protests, 
particularly with regard to violent protests. Qualitative data further demonstrates how 
contested TAs can reduce the accountability and credibility of local governance 
institutions and facilitate mobilisation against the current power holders.44 
 
                                                          
44 A version of this chapter was awarded the runner-up price for the Jacek Kugler Political Demography 
and Geography Student Paper Award at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, 2019, 
Toronto. The chapter is currently under a review and resubmit process. 
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3.2.Introduction 
The remote Xolobeni village in Eastern Pondoland, South Africa, broke international 
news in early 2017 as tensions escalated between the Amadiba community and the 
local authorities. Protests and sporadic violence were triggered by opposition against a 
proposed mining initiative (Burke, 2016; Pearce, 2017). Notably, a historical contest 
regarding the traditional leadership in Eastern Pondoland further fuelled the dispute. 
While the traditional leaders enjoying state recognition supported the mining initiative, 
the community’s rival traditional leaders aligned themselves with the local resisters. 
The contested nature of the traditional leadership contributed to the escalation of the 
dispute. It undermined attempts to resolve the situation and provided mobilisation 
power to each side of the land incompatibility.  
The situation in Eastern Pondoland illustrates two intriguing phenomena often 
present at the local level in developing countries: low-scale violence and protests 
targeting alleged malfunctioning or injustices in local institutions and the participation 
of traditional authorities (TAs) in governing local affairs alongside the state.45 
Considering the former, empirical analyses have often concentrated on local state 
capacities and state-centred grievances as sources of variation in local-level political 
violence and protests.46 Considerably less comparative attention has been paid to the 
influence of the latter (e.g. traditional authorities) in fuelling or mitigating local social 
unrest. The role of traditional authorities has attracted growing interest among scholars 
examining the interaction between state and traditional institutions (Englebert, 2002a; 
                                                          
45 As the next section clarifies, the concept traditional authority refers to indigenous and ethnic 
communities’ leaders who derive their legitimacy from traditional governance structures rather than 
from the modern state. For a definition, see Holzinger et al. (2016, p. 2) and Osaghae (2000, p. 205). 
Local level here refers to municipality and communal stages. 
46 For example, Wig and Tollefsen (2016) find high quality local government institutions to prevent 
political violence. De Juan and Wegner (2017) find evidence that horizontal social inequalities across 
ethnic groups increase the propensity of political protests. 
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Ntsebeza, 2005; Williams, 2010; Baldwin, 2015; Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2016). 
Yet these studies vary considerably in their inferences regarding the implications of 
TAs: while some expect TAs to exacerbate corruption and induce tensions at the local 
level others argue that TAs can play an instrumental role in the implementation of 
public goods and development policies (see Ntsebeza 2005; Williams 2010).47  The 
contrasting findings present an intriguing puzzle for political scientists: Why do TAs 
seem to fuel disputes and protests in some contexts while in others they appear 
instrumental for maintaining local stability?  
This chapter proposes that the structural cohesion of TAs, specifically whether 
the incumbent leaders are contested or uncontested, is an overlooked but important 
factor in determining how traditional leaders influence local-level stability. As the 
opening example suggests, TAs are at times factionalised into contesting leadership 
wings. Traditional leadership succession remains most often hereditary and is governed 
by written or oral customary law. Contest over traditional leadership occurs when two 
or more individuals claim to have a customarily justified right to the same traditional 
leadership position of a community. TA contest commonly dates back to historical 
moments such as colonial interventions that removed and replaced leaders or 
succession disputes that induced competing narratives of the rightful holders of specific 
leadership positions (Oomen, 2005; Picard and Mogale, 2015).  TA contest is 
particularly evident in contexts where the state recognises the institution of traditional 
leadership and TAs have access to public power. This is when decisions over the 
rightful traditional authorities of a specific community have concrete implications for 
individual leaders’ benefits and privileges. Challenging the general view that contest 
                                                          
47 By state-recognised I refer to a constitutional recognition of TA structures in a country. I restrict my 
focus to these contexts where TAs have been somewhat integrated into the local state institutions and 
given some public authority.   
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over political leadership positions always increases accountability, this chapter 
contends that TA contest has a deteriorating influence on the accountability and 
credibility of the overall local administration. This contributes to local grievances and 
political opportunities that give rise to social unrest. Given a context of state-recognised 
TAs, I expect localities with contested TAs to experience more episodes of local 
protests than localities with uncontested TAs.  
I test the theoretical framework on cross-municipality data of protests in all South 
African municipalities that have at least one TA structure geographically present. 
Information for the dependent variable comes from the South African Police Service’s 
Incident Registration Information Service and captures local protest events in 2011-
2013. The explanatory variable, uncontested versus contested TAs, is operationalised 
as the presence and proportion of formally contested TA structures in a municipality. 
The results of the statistical analyses support the theoretical proposition. Municipalities 
with contested TAs have experienced higher rates of protests, particularly with regard 
to violent protests. Furthermore, qualitative data from semi-structured key informant 
and focus group interviews suggest ways that contested TAs reduce the efficacy and 
credibility of local governance institutions and facilitate mobilisation against the 
current power holders.  
This chapter contributes to research on mixed or hybrid governance by moving 
beyond the binary debate of whether the accommodation of traditional institutions 
alongside the state has negative or positive societal implications. Focusing empirically 
on South Africa, I show that the way traditional authority institutions influence local 
governance is shaped by the nature of the integrated traditional leadership. South Africa 
makes a suitable country of focus for three reasons. First, there has been an upward 
trend in the scale of local protests that target the alleged malfunctioning of local 
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governance institutions, albeit to different extent in different municipalities 
(Alexander, 2010). Second, as elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa and other regions with 
a history of European colonisation, traditional leaders maintain significant societal 
influence in South Africa. However, there is variation in the type of traditional 
leadership structures across the country. While some have uncontested leaderships, 
others are internally contested; inhabiting competing historical narratives over the 
rightful leadership.  
Third, South Africa is a typical case of institutional hybridity. TAs co-exist 
alongside the state and are constitutionally recognised and integrated into the local 
government framework. The state considers TAs vital in improving local governance 
in areas where the institution of traditional leadership is present. 48 The empirical 
resonance of this type of hybrid governance in sub-Saharan Africa makes it important 
to study traditional institutions as part of the local governance structures (Raleigh and 
Linke, 2018). The results call for a careful consideration of the historically constructed, 
locally embedded institutions in the study of local conflict and governance dynamics. 
 
3.3.Previous literature on TAs 
Traditional authorities (TAs) alongside the modern state 
Traditional authorities (TAs) refer to community leadership structures that derive their 
legitimacy from historically and context-specifically constructed customs and norms 
rather than from the modern state. The key aspect in defining traditional authority is 
the perception of a leadership role as traditional: ‘The term mainly refers to a mode of 
                                                          
48 In the Annual report of the Traditional Affairs Department, Minister Pravin Gordhan (2014, p. 9) 
states: “We recognise the important role played by traditional leaders in rural areas. It is therefore 
fundamental that they collaborate and cultivate harmonious relations with municipalities to advance 
development and service delivery”. 
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legitimisation of political institutions’ (Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2016, p.2). In 
practice, the concept encompasses kings, queens, chiefs and headmen that the general 
public identifies as traditional. TAs remain particularly salient in sub-Saharan Africa, 
where the imposition of colonial state structures on the existing kingdoms and 
chieftaincies created dual systems of state and pre-colonial, traditional structures 
(Herbst, 2000; Koelble, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2005; Baldwin, 2015). TAs maintain 
significant socio-economic and political influence that ranges from shaping voting 
decisions to managing and allocating land and resolving communal disputes (ECA, 
2007; Buur and Kyed, 2007b; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015; Meriggi and 
Bulte, 2018). Recently, the role of TAs has attracted the interest of scholars examining 
armed conflict dynamics (Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017; Wig and Kromrey, 2018).  
The resilience of TAs in sub-Saharan Africa is often explained by the continued 
state weakness and the subsequent need to co-opt traditional leadership (Mamdani, 
1996; Herbst, 2000; Ntsebeza, 2005). Empirical studies demonstrate considerable 
levels of public trust in traditional leaders (Logan, 2009, 2013; Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou, 2015). The Afrobarometer surveys imply that TAs enjoy higher levels of 
public trust than the state administration, particularly in the rural areas (Logan, 2009, 
2013). Yet trust in TAs and the concrete importance of traditional institutions vary both 
across and within countries. For example, De Juan (2017) shows that traditional 
conflict resolution instruments remain relatively resilient in the historical strongholds 
of the pre-colonial kingdoms and chieftaincies, in comparison to other regions.  
The organisational structure of a traditional leadership is also found to influence 
its contemporary capacities (Wig, 2016; Wig and Kromrey, 2018). Cross-country 
studies indicate that states where the pre-colonial societies had more centralised 
leadership structures (e.g. more centralised TA structures) have performed better in 
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terms of growth and administrative development than states with more decentralised 
pre-colonial communities (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou, 2015). These studies suggest that rather than solely depending on the 
continued weakness of the state, TAs’ societal influence is dependent on their structural 
nature that vary across communities and regions. 
 
Societal implications of state-recognised TAs 
One of the most pressing questions with regard to TAs alongside the state is whether 
the policy of accommodating traditional leadership institutions has positive or negative 
implications for societal outcomes such as peace and democracy (Englebert, 2002b; 
Ubink, 2008; Baldwin, 2015). Across sub-Saharan Africa in countries such as South 
Africa, Niger, and Gambia the state has recognised traditional leaders and made efforts 
to integrate their authority into the local state (see Englebert, 2002b). The research field 
remains deeply divided over the expected implications of actively preserving this type 
of dualism.  
Some scholars remain deeply sceptic about empowering TAs in the 
administration of the local sphere (Mamdani, 1996; Herbst, 2000; Ntsebeza, 2005; 
Claassens, 2011). Approaching the issue from the perspective of democratisation, they 
argue that traditional leaders use their powers as state-agents for their private interests 
rather than for the benefit of the public. In-depth case studies illustrate how traditional 
authorities can contribute to elite capturing of development and democratisation 
processes (Ntsebeza, 2005; Mnwana, 2015a). A close relationship between TAs and 
local state administrators is argued to induce corruption and lead to diminishing returns 
of public goods (Clayton, Noveck and Levi, 2015; Acemoglu et al., 2016).  
Other studies propose that TAs have the potential to act as intermediaries 
between the state and its constituents (Sklar, 1994, 1999). Coordinating with traditional 
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authorities is seen to improve the efficacy and accountability of the state as TAs can 
help to implement policies in areas where state institutions remain weak (Baldwin, 
2015). Rather than necessarily leading to more corruption and bad governance, 
cooperation between local councillors and traditional leaders can channel 
communication between rural communities and the state (Williams, 2010). Involving 
TAs in governance can also play a vital role in maintaining national stability in 
politically unstable periods (Eggen, 2011) and improve the outcomes of development 
interventions at the local level (Klick, 2016; Pula, 2015; Kyamusugulwa and Hilhorst, 
2015; Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Ruiz-Euler, 2014). Studies on peacebuilding and 
transition processes suggest that taking traditional authorities into account in conflict 
resolution and negotiation processes is crucial for the prospect of peace (Osaghae, 
2000; Koelble and LiPuma, 2011).  
Variation in the type and internal dynamics of traditional institutions might 
explain some of these seemingly contrasting findings. For example, Ntsebeza’s (2005) 
region of focus in South Africa (Xhalanga, Eastern Cape) has a particularly ambiguous 
history with regard to TAs. British colonial rulers intervened strongly in the imposition 
of specific leaders and the institution has never been unambiguously embedded in the 
region (Ntsebeza, 2005). On the contrary, William’s (2010) focus region is situated in 
an area (Kwazulu-Natal) where TA structures are generally more embedded and have 
faced fewer disruptions concerning their authority. These different historical 
conjectures may have contributed to the variation in the societal influence of TAs 
today. In connection to this, studies by De Juan (2017), Wig (2016), and others 
(Englebert, 2002b; Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson, 2014; Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou, 2015) demonstrate how variation in the pre-colonial forms of 
organisation continues to influence traditional governance institutions.  
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The interest here comes close to these studies. Yet instead of assuming that TAs 
with a history of a certain type of pre-colonial organisation would have remained more 
or less capacitated throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods, I explicitly focus 
on the presence of structural contest in the contemporary traditional leaderships. As the 
South African example illustrates, focusing solely on the pre-colonial structure of TAs 
would undermine all later time points (e.g. intervention by colonial powers in the 
leadership structure or succession disputes after the death of a leader) that may have 
induced contested TA structures. 
 
3.4.South Africa as a country of focus 
TAs in South Africa 
Heterogeneity and complex history define the institution of traditional leadership in 
South Africa.  Home to numerous ethnic groups, such as the Xhosa, Zulu, and Tswana, 
South Africa also accommodates several types of traditional governance systems 
ranging from highly centralised authority structures (Zulu, Sotho) to more localised 
hierarchies surrounding individual chiefs (Tswana) (Picard and Mogale, 2015).49 The 
colonial and apartheid periods left an ambiguous mark on the institution of traditional 
leadership in South Africa.50 On one hand, the colonial powers stripped TAs their 
autonomy and imposed significant modifications on TA structures, albeit to different 
extent in different regions (Picard and Mogale, 2015). On the other hand, TAs were 
instrumental in enabling control over the so-called homelands where South Africans 
belonging to ethnic African groups were forcedly moved to during the apartheid era. 
                                                          
49 The organisational structure of TAs will be proxied in the analysis by including a measure of the pre-
colonial centralisation of the dominant ethnic group in the municipality. 
50 For an in-depth analysis on the influence of colonial and apartheid eras for South Africa, see Oomen 
(2005) and Ntsebeza (2005). For an overview of the effects of colonialism on African pre-
colonial/traditional societies, see Mamdani (1996) and Herbst (2000).  
 96 
Those TAs that were recognised by the colonial/apartheid administration gained 
significant powers in relation to their subjects. As a consequence, the institution of 
traditional leadership suffered heavily in terms of its reputation and integrity during the 
colonial and apartheid periods (Koelble and LiPuma, 2005; Oomen, 2005).   
While the post-apartheid constitution and the subsequent legislation introduced 
wall-to-wall democratically elected local governments, it also recognised the 
institution of TA and outsourced some governance authority to it (Claassens, 2011). 
Figure 3.1 depicts the municipalities where traditional authority structures are present. 
The approximately 800 recognised chieftaincies are located in the same geographical 
areas as the apartheid-period homelands, making Western Cape the only province 
without traditional authority structures. The Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act (TLGFA) recognises ‘the institution, status and role of traditional 
leadership according to customary law’ and defines its role among other things as 
‘supporting municipalities in the identification of community needs’ and ‘participating 
in the development of policy and legislation at local level’ (Republic of South Africa, 
2003). Traditional authorities are to be represented and consulted at the municipality 
and district level administrative bodies in the areas where their communities reside. 
Headmen, senior traditional leaders (chiefs), principal traditional leaders, and 
kings/queens receive salaries from the state for their services as TAs. The TLGF Act 
aligns with the popular notion of the gatekeeper or an intermediary role of TAs 
(Baldwin, 2015).  
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Figure 3.1. Local municipalities in South Africa: with and without TAs 
 
Participation of traditional leaders in local administration has made urgent the 
question over the legitimate holders of specific TA positions within communities. 
State-recognition of TA accentuates a contested traditional leadership structure as it 
divides the competing factions into those with state-recognition and those without it. 
The TLGF Act in 2003 set to establish a Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims 
Commission in order to investigate and make recommendations in situations 
concerning ‘traditional leadership position where the title or right of the incumbent is 
contested’. It is precisely in these contested versus uncontested structures of traditional 
leaderships – which date back years (or decades) to specific customary successions or 
removals of leaders by colonial and/or apartheid powers (see Osaghae 2000) and that 
can therefore be considered relatively exogenous to contemporary local politics – that 
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I focus here. Contested TA structures are not specific to South Africa.51 The 
implications of contested TA structures have gained research attention for instance in 
the context of Sierra Leone, where contested chieftaincies are seen to have fuelled 
local-level violence during the civil war (Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017).   
 
 
Local-level protests in South Africa 
With regard to local stability, post-apartheid South Africa has experienced a worrying 
development concerning localised political protests. Despite the African National 
Congress-led (ANC) governments’ developmental agenda and the achieved 
improvements in the access to basic services across the country, protests concerning 
service delivery and other governance-related shortcomings have been on the rise since 
the mid-2000s. Moreover, the number of violent protests has increased over the last 
decade (Alexander, 2010; De Juan and Wegner, 2017). Notably, protests in South 
Africa are often localised to the extent that they primarily target the local authorities 
and the malfunctioning of local governance – rather than the national government 
(Alexander, 2010). Atkinson identifies three municipality-level causes for the protests: 
‘municipal ineffectiveness in service delivery, the poor responsiveness of 
municipalities to citizens’ grievances, and the conspicuous consumption entailed by a 
culture of self-enrichment on the part of municipal councillors and staff’ (Atkinson, 
2007, p. 53).  
Despite the recognised association between protests and the quality of local 
governance, the role of TAs in mitigating or fuelling protests by influencing the 
problems of service delivery and equal distribution of goods and resources has not been 
                                                          
51 The variation in the TA structures and the availability of systematic data on the internal rivalries within 
them make South Africa a suitable country of focus.  
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systematically examined. The presence and variation of protests across municipalities 
in South Africa calls for a more comprehensive analysis of the actors involved in 
shaping the subnational governance realities. Given the perceived importance of 
traditional authorities within the local governance and the contrasting arguments on 
their role, it is necessary to take a closer look at the conditions determining their 
implications for local stability. 
 
3.5.Theory: contested versus uncontested TAs and local protests 
The scale of local protests and violence is understood to be a function of the existing 
grievances and opportunities to challenge the status quo at the local level (Buhaug and 
Rød, 2006; Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012; Wig and Tollefsen, 2016; De Juan and 
Wegner, 2017). Notably, in a context such as characterised in South Africa, rather than 
associating the source of local grievances and institutional weakness solely with the 
local state actors, the role of TAs has to be considered. The constituents recognise TAs’ 
public authority and expect their leaders to be involved in the implementation of 
development and public goods-related policies for the benefit of the community 
(Williams, 2010). What vary are the internal structures of these state-recognised TAs: 
while some have uncontested leadership structures others are contested with regard to 
specific TA positions.  
Given this context, contested TAs are expected to increase the scale of social 
unrest that challenges local stability for two underlying reasons. First, the presence of 
customary contest can decrease the accountability of the current incumbents, inducing 
elite capture of local public goods and services. Contrary to making TAs more 
accountable to their constituents, the contested nature of the leadership structure 
exacerbates a winner takes it all-situation in which allegiance to the state elites 
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outweighs the downward accountability of the traditional leaders. This, in turn, 
translates to increased local grievances. Second, contested TAs can decrease the overall 
credibility of the local governance institutions as the traditional leaders in charge (e.g. 
the incumbent TAs) do not enjoy unambiguous acceptance, but face challenging claims 
for power from within the community. This creates mobilisation opportunities to 
challenge the public administration. A contested traditional leadership gives the state, 
the constituents, and potential external actors room to forum-shop between the 
competing TAs and question the legitimacy of the incumbent TAs. Figure 3.2 
summarises the theoretical argument: 
 
Figure 3.2. Theoretical framework 
 
To specify, the presence of internal contest over traditional leadership positions 
is expected to exacerbate the problem of unaccountable local leaders that act in the 
favour of the elites’ private interests rather than that of the overall public. Facing 
contesting claims for power from within the community, the contested incumbent 
leaders face more uncertainty in terms of the future of their power position and rely 
increasingly on the state in order to maintain their authority. The prospects of losing 
the incumbent privileges make the contested traditional leaders more prone to act in a 
manner that maximises their own short-term goals rather than in consideration of the 
long-term implications of their actions. This makes the incumbents more vulnerable to 
Context: TAs 
integrated in local 
administration
Contested TA
Weakened 
accountability
Weakened 
credibility
Higher rate of 
local protest
Uncontested TA
Stronger 
accountability
Increased 
credibility
Lower rate of 
local protest
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co-option by the local councillors or external actors, who might otherwise switch their 
support to the rival TAs.52 Hence, it becomes more rational for the incumbent leaders 
to act in the advantage of state elites who ultimately enable their privileges. This fosters 
inter-elite alliances that neglect the needs of the general population and lower general 
accountability. This, again, will further strengthen existing grievances and opposition 
against the local administration.  
On the contrary, when a TA structure is uncontested, i.e. when there is no contest 
over the customary rightfulness of the state-recognised TAs, the accountability of the 
local leaders stands on firmer ground. Facing no imminent threat from within the 
traditional hierarchy, the incumbent leaders have less pressure to make decisions in a 
manner that maximises their own short-term gains (at the expense of the public good). 
Instead, the prospects of long-term responsibility over the well-being of their 
community – and the potential repercussions from the community in the face of major 
grievances – should make the traditional leaders inclined to balance between the needs 
and interests of the wider population and the different elites. Furthermore, lacking 
overlapping candidates for a traditional leadership position, the local state actors have 
fewer possibilities to forum-shop between different leaders to see who would be more 
inclined to advance the elites’ interests.  
In addition to decreasing the accountability and increasing grievances, contested 
TAs contribute to a decrease in the credibility of the local administration. As the 
rightfulness of the incumbent traditional leaders is by definition challenged, the 
decisions and processes undertaken by them are likely to suffer from weakened 
credibility in the eyes of their constituents. This erodes the capacities of the local 
                                                          
52 Raleigh and De Bruijne find that contested TAs were more frequently co-opted by state and non-state 
armed actors in the Sierra Leonean civil war. In Ntsebeza’s and Mnwana’s empirical focus areas abuse 
of power and privileges by TAs coexists with contested TAs (Ntsebeza, 2005; Mnwana, 2015b; Raleigh 
and De Bruijne, 2017).  
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administration and increases opportunities to stand against it. With contested traditional 
leadership, the incumbents face rivals in whose interest it is to de-legitimatise the status 
of the current leaders and mobilise against them.53 For the constituents (and the state) 
the situation offers increased possibilities to forum-shop between the different TA 
factions. Rather than depending on the intermediary role of the current incumbents, the 
constituents can direct their allegiance to the rival TAs. These, in turn, are in an ideal 
position to support or manipulate any overt opposition against the current power 
holders.  
The problems with accountability and credibility – which translate to increased 
grievances and opportunities to mobilise against the local administration – are expected 
to increase the prospects of local protests in those areas where TAs are contested, 
comparative to areas with uncontested TAs. This leads to the general theoretical 
proposition of this chapter.  
 
H1: Local municipalities with contested TA structures experience more protests than 
local municipalities with uncontested TA structures.  
 
The hypothesis does not imply that uncontested TAs would have a significant, absolute 
positive impact on local-level stability. There is a range of idiosyncratic factors that 
influence the ways TAs affect local governance dynamics. When asked about the 
influence of TAs, several interviewees emphasised individual capacities, integrity, and 
the personality of traditional leaders in yielding any influence at the local level.54 
However, what is argued is that contest over specific TA positions systematically 
                                                          
53 See Berenschot (2011) for a case study on the importance of patronage networks for mobilisation.   
54 Interviews with civil society activists and public officials from Pietermaritzburg and Pretoria in May 
2017.  
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exacerbates the problems of accountability and credibility of the local administration, 
as outlined above. An alternative mechanism would posit that contest within a TA 
structure can increase accountability as intra-elite competition makes individual leaders 
more responsible towards the constituents (Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson, 2014). 
While theoretically plausible, this chapter argues that the characteristics of life-long 
power position and hereditary nature of power change the implications of leadership 
contest (see Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015, for influence of introducing elections in 
TA structures).   
 
3.6.Research design 
Dependent variable 
In order to test the theoretical proposition empirically, I use protest data originating 
from the South African Police Service’s Incident Registration Information Service 
(IRIS). The IRIS database covers all crowd control events reported by the police that 
involve more than 15 participants. The data include information on the motivation and 
the nature (peaceful or violent) of the event as well as the location and time of the event. 
As the unit of analysis in this chapter is local municipality, I have aggregated the 
number of protest events on municipality level. Figure 3.3 demonstrates the variation 
of protests across the municipalities under examination. 
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Figure 3.3. The scale of protests (log) per municipality (with at least one TA structure) in South 
Africa, 2011-2013 
 
For the purposes of this chapter I use De Juan and Wegner’s (2017) recoding of the 
IRIS data. The authors’ coding of the number of protests for the time period of 2011–
2013 fits well with the methodological and theoretical framework of this study. In 
regard to the institutional context, the TLGF Act that defined the role of TAs in South 
Africa had been in place for eight years in 2011, thus ensuring time for efforts to 
implement it. Furthermore, the first commission to investigate contested TA structures 
has finished its mandate and the contested structures have become public. Finally, the 
2011 census provides many control variables that enable the consideration of 
confounding factors. Adopting De Juan’s and Wegner’s (2017) categorisation of 
peaceful and violent protests, I first estimate all protests and then restrict the focus to 
those protest events that are coded as violent. As a robustness check, I further restrict 
the focus to specific categories of protests. The median number of all protests per 
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municipality with TA structures is 74 in the period under examination. As the number 
of protests is a highly skewed variable, I use natural logs of protests in the analysis.  
 
Independent variable 
The main independent variable, contested versus uncontested TAs, is operationalised 
as the presence of formally contested traditional leadership positions in a given 
municipality. The data for the variable derives from the Southern African Legal 
Information Institute (SAFLII) that allows search for all legal claims in South African 
high courts, including those that deal with contesting claims over traditional leadership 
positions.55 For a TA to be coded as contested, a legal dispute over the customary 
rightfulness of an incumbent to hold a certain formal TA position in a given community 
must have been brought to a state’s high court sometime after the 2003 TGLF Act but 
before 2011. The upper limit is to make sure that the public emergence of the structural 
contest within a TA precedes and is different from the outcome of interest, local 
protests in 2011–2013. There are 34 cases of contested TAs that fit the above criteria. 
In order to locate the contested TAs in the correct municipalities, the following 
steps were taken. First, the legal disputes were matched with spatial data received from 
the South African Demarcation Board concerning all TA structures in the country. 
Based on information gathered from the legal proceedings each contested leadership 
position was assigned to a specific TA/chieftaincy. The spatial data of the chieftaincies 
were then matched with spatial municipality data from GADM. As a result, a dataset 
with 111 municipalities with at least one TA structure (contested or uncontested) was 
constructed.56 Out of the 111 municipalities, 23 municipalities are home to at least one 
                                                          
55 SAFLII (2017), available at http://www.saflii.org. 
56 I also test the hypothesis using an empirical scope including all South African municipalities (n = 
234), including those without any TA structures. See Expanding the analysis for the discussion. 
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TA structure coded as contested. Figure 3.4 demonstrates the empirical scope of this 
study, i.e. municipalities with at least one TA structure and the spatial division of the 
main independent variable across these municipalities, i.e. the presence versus absence 
of contested TA structures in a municipality. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. TA municipalities with contested versus uncontested TA structures (only 
municipalities with TA structures included) 
 
The independent variable is first understood as a binary variable of presence 
versus absence of contested TAs in a given municipality. This results in 23 
municipalities being coded as contested. However, this approach induces two 
problems. First, some municipalities have more than one TA structure in place and can 
thus have both contested and uncontested TA structures. In fact, there are on average 
six TA structures in a municipality. Hence, in a given municipality some TAs might be 
contested while others are uncontested. In order to take this into account, the 
independent variable is transformed into a proportion of contested TAs in a given 
municipality. A municipality with two TA structures out of which one is contested gets 
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the value 0.5 while a municipality with 10 TAs out of which 3 are contested gets the 
value 0.3. If the contest over a TA occurs within the highest level of authority 
(kingship/principal traditional leaders), the municipality gets the value 1 as the contest 
over the kingship is likely to influence the different chieftaincies in the municipality.57 
Second, TA structures are matched with specific municipalities based on their 
spatial centre points (longitude-latitude centre points). However, the influence of 
contested TAs might not be restricted to the municipality where their centre is located. 
Many TAs are spatially spread across municipality borders and the borders of TAs are 
ambiguous in the first place. In order to consider the influence of contested versus 
uncontested TAs across neighbourhood municipalities, a spatial lag of the independent 
variable is included in the empirical tests.  
 
 
Control variables 
As control variables, I consider covariates that can influence the main independent and 
dependent variables of interest. First, I include a measure of the number of TA 
structures in a municipality, as this affects the odds for contested TAs to emerge and 
can contribute to the general potential for local protests. I also take into account the 
pre-colonial organisation of the dominant ethnic groups in the municipality. Previous 
literature suggests that this can influence both the type of TA structures today and the 
general stability of a region (Wig, 2016; Wig and Kromrey, 2018). The data for this 
variable comes from Wig (2016). I use data from the U.S geological survey (2005) to 
capture the presence of mines in a municipality. While the presence of mines can 
                                                          
57 The most common type of TA contest takes place at the chieftaincy level between two or more 
competing senior traditional leaders. Aside these and contests over the kingship, disunity can take place 
between competing headmen (the lowest level recognised traditional leaders). See the Appendix A3.1 
for a table of the types of disputes. 
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contribute to local social unrest in general, it can also increase the stakes in potential 
TA contests as TAs have considerable powers over communal land.58  
Furthermore, economic development can influence the general propensity for 
local social unrest and motivations for escalating customary disputes between leader 
candidates. As municipality level economic data remains sparse, I use the DMSP OLS 
night-time light to capture general economic development (Elvidge et al., 2014). 
Specifically, I measure the average nightlight levels in a municipality. In order to 
control for the demographic structural factors that influence both the context in which 
TAs are structurally contested or uncontested and general mobilisation for protests I 
refer to the 2011 population census. Specifically, I consider the population density and 
the share of black Africans in a municipality. I also consider the share of ANC support 
in the 2011 municipality elections. I take the temporal and spatial dependencies into 
account by including a measure of past protest rates (2001–2003) and the sum of 
protests in adjacent municipalities. Finally, I include province dummy variables to 
account for region specific dynamics.  
 
3.7.Empirical results 
Table 3.1 portrays the average scale of protests (logs of total protests and logs of 
peaceful and violent protests) for municipalities included in the main analysis.59 The 
descriptive statistics support the theoretical proposition: On average, municipalities 
with at least one structurally contested TA have experienced more protest events than 
municipalities without contested TAs in the period 2011-2013. Notably, there is some 
                                                          
58 For an in-depth analysis of the implications of traditional leaders’ rule over land in sub-Saharan Africa, 
see Boone (2017). 
59 To reiterate, the empirical scope of this study covers municipalities that have state–TA dual structures 
in place. The scope is relaxed later in the analysis to include all South African municipalities. 
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variation in the significance of this variance.  Municipalities with contested TAs have 
a significantly higher rate of violent protests (p-value = 0.004) while the difference in 
means for peaceful protests fails to reject the null hypothesis of equal means at the 95% 
confidence level (with a p-value of 0.06).  
 
Table 3.1. Protest levels in municipalities with contested versus uncontested TAs 
Municipalities with contested 
versus uncontested TAs 
Mean log of protests 
in 2011-2013 
Mean log of 
peaceful protests 
Mean log of 
violent protests 
Contested TAs 4.743248 4.596535 2.669559 
Uncontested TAs 4.143374 4.04188 1.798034 
t-tests: p-value for all protests = 0.04, for peaceful protests = 0.06, and for violent protests = 0.004 
 
 
In order to examine the hypothesised relationship beyond simple binary 
tabulations, Table 3.2 estimates seven multivariate models of local protests in South 
African municipalities with at least one TA structure present, using the OLS method. 
Models 1, 3, and 5 treat the main independent variable as a binary variable of presence 
versus absence of contested TAs while models 2, 4, 6 and 7 use the proportion of 
contested TAs in a municipality as the main independent variable. Models 1–4 examine 
all protest events, models 5-7 restrict their focus to violent protests, and model 7 
includes a spatial lag of the independent variable in order to examine the diffusion of 
the effect of contested TAs in neighbour municipalities.  
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Table 3.2. OLS-regression models of local protests, 2011–2013 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 7 Model7 
 All 
protests 
All 
protests 
All 
protests 
All 
protests 
Violent 
protests 
Violent 
protests 
Viol. 
Prot. 
SLX  
Presence of 
contested TA 
0.518*  0.312*  0.411*   
 (0.259)  (0.145)  (0.167)   
Number of TAs 0.033 0.033 0.021† 0.021† 0.025 0.025 0.012 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) 
Proportion of 
contested TAs 
 1.296**  0.464*  0.494* 0.626** 
  (0.407)  (0.199)  (0.214) (0.224) 
Average 
nightlight 
  0.382 0.381 2.448 2.649 2.812 
   (3.065) (3.052) (3.995) (3.997) (4.129) 
(log) Population 
density 
  0.181* 0.181* 0.112 0.109 0.132 
   (0.078) (0.077) (0.088) (0.089) (0.096) 
Share of black 
South Africans 
  -0.816 -0.613 -3.279* -3.024† -1.992 
   (2.114) (2.082) (1.621) (1.577) (1.773) 
Mines   0.429** 0.392* 0.398* 0.362† 0.350† 
   (0.159) (0.152) (0.196) (0.197) (0.197) 
Pre-colonial 
centralization 
  -0.198† -0.205* -0.159 -0.165 -0.173 
   (0.112) (0.116) (0.123) (0.126) (0.128) 
ANC share   -1.538* -1.527* -0.627 -0.619 -0.915 
   (0.614) (0.619) (0.850) (0.864) (0.842) 
(log) Past 
protests 
  0.488*** 0.498*** 0.402*** 0.417*** 0.400*** 
   (0.084) (0.084) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
Neighbour 
protests 
  -0.026 -0.026    
   (0.016) (0.016)    
Neighbour viol. 
protests 
    -0.071* -0.073** -0.062* 
     (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) 
Spatial lag of 
contested TAs 
      -0.171 
       (0.171) 
Constant 3.963*** 3.947*** 1.639 1.476 2.695 2.529 1.601 
 (0.195) (0.190) (1.885) (1.868) (1.928) (1.933) (2.330) 
Observations 110 110 110 110 110 110 103 
R2 0.053 0.087 0.750 0.747 0.678 0.671 0.662 
Standard errors clustered by municipality, province dummies not reported in the table. †p<0.1, *p<0:05, 
**p<0:01, ***p<0.001. 
 
The results of the core models support the theoretical hypothesis. The coefficient 
for contested TAs is systematically positive and statistically different from null across 
the models, both when the independent variable is understood as a binary variable and 
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when it is operationalised as a proportion of contested TAs. The estimated influence of 
contested TAs is somewhat more substantive for the proportion of contested TAs than 
for the simple binary variable of the presence of contested TAs. Moreover, the 
correlation between contested TAs and protests is particularly strong with regard to 
violent events. Based on model six, a ten-percentage point increase in contested TAs 
increases violent protests by 4.9 percent. Figure 3.5 illustrates the coefficients of the 
main independent variable and other key explanatory variables.  
 
 
Figure 3.5. Coefficients of key independent variables for (log) protests in 2011–2013 
 
That a higher proportion of contested traditional leaderships increases the 
estimated scale of local protests and violent events in particular supports the theoretical 
framework. As discussed, the proportion of contested TAs might better grasp the 
variation induced by multiple uncontested and/or contested TAs in a municipality, in 
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comparison to the simple binary variable. Furthermore, while estimating all protests 
can include events where mobilisation is motivated by other than low accountability 
and credibility issues, the events that are coded as violent indicate that the local 
authorities struggle to prevent outbursts of social unrest. 
Aside the protest-inducing effect of contested TAs, the simple number of TAs in 
a municipality is positively correlated with the scale of protests. However, this 
correlation is significant only at the 90% confidence level and when estimating all 
protests. Moreover, the substantive effect of the number of TAs is small. Considering 
the potential spatial diffusion of the independent variable, model 7 shows an 
insignificant coefficient for the spatial lag of the proportion of contested TAs. The 
influence of contested TAs does not travel across municipality boundaries. Notably, 
testing the robustness of the results by examining spatial interdependence of the 
dependent variable and including a spatial lag of the residuals implies that there is 
significant spatial clustering of the residuals in the model. However, the protest-
inducing influence of contested TAs remains robust when adding the spatial lags in the 
model.60  
With regard to the control variables, the measure of past protests has a 
substantially and statistically significant positive coefficient across the models. The 
scale of protests in a municipality is dependent on the scale of past protests, implying 
strong historical continuities in the stability versus instability of local municipalities in 
South Africa. A ten-percentage point increase in past protests is estimated to increase 
protest levels in 2011–2013 by approximately 4–5 percent. The scale of violent protests 
in the neighbourhood municipalities has a negative and significant coefficient, 
implying that a higher total number of violent protests in the neighbourhood is 
                                                          
60 See the Appendix A3.6 for the regression tables of the spatial regression models. 
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associated with lower scales of violent protests in a municipality. A possible 
explanation for this is that municipalities with relatively high scales of violent protests 
increase the neighbourhood protest value for municipalities with modest levels of 
violent protests and induce this correlation. Investigating the spatial correlation of 
protests further indicates that significant clustering only occurs around a few 
municipalities.  
With regard to all protests, more densely populated municipalities are estimated 
to have experienced significantly higher rates of protests. This makes intuitive sense: 
the denser the municipality is populated the easier it is to mobilise people. However, 
population density does not seem to be driving violent protests as indicated by the 
statistically insignificant coefficient estimate. The share of ANC voters has a 
considerable negative and statistically significant effect on all protests. Yet the standard 
error of this variable is rather large, and the variable loses its significance when 
estimating violent protests. This might imply that there are more peaceful, political 
protests in municipalities where the opposition parties challenge the dominance of the 
ANC, but that party politics do not have as clear influence on the variation of violent 
protests.  
General economic development, captured by the nightlight emissions, does not 
appear to explain local-level protest scales in municipalities. However, the presence of 
mines has the anticipated positive and significant effect on protests. The economic 
importance of mines in South Africa and the disputes surrounding labour rights and 
distribution of the wealth produced by the mine industry explains these results. 
Notably, controlling for mines does not alter the interpretation with regard to the main 
independent variable. Finally, municipalities with a history of more centralised pre-
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colonial communities are estimated to have lower scales of protests, yet this correlation 
is not robust.  
 
Expanding the Analysis 
I use several additional tests to assess the strength of the results (see Appendix A3.3–
3.10 for the model specifications). First, I include a measure of local state capacity 
(municipality staff per capita) as the overall strength of the local state can influence the 
weight of TAs in the municipality and the motivations and opportunities to protest. 
While the indicator has a negative, substantially small effect on protest rates, its 
inclusion does not change the results regarding the main independent variable.  
Furthermore, I exclude all metropolitan areas from the baseline models. 
Metropolitan municipalities have generally higher protest levels and motivations to 
protest there can differ from other local municipalities. Excluding these areas in fact 
increases the substantive effect of the proportion of contested TAs on protest levels. 
The core results remain robust also when excluding other possible outliers with 
particularly high rates of protests. In order to further examine the neighbourhood 
effects, I include a simple control of the neighbouring municipalities’ proportion of 
contested TAs instead of the spatial lag of the independent variable. The results remain 
unaltered in this model specification.  
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Table 3.3. Modelling protests across all municipalities in South Africa 
 Model 8 Model 9 
 (log) total protests (log) violent protests 
Proportion of contested TAs 0.596* 0.743** 
 (0.256) (0.244) 
Presence of TA -0.042 -0.108 
 (0.192) (0.206) 
Number of TAs 0.010 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.017) 
Average nightlight 1.704 2.654 
 (2.187) (2.193) 
(log) Population density 0.181*** 0.199*** 
 (0.045) (0.044) 
Share of black South Africans 0.073 0.062 
 (0.572) (0.552) 
Mines 0.074 -0.043 
 (0.131) (0.151) 
Pre-colonial centralization 0.001 -0.038 
 (0.068) (0.072) 
ANC share -0.518 0.114 
 (0.505) (0.630) 
(log) Past protests 0.553*** 0.428*** 
 (0.064) (0.062) 
Constant -0.448 -2.330*** 
 (0.627) (0.629) 
Observations 217 217 
R2 0.709 0.623 
Standard errors clustered by municipality, province dummies not reported in the table. †p<0.1, 
*p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001. 
 
 
Furthermore, while the primary focus of this chapter is on municipalities with 
dual structures of local state and TAs (thus comparing municipalities with contested 
TAs to those with uncontested TAs), it is intriguing to examine whether the effect of 
contested TAs holds when the empirical analysis is expanded to cover all South African 
municipalities (e.g. including also those that do not have any TAs). Table 3.3 replicates 
models 4 and 6 but expands the analysis to cover all South African municipalities. 
Notably, widening the geographical scope does not diminish the effect of the 
proportion of contested TAs in a municipality. As models 8–9 illustrate, the estimated 
influence of the proportion of contested TAs increases when including all 
municipalities. Interestingly, the coefficient of presence versus absence of TAs is not 
statistically significant. While the presence of TAs does not itself influence the 
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prospects for protests, the presence of contested TAs has a distinct protest-inducing 
effect – even when including municipalities that do not have any TA structures in place.  
Finally, in order to test the robustness of the findings across different 
operationalisations of the dependent variable, I estimate protest levels in all 
municipalities using a more conservative approach to what counts as a protest. First, I 
restrict the focus to those peaceful and violent protests that De Juan and Wegner (2017) 
have coded under the categories of state, service, identity, and elections-related 
protests. The results remain in line with the core models. Second, I focus solely on state 
and service-related protests as these can be seen to derive most directly from 
malfunctional and illegitimate governance. The effect of contested TAs remains robust.  
Third, I turn to the ACLED dataset and its protest and riot categories. Notably, 
ACLED codes significantly fewer incidents of protests and riots in the time period than 
the South African Police Incidents Registration Information Service. Different coding 
schemes explain this difference.61 Due to the high rate of zero events in municipalities 
I use protest/riot incidents between 2011–2013 as the dependent variable while 
controlling for the number of protests in 2003. The results of the analysis using logit 
models estimating the likelihood of protest/riot incidents in a municipality are in line 
with the results from the main analyses. Contested TAs increase the likelihood of a 
protest and/or riot event taking place in a local municipality (both when the analysis is 
restricted to municipalities with TA structures and when all South African 
municipalities are examined).  
                                                          
61 ACLED (2010) collects and geocodes events of political violence, demonstrations, riots, and other 
politically significant events defines protests as “a public demonstration in which the participants do not 
engage in violence”, while rioting refers to “violent form of demonstration where the participants engage 
in violent acts, including but not limited to rock throwing, property destruction, etc.”. ACLED’s data 
collection is based on news reports, which explains the considerably lower number of events reported in 
many municipalities. Smaller events in rural areas can be easily left unreported in news agencies and, 
thus, many small events captured by the IRIS-data have been left out in the ACLED-data. 
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Qualitative Evidence: Contested TAs Undermining Governance 
While the statistical analysis points to a systematic correlation between contested TA 
structures and local protests, it does not directly tackle the mechanisms through which 
contested structures contribute to increasing local unrest. In order to examine the issue 
more in-depth, I use qualitative evidence from semi-structured key informant 
interviews with policy-makers, representatives of TAs, and civil society members as 
well as two community focus-group discussions in South Africa in April-June 2017.62 
The qualitative evidence helps to unpack how contested TAs have facilitated 
mobilisation and influenced the accountability of individual traditional leaders. 
Examples also point to a more general challenge of governance efficacy in 
municipalities with contested TA structures. 
First, contested TAs appear to facilitate mobilisation against current power 
holders around existing issues of incompatibilities. As a public official noted, 
contesting factions (particularly traditional leaders challenging the current incumbents) 
can fuel existing grievances to mobilise support for themselves and against their 
rivalries.63 This was evident in the case of the AmaMpondo community in Eastern 
Cape, where the parties to the customary kingship contest used the substantive issue of 
controversial land-use plans to gain grassroots support for themselves. An interviewed 
community elder, who was fiercely against the controversial land-use initiatives in the 
area, expressed strong allegiance and gratitude towards the currently dethroned TAs 
who actively supported the opposition against the local government’s plans. The elder 
discredited the incumbent TAs (who had allied with the local state on the land-use 
                                                          
62 The author conducted the interviews in Cape Town, Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg, Durban, Ngquza Hill, 
Mbizana, and Bhisho in the spring and summer 2017. See Appendix A3.11 for more information.  
63 Interview with a public official in Pretoria, May 2017. 
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plans) and did not view them as legitimate leaders of the community. Moreover, while 
the participants in the two focus groups generally considered their communities to be 
peaceful, the ongoing TA contest was recognised as exacerbating communal tensions. 
Both of the focus groups reported that the kingship contest can spread to the grassroots 
level and ‘causes divisions at the lowest level’, as mobilisation around other substantive 
issues takes place along the contesting leadership lines.64 
Second, TA contest is seen to facilitate forum-shopping behaviour whereby the 
state can select between the rival factions in a contested TA structure and formally 
nominate those leader candidates that will act in a manner favourable to the state’s 
interests.  This fosters elite-alliances that can undermine public goods provisions and 
increase grievances. The following interview extract describes the perspective of a 
currently dethroned traditional leader: 
 
‘Because the government now picks and chooses whoever is going to be their puppet. 
[…] in our case they will choose […] because you’re gonna give him a bottle of whisky 
and he will sign off all the land’. 
 
More neutral interviewees also recognised the problem of accountability of the 
contested TAs. As one informant noted, for those traditional leaders that face contest 
or whose continuing power position is otherwise endangered, the temptation to abuse 
power in order to gain short-term profits is particularly high: ‘so instead of playing 
long-term, they are looking at can I get something now before I vacate. They don’t 
have that kind of long-term planning’. Reports from areas with contested TAs and an 
incumbent that is perceived unaccountable and co-opted by the local state elites support 
                                                          
64 The focus group discussions took place in two villages in Mbizana local municipality. The participants 
were mostly household heads and sub-headmen. 
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this argument.65 For example, in Mogalakwena municipality (Limpopo province), 
protests concerning land have taken place in response to decision-making by a 
contested chief and the local state.66  
Aside facilitating mobilisation against the local administration and changing the 
rationale of the incumbent TAs, TA contest seems to harm governance efficacy by 
preventing development at the local level. In Kwazulu-Natal, the Mbuyazi clan has 
reportedly been deprived of considerable funds due to a TA contest.67 The subsequent 
lack of development has led to protests in the area. This incapacitation of local 
governance in TA contest situations was brought up also in the key informant 
interviews. Describing a contested TA in Limpopo, a public official noted that 
‘everything stagnated there, up until that [the contested structure] was resolved’.  
Albeit supporting the hypothesis, the reduced governance efficacy due to 
contested TAs points to a slightly different mechanism than theoretically suggested. 
Instead of deliberate lack of accountability, TA contest can also simply lead to 
decreased efficacy of policy initiatives and governance in general, which strengthens 
grievances and sparks protests. A representative of a contested traditional leadership 
alluded to this when stating their fears that the TA contest would continue contributing 
to grievances and eventually lead to the community rising against all authority sides 
due to neglect of general development and welfare. 
 
 
                                                          
65 See Channel NewsAsia (2017), accessed through Lexis Nexis database. 
66 Similar outbursts of grievances have taken place in the Moses Kotane municipality, where a contested 
incumbent TA has been accused for abusing his authority and depriving development from the wider 
community. 
67 See Harper (2017), accessed through Lexis Nexis database. 
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3.8.Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the implications of contested versus uncontested TAs for 
local-level stability in contexts portrayed by state–TA dualism. The chapter has 
combined data on local-level protests with new data on uncontested versus contested 
TA structures in South Africa in order to examine whether municipalities with 
contested TA structures experience more local instabilities than municipalities with 
uncontested TA structures. The empirical findings support the theoretical proposition. 
Municipalities where TA structures are factionalised into competing claimants for 
specific authority positions have recently experienced significantly higher scales of 
protests than municipalities with uncontested TA structures. The effect of contested 
TAs remains robust under various model specifications.  
A few concluding remarks deserve attention here. First, the results contribute to 
an increasing number of studies that have demonstrated the influence of traditional 
governance institutions in the modern state. Corroborating the findings of recent 
empirical studies (Logan, 2009, 2013; Baldwin, 2015; Wig, 2016; De Juan, 2017; Wig 
and Kromrey, 2018), the results show that traditional institutions can yield significant 
influence in the local governance realities. Aside and through their de facto importance 
in the lives of local communities, TAs influence local-level grievances and contribute 
to mobilising people. The qualitative data has further highlighted how contested TA 
structures lower the efficiency of local governance institutions and facilitate 
contentious mobilisation around local issues of incompatibilities.  
Second, the results highlight the importance of the structure of TAs for their 
societal implications. The main contribution of the chapter is to demonstrate that rather 
than being a question about negative versus positive implications, systematic factors – 
e.g. the contested versus uncontested nature of the TAs – influence the way TAs 
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contribute to local-level realities. It is noteworthy that the effects of contested TAs 
remain considerable even when expanding the analysis to cover municipalities without 
any state–TA dualism in place.  
Aside supporting the theoretical proposition here, the findings bear general 
implications for the policy of recognising traditional leadership and outsourcing the 
institution authority at the local level. Specifically, the empirical findings suggest that 
governments concerned about the participation of TAs in local governance may want 
to investigate the historical cohesion and the current structure of the TAs that are to be 
recognised prior to their accommodation, as the recognition itself can exacerbate 
problems associated to contested TAs. In relation to this, future studies should pay 
closer attention to how contest over TA positions influences societies outside the 
context of state-recognition of TAs.  
Furthermore, while the results suggest that contested TAs can escalate grievances 
and provide opportunities to protest, less focus has been given to the potentially 
constructive role of TAs. The conditions and the extent that TAs can yield positive 
influence at the local level remains understudied. Can historically cohesive traditional 
leaderships have a significantly positive influence in the quality of local governance or 
do they simply cause less trouble?  
Finally, future studies should continue tracing the historical continuities in the 
variation of local-level governance institutions. Recent studies from Wig and Kromrey 
(2018) and De Juan (2017) demonstrate the continuing influence that pre-colonial 
institutions have on post-colonial societies. This chapter has found historically 
constructed contests over the customary right to govern to influence protest levels of 
local municipalities where TAs are recognised. To what extent historical coherence or 
contestation of local governance institutions influences such important outcomes as 
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democratisation or armed conflict dynamics should be the focus of future research. In 
light of the popularity of the policy of accommodation of TAs, it is vital to understand 
the extent to which historical dependencies determine the role that traditional 
leadership structures play alongside the local state structures.  
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3.9.Appendices 
A3.1 Different types of traditional authority contests in local municipalities with state-
recognised TA structures 
Type of TA contest N 
Kingship 5 
Senior traditional leadership (chiefs) 12 
Headman 3 
Multiple form of contest within a municipality 3 
 
A3.2 Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
 
 Obs Min  Max Mean St.Dev. Source 
Presence of TA contest 
in a municipality 
111 0 1 .2072072 .4071434 Author 
Proportion of 
contested TAs 
111 0 1 .0979608     .2584407 Author 
Number of TAs in a 
municipality 
111 1 30 7.099099     5.463856 Author 
Average nightlight 111 0701538 .2402316 .098931     0313519  
Log population 
density 
110 9.013189 16.04859 12.413 1.196504 2011 Census 
Share of black South 
Africans 
111 .7379938 .9971096 .9557657 .0584399 2011 Census 
Mines 111 0 1 .2882883 .4550202 U.S. geological 
survey (2005) 
       
Pre-colonial centralis. 111 0 3 1.774775     1.310341           Wig (2016) 
ANC share 111 .1212669 .9512468 .6987389     .1792136    Electoral 
commission of 
South Africa 
(2011) 
Municipality staff per 
capita 
 136.4 50777.5 2109.754 6341.238 2011 Census 
Log protests 2001-
2003 
110 0 7.164721 3.60663     1.450024 De Juan and 
Wegner (2017) 
Neighbouring 
municipality protests  
110 0 36.5368 17.88973     7.004917           De Juan and 
Wegner (2017) 
Neighbouring 
municipality violent 
protest 
110 0 16.47318 7.924784     3.362002           De Juan and 
Wegner (2017) 
Neighbouring 
municipality share of 
contested TAs 
110 0 2 .3712338 .5115143 Author 
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A3.3 Including municipality staff per capita measure68 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 (log) total 
protests 
(log) total 
protests 
(log) violent 
protests 
(log) violent 
protests 
Presence of contested 
TA 
0.326*  0.452**  
 (0.148)  (0.166)  
Proportion of 
contested TAs 
 0.483*  0.543* 
  (0.204)  (0.211) 
Number of TAs 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.018 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) 
Average nightlight 0.319 0.407 1.772 2.077 
 (3.289) (3.255) (4.170) (4.164) 
(log) Population 
density 
0.184* 0.178* 0.142 0.130 
 (0.088) (0.087) (0.095) (0.097) 
Share of black South 
Africans 
-0.324 -0.095 -2.662 -2.408 
 (2.400) (2.354) (1.832) (1.785) 
Mines 0.422* 0.395* 0.378† 0.357† 
 (0.169) (0.162) (0.200) (0.198) 
Pre-colonial 
centralization 
-0.205† -0.213† -0.166 -0.174 
 (0.118) (0.122) (0.128) (0.132) 
ANC share -1.693** -1.689** -0.874 -0.862 
 (0.611) (0.618) (0.849) (0.867) 
(log) past protests 0.482*** 0.493*** 0.380*** 0.396*** 
 (0.087) (0.086) (0.079) (0.080) 
Neighbour protests -0.025 -0.026   
 (0.018) (0.018)   
Municipality staff per 
capita 
-0.000† -0.000† -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Neighbour viol. 
protests 
  -0.057† -0.061* 
   (0.029) (0.030) 
Constant 1.315 1.207 2.050 1.990 
 (2.241) (2.225) (2.310) (2.320) 
Observations 104 104 104 104 
R2 0.722 0.719 0.669 0.660 
 
A3.4 Models excluding metropolitan areas 
 (1) (2) 
 (log) total protests (log) violent protests 
Proportion of contested TAs 0.543* 0.652** 
 (0.230) (0.232) 
Number of TAs 0.018 0.021 
 (0.013) (0.018) 
Average nightlight 1.045 4.180 
 (3.389) (4.634) 
                                                          
68 All models in this Appendix have standard errors, clustered by municipality, reported in parentheses; 
†p<0.1, *p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001, province dummies not reported in the tables 
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(log) Population density 0.175† 0.097 
 (0.098) (0.103) 
Share of black South Africans -0.255 -2.562 
 (2.625) (1.864) 
Mines 0.365* 0.320 
 (0.152) (0.208) 
Pre-colonial centralization -0.221 -0.193 
 (0.133) (0.139) 
ANC share -1.604** -0.803 
 (0.603) (0.897) 
(log) past protests 0.494*** 0.412*** 
 (0.088) (0.084) 
Neighbour protests -0.026†  
 (0.015)  
Neighbour viol. protests  -0.074** 
  (0.028) 
Constant 1.234 2.285 
 (2.206) (2.122) 
Observations 106 106 
R2 0.705 0.607 
 
 
A3.5 Excluding outliers with extremely high protest levels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 (log) total protests (log) total protests 
(log) violent 
protests 
(log) violent 
protests 
Presence of 
contested TA 
0.346*  0.551**  
 (0.143)  (0.185)  
Number of TAs 0.016 0.015 0.021 0.021 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) 
Proportion of 
contested TAs 
 0.571**  0.827** 
  (0.214)  (0.251) 
Average nightlight -3.119 -2.490 4.779 5.641 
 (5.483) (5.477) (5.518) (5.635) 
(log) Population 
density 
0.201* 0.202* 0.077 0.068 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.103) (0.106) 
Share of black 
South Africans 
-0.022 0.147 -2.745 -2.357 
 (2.740) (2.707) (1.868) (1.828) 
Mines 0.404† 0.363* 0.240 0.179 
 (0.171) (0.169) (0.206) (0.213) 
Pre-colonial 
centralization 
-0.212† -0.218† -0.198 -0.217 
 (0.121) (0.125) (0.131) (0.137) 
ANC share -1.291* -1.324* -0.938 -0.987 
 (0.539) (0.544) (0.905) (0.924) 
(log) past protests 0.417*** 0.429*** 0.361*** 0.382*** 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.083) (0.083) 
Neighbour protests -0.018 -0.019   
 (0.015) (0.015)   
Neighbour viol. 
protests 
  -0.070* -0.076** 
   (0.028) (0.028) 
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Constant 0.797 0.646 2.802 2.608 
 (2.406) (2.384) (2.120) (2.136) 
Observations 100 100 101 101 
R2 0.653 0.651 0.538 0.526 
 
A3.6 Neighbouring municipalities proportion of contested TAs included 
 (1) (2) 
 (log) total protests (log) violent protests 
Proportion of contested TAs 0.552** 0.533* 
 (0.205) (0.226) 
Number of TAs 0.016 0.022 
 (0.013) (0.018) 
Average nightlight 1.201 2.916 
 (3.178) (4.002) 
(log) Population density 0.185* 0.112 
 (0.076) (0.089) 
Share of black South Africans -0.112 -2.801† 
 (2.170) (1.589) 
Mines 0.379* 0.356† 
 (0.157) (0.197) 
Pre-colonial centralization -0.206* -0.164 
 (0.115) (0.125) 
ANC share -1.631** -0.654 
 (0.596) (0.856) 
(log) past protests 0.504*** 0.419*** 
 (0.084) (0.081) 
Neighbour protests -0.028†  
 (0.016)  
Proportion of contested TAs in neighbouring munic. -0.206† -0.097 
 (0.121) (0.169) 
Neighbour viol. protests  -0.072* 
  (0.028) 
Constant 1.041 2.300 
 (1.947) (1.953) 
Observations 110 110 
R2 0.752 0.672 
 
A3.6 Spatial models estimating (log) violent protests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SAR-model SLX-model SEM-model SAR & SEM  
Proportion of contested TAs 0.870* 0.626** 0.941** 0.913* 
 (0.360) (0.224) (0.363) (0.363) 
Number of TAs -0.008 0.012 -0.014 -0.016 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Average nightlight -4.046 2.812 -2.304 -1.537 
 (3.585) (4.129) (3.891) (4.092) 
(log) Population density 0.203† 0.132 0.291* 0.298** 
 (0.117) (0.096) (0.117) (0.112) 
Share of black South Africans -3.212 -1.992 -0.586 0.052 
 (2.009) (1.773) (2.063) (2.120) 
Mines 0.367† 0.350† 0.294 0.270 
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 (0.216) (0.197) (0.222) (0.222) 
Pre-colonial centralization -0.066 -0.173 -0.147 -0.188 
 (0.084) (0.128) (0.100) (0.123) 
ANC share 0.321 -0.915 0.257 0.275 
 (0.598) (0.842) (0.680) (0.706) 
(log) Past protests 0.444*** 0.400*** 0.448*** 0.446*** 
 (0.083) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080) 
Neighbour viol. protests  -0.062*   
  (0.030)   
SLX1  -0.171   
  (0.171)   
Constant 0.771 1.601 -2.412 -2.857 
 (2.615) (2.330) (2.766) (2.652) 
     
lambda 0.166*   -0.114 
 (0.097)   (0.181) 
     
sigma2 0.733***  0.692*** 0.669*** 
 (0.102)  (0.098) (0.103) 
     
rho   0.355** 0.456* 
   (0.131) (0.186) 
Observations 103 103 103 103 
Log pseudolikelihood -130.536 -116.578 -128.991 -128.792 
 
A3.7 Measures of local spatial autocorrelation (Moran's Ii (log violent protests) 
Municipality     Ii    E(Ii)  sd(Ii) z p-value* 
   
Matatiele   1.295  -0.010   0.698 1.868 0.062 
Mbizana  -0.022  -0.010   0.395 -0.032 0.975 
Ntabankulu   0.016  -0.010   0.435 0.060 0.952 
Umzimvubu   0.140  -0.010   0.435 0.343 0.731 
Amahlathi  -0.087  -0.010   0.435 -0.178 0.858 
Mbhashe   0.174  -0.010   0.567 0.325 0.746 
Mnquma   0.059  -0.010   0.489 0.141 0.888 
Ngqushwa  -0.687  -0.010   0.698 -0.969 0.333 
Nkonkobe   0.032  -0.010   0.489 0.086 0.931 
Buffalo City  -0.739  -0.010   0.567 -1.285 0.199 
Emalahleni  -0.141  -0.010   0.489 -0.269 0.788 
Engcobo  -0.159  -0.010   0.395 -0.377 0.706 
Intsika Yethu  0.361  -0.010   0.395 0.939 0.348 
Lukanji  -0.139  -0.010   0.489 -0.264 0.791 
Sakhisizwe   0.444  -0.010   0.435 1.044 0.297 
Elundini   0.319  -0.010   0.364 0.904 0.366 
Senqu  -0.905  -0.010   0.567 -1.578 0.115 
King Sabata Dal. -0.406  -0.010   0.435 -0.910 0.363 
Mhlontlo   0.081  -0.010   0.435 0.208 0.835 
Ngquza Hill   0.067  -0.010   0.489 0.157 0.875 
Nyandeni   0.094  -0.010   0.435 0.239 0.811 
Port St Johns   0.336  -0.010   0.698 0.495 0.621 
Mangaung   0.000   0.000   0.000 . . 
Maluti a Phof,  -0.032  -0.010   0.698 -0.032 0.974 
City of Tshwane  0.876  -0.010   0.489 1.812 0.070 
Dannhauser   0.079  -0.010   0.993 0.089 0.929 
KwaDukuza   0.152  -0.010   0.489 0.330 0.741 
Mandeni  -0.388  -0.010   0.698 -0.541 0.588 
Maphumulo  -1.035  -0.010   0.435 -2.355 0.019 
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Ndwedwe  -0.167  -0.010   0.489 -0.321 0.748 
Ingwe   0.564  -0.010   0.435 1.319 0.187 
Ubuhlebezwe   0.531  -0.010   0.435 1.243 0.214 
Umzimkhulu   1.370  -0.010   0.489 2.822 0.005 
Ezingoleni   0.046  -0.010   0.489 0.114 0.910 
Hibiscus Coast  0.022  -0.010   0.567 0.056 0.955 
Umdoni  -0.083  -0.010   0.698 -0.105 0.917 
UMuziwabantu  0.545  -0.010   0.489 1.135 0.257 
Umzumbe  -0.371  -0.010   0.364 -0.993 0.321 
Vulamehlo   0.061  -0.010   0.435 0.162 0.871 
Impendle   0.063  -0.010   0.567 0.129 0.898 
Mkhambathini -0.606  -0.010   0.489 -1.219 0.223 
Richmond  -0.211  -0.010   0.435 -0.462 0.644 
The Msunduzi -0.617  -0.010   0.435 -1.395 0.163 
uMshwathi  -0.240  -0.010   0.489 -0.471 0.637 
Hlabisa   0.764  -0.010   0.395 1.959 0.050 
Jozini   0.921  -0.010   0.489 1.904 0.057 
Mtubatuba   0.030  -0.010   0.698 0.056 0.955 
Umhlabuyalingana 1.536  -0.010   0.993 1.558 0.119 
Msinga  -0.053  -0.010   0.435 -0.100 0.920 
Nqutu  -0.016  -0.010   0.489 -0.013 0.989 
Umvoti   0.000  -0.010   0.435 0.023 0.981 
Emnambithi/Ladys. 0.037  -0.010  0.435 0.108  0.914 
Imbabazane   0.244  -0.010   0.567 0.447 0.655 
Indaka  -0.219  -0.010   0.567 -0.369 0.712 
Okhahlamba  -0.109  -0.010   0.489 -0.204 0.839 
Umtshezi  -0.066  -0.010   0.435 -0.130 0.897 
Mfolozi   0.278  -0.010   0.489 0.588 0.556 
Nkandla  -0.143  -0.010   0.395 -0.336 0.737 
Ntambanana   0.385  -0.010   0.435 0.908 0.364 
uMhlathuze  -0.576  -0.010   0.567 -0.998 0.318 
uMlalazi   0.112  -0.010   0.395 0.308 0.758 
Abaqulusi  -0.064  -0.010   0.435 -0.126 0.900 
eDumbe  -0.082  -0.010   0.489 -0.149 0.882 
Nongoma   0.160  -0.010   0.435 0.390 0.696 
Ulundi  -0.331  -0.010   0.395 -0.814 0.416 
UPhongolo   0.027  -0.010   0.435 0.085 0.932 
Aganang   0.610  -0.010   0.489 1.268 0.205 
Blouberg   0.280  -0.010   0.435 0.666 0.505 
Lepele-Nkumpi 0.047  -0.010   0.364 0.157 0.876 
Molemole   0.418  -0.010   0.435 0.984 0.325 
Polokwane  -0.516  -0.010   0.489 -1.036 0.300 
Ba-Phalaborwa 0.059  -0.010   0.489 0.141 0.888 
Greater Giyani -0.017  -0.010   0.567 -0.013 0.990 
Greater Letaba 0.075  -0.010   0.489 0.173 0.862 
Maruleng  -0.447  -0.010   0.435 -1.005 0.315 
Ephraim Mogale 0.537  -0.010   0.567 0.964 0.335 
Fetakgomo  -0.008  -0.010   0.567 0.004 0.997 
Greater Tubatse -0.493  -0.010   0.435 -1.110 0.267 
Makhudutham.  -0.006  -0.010   0.489 0.007 0.994 
Makhado  -0.258  -0.010   0.489 -0.508 0.611 
Lephalale  -0.155  -0.010   0.698 -0.208 0.835 
Mogalakwena  -0.027  -0.010   0.435 -0.040 0.968 
Bushbuckridge 0.254  -0.010   0.435 0.606 0.545 
Mbombela   1.598  -0.010   0.489 3.289 0.001 
Nkomazi   1.942  -0.010   0.698 2.795 0.005 
Thaba Chweu 0.300  -0.010   0.489 0.633 0.527 
Albert Luthuli 0.548  -0.010   0.698 0.799 0.425 
Mkhondo  -0.044  -0.010   0.489 -0.069 0.945 
Pixley Ka Seme -0.007  -0.010   0.698 0.004 0.997 
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Dr JS Moroka  -0.624  -0.010   0.567 -1.082 0.279 
Thembisile   0.248  -0.010   0.698 0.370 0.712 
Madibeng   2.890  -0.010   0.489 5.930 0.000 
Moretele   0.537  -0.010   0.698 0.783 0.433 
Moses Kotane   2.088  -0.010   0.567 3.696 0.000 
Rustenburg   3.564  -0.010   0.698 5.116 0.000 
Greater Taung 0.622  -0.010   0.698 0.904 0.366 
Kagisano/Molopo 0.239  -0.010   0.567 0.439 0.661 
Ditsobotla   0.360  -0.010   0.567 0.652 0.514 
Mafikeng   0.527  -0.010   0.489 1.098 0.272 
Ramotshere Moiloa 0.787  -0.010   0.567 1.405 0.160 
Ratlou   0.192  -0.010   0.567 0.355 0.723 
Tswaing  -0.251  -0.010   0.567 -0.425 0.671 
Joe Morolong   0.539  -0.010   0.698 0.786 0.432 
 
*Municipalities that are bolded show significant local spatial clustering of violent protests (p<0.05). 
 
A3.9 Restricted protest data (specific protest categories) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Restricted protest 
counts 
Restricted violent 
protest counts 
State and service 
related protest counts 
    
Proportion of contested TAs 0.556* 0.621** 0.627** 
 (0.247) (0.207) (0.207) 
TA presence -0.133 0.023 -0.119 
 (0.208) (0.191) (0.204) 
Number of TAs 0.021 -0.002 0.009 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) 
Average nightlight -1.190 -0.326 -1.080 
 (2.652) (2.041) (2.202) 
(log) Population density 0.217*** 0.184** 0.213*** 
 (0.050) (0.057) (0.053) 
Share of black South 
Africans 
-0.683 0.046 -0.122 
 (0.565) (0.571) (0.581) 
Mines -0.042  -0.166 
 (0.138)  (0.156) 
Pre-colonial centralization 0.044 0.081 0.056 
 (0.064) (0.067) (0.065) 
ANC share 0.324 0.146 0.062 
 (0.504) (0.576) (0.563) 
Past protests 0.372*** 0.346*** 0.436*** 
 (0.064) (0.059) (0.063) 
Constant -2.359*** -1.965*** -1.945*** 
 (0.548) (0.563) (0.563) 
Observations 217 217 217 
R2 0.564 0.565 0.612 
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A3.10 Protests and riots in 2011-2013 using ACLED-data (logit models) 
 (1) (2) 
 ACLED all 
municipalities 
ACLED only TA 
municipalities 
Proportion of contested TAs 2.510* 2.986* 
 (1.120) (1.493) 
Number of TAs -0.024 0.110 
 (0.041) (0.069) 
Average nightlight 12.602† -11.590 
 (7.613) (13.004) 
(log) Population density 0.316* 0.446 
 (0.148) (0.309) 
Share of black South 
Africans 
2.496† -20.437† 
 (1.428) (11.725) 
Mines 0.124 -0.097 
 (0.550) (0.743) 
Pre-colonial centralization -0.035 0.905 
 (0.186) (0.558) 
ANC share -0.488 -0.890 
 (1.600) (1.949) 
Past protests 0.377 0.722 
 (0.259) (0.826) 
Constant -4.789* 16.558 
 (1.868) (13.323) 
Observations 207 106 
Log pseudolikelihood -104.588 -48.204 
 
 
A3.11 Qualitative data 
As part of this research project, a small number of semi-structured interviews and focus 
group discussions were conducted in South Africa in the spring and summer 2017.69 
The table below reports basic information concerning the interviews and the 
questionnaire that guided the interviews and focus group discussions in Mbizana and 
Ngquza Hill municipalities is included. All interviews were recorded upon receiving 
consent from the interviewees/participants. The interviews lasted normally around 1.5-
2h. Further information regarding the qualitative data, including the anonymised 
transcripts of the interviews, can be made available by the author upon request. 
                                                          
69 The field research was given Ethical Approval by the Director of Research, Department of 
Government, University of Essex. 
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Affiliation of the 
interviewee 
Location Time Type of interview 
Academic Cape Town April 2017 Personal 
Academic Cape Town  April 2017 Personal 
National public 
official (Focused on 
TA) 
Pretoria May 2017 Group and 
personal 
National public 
official 
(Focused on TA) 
Pretoria May 2017 Group interview 
National public 
official 
(Focused on TA) 
Pretoria May 2017 Group interview 
Land rights activist Pretoria May 2017 Personal 
Provincial public 
official (Focused on 
TA) 
Pietermaritzburg May 2017 Personal 
Provincial public 
official (Focused on 
TA) 
Cape Town - 
Pietermaritzburg 
May 2017 Phone call 
Traditional authority  Pietermaritzburg May 2017 Personal 
Civil society Pietermaritzburg May 2017 Personal 
Civil society Pietermaritzburg May 2017 Personal 
Journalist Durban May 2017 Personal 
Human rights activist Cape Town May 2017 Personal 
Civil Society Matatiele June 2017 Personal 
Traditional authority Ngquza Hill June 2017 Pair 
Traditional authority Ngquza Hill June 2017 Pair 
Elder Mbizana June 2017 Personal 
Provincial public 
official 
Bhisho June 2017 Personal 
Community members Mbizana June 2017 Focus group 
Community members Mbizana June 2017 Focus group 
 
 
Questionnaire for the focus group discussions (all other interviews centred around the 
same thematic issues concerning the role of traditional authorities in South Africa): 
 
1. Background of the respondents: 
- Community, district and municipality background, age, role/occupation, gender 
 
 
2. The role and efficacy of Traditional Leaders 
2.1. Who are the traditional leaders in this area?  
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2.2. How would you say the headman and the senior traditional leader influence the lives 
and welfare of the community members? 
2.3. Can you recall any examples of situations in which the traditional leaders helped the 
community to achieve/get an important improvement in the local conditions? 
2.4. What about the King/Queen/paramount chief, how does he/she influence the lives 
and welfare of the community members? 
2.5. What would you say is the main role of traditional authorities and when do you 
think they are most needed? 
2.6. In some areas of South Africa, there are disputes over who the rightful traditional 
leaders of the communities are. Does this kind of situation influence your 
community? What kind of implications would you say these situations have for the 
community? 
2.7. How do your traditional leaders respond to situations where there are grievances or 
disputes within the community? Are the actions of the traditional leaders generally 
successful or unsuccessful in resolving the issues?  
 
3. Local level conflicts 
3.1. How peaceful or conflict-ridden would you say your community and the wider 
region are on a scale from 0 to 5 (0 being very peaceful and 5 being conflict-
ridden)? 
3.2. In many parts of South Africa, there have been a lot of violent protests concerning 
lack of services and bad governance. From your perspective, does this region 
experience fewer or more protests and other instabilities than other regions that you 
are aware of? 
3.3. Would you say that this region has become more or less peaceful over the recent 
years? Why do you think this is so?  
3.4. Have you ever participated in a protest concerning public services or the way 
decisions have been reached? 
3.5. What would you say are the main challenges related to peace here? 
3.6. What do you think causes the(se) grievances and disputes? 
3.7. What would you say is the role of the traditional authorities in related to the 
conflicts? 
3.8. Can you recall any times when the traditional authorities intervened in a dispute 
situation and tried to resolve it? 
3.9. Who would you say is the best figure to try to resolve a dispute related to a) land, 
and b) public services? 
 
4. Inter-authority relationship between traditional authorities and the local government  
4.1. How would you describe the relationship between the community’s traditional 
authorities and the other public authorities?  
4.2. Would you say that it is good that the traditional authorities cooperate with the local 
ward and municipality councillors? Why is this so/is not so? 
4.3. Have you heard of any incidents where the councillors or some other agents tried to 
pressure the traditional authorities to act in a way that would be damaging for your 
community?  
4.4. What do you think motivates the local councillors in their decision-making process 
(private or collective interests)? 
4.5. What do you think motivates the traditional authorities in their decision-making 
process (private or collective interests)? 
 
5. The relationship between the constituents and the authorities 
5.1. On a scale from 0 to 5 (five being a lot) how much do you trust the traditional 
authorities? Why is this? 
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5.2.  On a scale from 0 to 5 (five being a lot) how much do you trust the local 
councillors? Why is this? 
5.3. Can you recall any times when the traditional leaders failed to consult the 
community concerning an important issue? What were (would be) the implications 
of this kind of situation?  
5.4. What would you say are the main challenges in the relationship between you and the 
different public authorities? 
5.5. If the senior traditional leader/traditional council/kingship decides concerning an 
important issue for the community, do you normally respect that decision even if 
you disagree with it?   
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4. Customary institutional strength and civilian 
victimisation in armed conflicts in sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
4.1.Abstract 
How does the strength of customary institutions influence the strategic use of violence 
against civilians in civil conflicts? Studies on wartime governance have sparked 
increasing interest in the role of civilian agency and authority in shaping armed groups’ 
conduct in conflict. Customary institutions, such as traditional authority and indigenous 
leadership structures, can help to maintain social cohesion and enable collective action 
and coordination during an armed conflict. However, I propose that customary 
institutions that are considered legitimate and efficient can also threaten the interests 
of the armed groups and therefore attract one-sided violence. Strong customary 
institutions can facilitate resistance and are harder to co-opt than weaker institutions, 
thus presenting potential obstacles to an armed group’s control over an area. I use 
geocoded Afrobarometer data to capture the strength of traditional leaders at a local 
level in 12 African countries and examine how this relates to acts of one-sided violence 
by state and non-state armed groups. The analysis indicates that areas with strong 
traditional leaders experience more one-sided violence than areas with weaker 
traditional rulers. In particular, rebel groups appear to target non-combatants in areas 
with strong traditional chiefs. This study suggests that while instrumental in managing 
communal and inter-group tensions, strong local customary institutions can 
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paradoxically attract more violence when they stand against the interests of armed 
groups fighting over the future political order of the state.  
 
4.2.Introduction 
Armed conflicts induce deadly violence and havoc upon the societies in which they 
occur. Yet violence during civil conflicts does not target all subnational regions and 
localities equally but varies considerably within state borders both in its intensity and 
type (Kalyvas, 2006). Specifically, one-sided violence by non-state and state armed 
groups that targets civilians varies across localities. Nor do armed conflicts occur in 
governance vacuums or tear down all pre-existing institutions and induce a state of 
anarchy. Armed parties act in a web of existing local governance institutions and social 
structures that vary in their shape and their strength (Kalyvas, 2003; Mampilly, 2011; 
Arjona, 2015; Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, 2015; Arjona, 2016b; Kaplan, 2017). 
This chapter investigates the role of customary institutions, particularly 
traditional leadership, in shaping the spatial dynamics of armed violence during civil 
conflicts.70 Specifically, the chapter examines how the strength of these institutions, 
understood as their efficiency and local legitimacy, influences the occurrence of 
violence against civilians in civil conflicts. The recent shift to subnational units of 
analysis in conflict research and studies on wartime governance have sparked 
increasing interest in the role of civilians and their customary and cultural institutions 
in shaping armed groups’ conduct in civil conflicts (Kalyvas, 2006; Arjona, 2016a, 
2016b; Kaplan, 2017). Yet despite acknowledging the influence of civilian agency in 
                                                          
70 Institutions refer to established codes of conduct, agencies, and rules that guide social interactions. 
Customary institutions allude to agencies and shared rules that derive their legitimacy from customs and 
norms of communities rather than from the state’s codified system. They are thus the “social norms; 
customary laws and codes of conduct” and the social structures and networks that direct people’s 
behaviour in a community (see Mazzucato and Niemeijer, 2002, p. 172; North, 1990). 
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conflict contexts, its implications for civilian victimisation remain little explicitly 
considered in cross-country studies on conflict dynamics. Further, the within-country 
studies that examine the influence of customary institutions on wartime realities have 
resulted in puzzling inferences that warrant comparative research across conflict 
contexts. For example, in some contexts, customary institutions appear to have 
safeguarded localities from violence by facilitating coordination and enabling 
communication between the locals and armed groups seeking to control an area or its 
resources (Kaplan, 2017). On the other hand, in some conflicts armed groups have 
violently targeted areas with strong customary institutions believed to threaten the 
interests and control of the armed actor (Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017).  
In line with recent wartime governance literature, I maintain that existing local 
institutions, i.e. customary institutions, affect the way communities are able to provide 
public order and uphold organisation and social cohesion in the course of an armed 
conflict (Kaplan, 2017; Arjona, 2016b). Customary institutions that are considered 
legitimate and effective, e.g. that are strong, are particularly useful in this regard. 
However, strong customary institutions can also pose obstacles to the control of armed 
groups, as they signal the potential to mobilise and are harder to co-opt than less 
legitimate and efficient institutions. Therefore, strong customary institutions can 
become targets of armed groups and drive rather than mitigate violence against 
civilians, even when contributing to the peacefulness of local relations. Specifically, 
this chapter argues that the stronger the customary institutions are in an area the more 
inclined armed groups are to use violence against civilians in order to seize control or 
gain access to local resources.  
In order to test the theoretical proposition and empirically capture the strength of 
customary institutions, this chapter focuses on the institution of traditional authority. 
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Traditional authority is a leadership institution that derives its legitimacy from context-
specifically constructed customs and norms rather than from the modern state 
(Holzinger et al. 2016).71 As an all-encompassing and often hierarchical form of 
customary institution, traditional authority has an important role in maintaining public 
order and communal cohesion across sub-Saharan Africa (Goist and Kern, 2018).  In 
rural areas, traditional chiefs and headmen are often more in control of the local service 
and public goods provisions than the local state, and the institution remains resilient 
also in more urban areas (Mengisteab, 2017).  
The data for traditional authority strength comes from the Afrobarometer survey 
rounds 4 and 6 and covers 12 sub-Saharan African countries. Using survey items 
concerning the quality of local institutions, I capture customary institutional strength 
at a PRIO-GRID cell level as the public trust towards and the salience of local 
traditional authorities. I measure one-sided violence by state forces and non-state armed 
groups (rebels) in the post-survey years using the Armed Conflict Location and Event 
Dataset (ACLED). The results of the empirical analysis point to a positive relationship 
between traditional authority strength and incidents of one-sided violence. Specifically, 
rebel groups appear to target non-combatants in areas with strong traditional chiefs. 
While instrumental in managing communal and inter-group tensions, strong local 
customary institutions can paradoxically attract more violence when they stand against 
the interests of armed groups fighting over control of the state. 
The chapter contributes to the literatures on wartime governance and spatial 
dynamics of armed violence. Considerable comparative research has explored how 
variation in economic conditions and natural resource endowments, population 
characteristics, geopolitics, and climate abnormalities influence variation in armed 
                                                          
71 Traditional authorities yield considerable influence particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where the 
colonial period created bifurcated systems of the modern state and pre-colonial governance structures. 
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violence within states (Le Billon, 2001; Buhaug and Rød, 2006; Raleigh and Hegre, 
2009; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; Detges, 2016; Fjelde et al., 2017; Dulić, 2018). 
Local institutional quality, particularly state capacity, has also received increasing 
attention among scholars studying the determinants of political violence (De Juan and 
Pierskalla, 2015; Linke et al., 2015; Wig and Tollefsen, 2016). While state institutions 
have primary responsibility in ensuring the well-being of the citizens, they often remain 
distant at the local-level in developing countries. As discussed in the previous chapters, 
customary institutions can substitute as well as co-exist with state institutions; inducing 
order, governing social interactions, and contributing to the production of public goods 
and services.72 The de facto salience of customary institutions makes comparative 
research on their role in conflict situations crucial. Focusing explicitly on customary 
institutions, this study corroborates with research highlighting the active civilian 
agency during armed conflicts. Doing so, it contributes to a more nuanced 
understanding of the political geography of civilian victimisation.  
 
4.3.Political geography of civilian victimisation in civil conflicts 
A growing number of empirical studies focus explicitly on the determinants of violence 
against civilians, i.e. one-sided armed violence that directly and deliberately targets 
non-combatants. This sub-field of political violence aims to understand why and how 
civilians caught up in armed conflicts become targets of violence committed by state 
and non-state armed groups, rather than being mere ‘collateral damage’ of battles 
                                                          
72 The significance of traditional authority in particular and customary institutions in general can become 
amplified in times of conflicts, when the state’s rule is fundamentally undermined (Raeymaekers, 
Menkhaus and Vlassenroot, 2008; Raleigh and Linke, 2018). 
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between the conflict parties (Eck and Hultman, 2007; Fjelde et al., 2017; Melander, 
Backer and Dunford, 2017).  
A prominent branch within this field examines the across-group variation in 
violence against civilians and focuses on organisational and structural factors 
explaining this. For example, Weinstein (2005, 2007) contends that different 
mobilisation processes and variation in the organisation of armed groups explain inter-
group variation in the conduct of brutalities against civilians. Accordingly, groups that 
are born in resource rich areas and rely on extractable natural resources tend to attract 
more opportunistic fighters and commit more indiscriminate violence than groups that 
rely on ideological and social ties to attract fighters (Weinstein, 2007). Similarly, 
Beardsley and McQuinn (2009) contend that groups with closer ties to the local 
population are more hesitant to use violence against civilians than groups with external 
resource endowments. Relatedly, groups with more heterogenous pool of combatants 
find it harder to police the conduct of the fighters (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006). 
While this organisational argument uncovers factors explaining differences 
across groups – such as ties between the combatants and the local population 
(Beardsley, Gleditsch and Lo, 2015; Bakke, 2012) – it focuses less on understanding 
the spatial variation of violence against civilians when it does occur. Given the overall 
differences between groups, considerable variation exists within an armed group and 
its use of violence against civilians (Speight, 2013). Another branch of the literature 
highlights the strategic aspect of armed groups’ commissions of civilian victimisation 
by asking more explicit questions about when and where an armed group uses one-
sided violence. Balcells (2010) and Weidman (2011) study how pre-war local power 
dynamics influence subnational variation in violence against civilians during civil 
conflicts. Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsey (2004) propose that states use mass 
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violence against civilians in order to weaken the support base of insurgents that use 
guerrilla tactics. Similarly, Fjelde and Hultman (2014) argue that both state and non-
state armed groups target civilians in areas that are associated with their opponent’s 
support base. They see civilian victimisation as a means to weaken the enemy’s military 
and political capacities (see also Eck and Hultman, 2007; Fjelde et al., 2017). Finally, 
recent empirical contributions suggest that violence against civilians is used in complex 
intrastate conflicts not only to weaken one’s main opponent but also to gain ground in 
the inter-group competition among multiple armed actors and to secure access to a 
finite pool of resources (Speight, 2013; Wood and Kathman, 2015; Koren and Bagozzi, 
2017; Raleigh and Choi, 2017).  
The above studies importantly shed light on how armed groups use violence 
against civilians as a means to weaken their enemies and improve their standing vis-à-
vis other armed groups and available resources. However, they have a tendency of 
overlooking the active agency of civilians. Civilians are differentiated along their 
associated connections to armed groups and these divisions are seen to influence local 
vulnerability towards violence. Yet variation in the institutional capacities of different 
localities remains under-explored. This is problematic, since – as the next section 
clarifies – the way civilians are organised and the types of institutions they have in 
conflict contexts can influence the strategic considerations of armed groups.  
 
4.4.Customary institutions and wartime governance realities 
A growing number of studies acknowledge the significance of customary institutions 
in shaping peace and wartime governance realities in the context of Latin America 
(Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Ruiz-Euler, 2014; Klick, 2016; Kaplan, 2017), sub-
Saharan Africa (Acemoglu, Reed and James A. Robinson, 2014; Baldwin, 2015; 
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Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015; Wig and 
Kromrey, 2018), and South Asia (De Juan, Pierskalla and Vüllers, 2015; Jochem, 
Murtazashvili and Murtazashvili, 2016; Murtazashvili and Murtazashvili, 2016). While 
often far from democratic or unequal power structures, customary institutions – such 
as chieftaincies and indigenous governance structures – induce shared rules and norms 
guiding social interactions at the local level (Meagher, 2007; Raleigh and Linke, 2018). 
This induces social cohesion and trust among individuals, which are necessary for 
cooperation and organisation (Acemoglu, Reed and James A. Robinson, 2014; Jordan, 
2015).  
Of particular importance is the role of customary institutions during civil 
conflicts. Customs and norms that bond communities often become amplified during 
armed conflicts as the state’s rule and institutions are fundamentally contested (Péclard 
and Mechoulan, 2015; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot, 2008). For example, 
in Liberia customary structures proved quintessential for communities during the civil 
war: ‘the most enduring form of collective action that ensured community survival 
despite violent conflicts was undertaken by networks and organisations whose 
membership is based on clan-related identity’ (Sawyer, 2005, p. 10). Similarly, in 
Somalia customary institutions have been critical in providing governance during the 
country’s armed struggles – even enforcing informal pacts and local arrangements with 
transnational actors (Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot, 2008). 
Beyond shaping community resilience in an armed conflict, customary 
institutions can influence the conduct of armed groups vis-à-vis localities and civilians. 
The resent work by Arjona (2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b) and others on rebel and wartime 
governance makes two important recognitions in this regard. First, in their efforts to 
control civilian behaviour, armed actors need to react and adapt to differing ‘authority 
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structures, local norms, and social cohesion’ (Arjona, 2014, p. 1372). Armed groups 
do not only impose control through the use of violence, but they co-opt and assimilate 
local structures in order to maintain their capacity to continue the struggle. Variation 
in the resulted wartime governance institutions does not solely depend on differences 
across armed actors; existing local institutions shape the strategies of armed groups 
(Mampilly, 2011; Arjona, 2014; Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, 2015).  
Second, the efficacy and the legitimacy, i.e. the strength, of local institutions, 
influences the extent and shape of an armed group’s rule over an area (Arjona, 2016a; 
Kaplan, 2017). On the one hand, strong local institutions can facilitate an armed 
group’s governance by providing established ways to implement public order and rules 
(Mampilly, 2011; Kaplan, 2017). Functioning community organisations and clear 
structures of authority can facilitate repeated engagements and the establishment of 
informal agreements between a community and armed groups (Kaplan 2017). 
Simultaneously, however, the more effective and legitimate the existing institutions 
are, the more resistant they can remain against total control by armed groups (Arjona, 
2016b). Civilians with cohesive social structures are better able to bargain with the 
armed groups and can therefore manage to uphold their own forms of rules and 
institutions (Kasfir, 2015). Strong local governance institutions give civilians better 
capacities to organise and sustain social cohesion that helps to retain collective action 
in an armed conflict situation (Arjona, 2016a, 2016b).  
Local institutions are seen to be particularly influential from the perspective of 
the rebels. Rebels often rely on civilian support or compliance for extracting the 
necessary resources to continue their struggle. While violence has an instrumental role 
in forcing compliance in civil war contexts (Kalyvas, 2006), it is not the only available 
strategy to the rebels. However, local governance structures are also important to 
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consider from the state’s perspective. Just like the rebel groups, state forces need to 
react to a variety of different local authorities and social structures in their interactions 
with civilians across the conflict zone.  
Given that customary institutions, as prevalent local institutions, influence the 
resilience of civilians and their interactions with armed groups, how should we expect 
them to influence the use of one-sided violence by these armed groups? While rarely 
the explicit focus of the wartime governance literature, two outcomes can be logically 
derived from the literature. First, customary institutions that provide order and enable 
coordination can safeguard a locality from violence. For example, in Colombia existing 
customary governance structures appeared to enhance civilians’ collective capacities 
and protect communities from brutalities by enabling repeated peaceful interactions 
between the locals and armed groups (Kaplan, 2017). More generally, empirical studies 
suggest that cohesive customary authority structures can reduce uncertainty in the 
interactions among and between groups at the local level and actively contribute to 
conflict mitigation and prevention at a subnational level (Krause, 2017; Wig and 
Kromrey, 2018). Second, the authority and collective action potential that customary 
institutions entail can also appear threatening from the perspective of an armed group 
and create incentives to use violence. Specifically, strong customary institutions signal 
a resistance potential and can be harder to co-opt than weaker institutions, which can 
render them targets of strategic violence. Below I argue that these mechanisms are 
parallel: While customary institutions are often instrumental for local cohesion and 
communication between groups, armed groups are more inclined to use violence 
against them when they are strong because of their perceived threat.  
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4.5.Theory: violence as a means to cut off local alternatives 
Rather than seeing civilians merely as victims of indiscriminate violence during civil 
conflicts, this chapter builds on the premise that civilian agency shapes the rationale 
and therefore the conduct of the armed groups on the ground. In their efforts to succeed 
in and continue their armed struggle, armed groups often rely on local population for 
food, shelter, and other extractable material or immaterial resources (Weinstein, 2007; 
Koren and Bagozzi, 2017). I argue that the strength of customary institutions influences 
the incentives of an armed group to use violence against civilians to secure its interests. 
This does not preclude the significance of other factors – such as organisational 
differences, capacity, and local ties – on the overall sensibility of a group to use 
violence. However, given the different outcomes produced by these factors, I expect 
variation in customary institutional strength to influence the spatial distribution of one-
sided violence by modifying the wartime institutional context in which any armed 
group finds itself. 
By ‘customary institutional strength’ I refer to the legitimacy of customary 
institutions among locals and their efficiency in responding to the local needs. As 
Arjona (2016a) notes, it is the strength of local structures that influences the depth and 
type of order that external armed groups can impose on a locality. There is considerable 
empirical variation in the strength of customary institutions today.73 This variation 
stems from multiple origins, such as different historical trajectories of customary rule, 
wider institutional and national contexts, and contestation within the customary 
structures. I argue that there are two mechanisms through which the strength of 
                                                          
73 Scholars, such as Mamdani (1996) and Ntsebeza (2005) highlight the loss of legitimacy of customary 
authorities in sub-Saharan Africa as a consequence of the co-option and manipulation of them by the 
colonial powers. However, these views tend to neglect the continued public trust towards and salience 
of customary institutions and the empirical variation that exists in this.  
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customary institutions influences the strategic use of violence against civilians by state 
and non-state armed groups. First, the stronger the customary rule is the harder it is for 
an armed group to co-opt locals and guarantee their compliance. Second, strong 
customary authority institutions entail potential to overtly resist the order imposed by 
an armed group. Both of these processes decrease an armed group’s incentive and 
capacity to take advantage of the existing structures and instead increase the incentive 
to violently target them in order to secure its interests within the conflict zone. 
 
Theoretical mechanisms 
In order to take advantage of the existing local institutions and to establish order and 
access to key resources armed groups need at least some level of cooperation from key 
local actors (e.g. local leaders) and general compliance among the locals (Arjona, 
2016a). In other words, armed groups need to assimilate or co-opt existing local 
institutions. However, the level of cooperativeness and compliance among civilians is 
likely influenced by the strength of their own existing governance institutions. The 
stronger the customary structures are the less dependent the locals will be on armed 
groups to provide order and the less willing they will be to handout rule to the armed 
actor. From the perspective of an armed group, this poses a hindrance on establishing 
control and an uncertainty over civilian compliance. This incentivises the armed group 
to use violence in order to secure its interests and eliminate local alternatives to the 
order it seeks to impose. 
Specifically, the more effective and legitimate local customary institutions are in 
providing public order and services, the less dependent they will be on the structures 
and organisation of armed groups. With functioning mechanisms to resolve local 
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disputes and regain a sense of normalcy during an armed conflict, civilians do not need 
to rely on armed groups to impose order. Furthermore, civilians that have access to 
their own viable customary structures outside the realm of armed groups tend to prefer 
maintaining their autonomy as much as possible rather than adopting foreign rules and 
norms instituted by armed groups (Arjona, 2016a). The allegiance of the civilians 
towards their own institutions and authorities creates two challenges of co-option for 
an armed group. First, leaders empowered by customary institutions face downwards 
accountability and pressures to not give their authority away to armed groups. Second, 
the group of civilians as a whole is more difficult to co-opt and/or assimilate into the 
armed group’s governance structures.  
This point can be traced back to Kalyvas’ (2006) argument on the way local feuds 
and conflicts shape the dynamics of intrastate violence. Strong customary institutions 
benefit civilians by providing means to resolve local tensions and enabling the 
maintenance of shared rules and procedures even in the midst of an armed conflict (Wig 
and Kromrey, 2018). Therefore, individuals and groups will have less motivation to 
become informants or denouncers for armed groups or use them to intervene in the 
local feuds when customary institutions are strong. This makes it more difficult for 
armed groups to use local divisions to establish patronage networks. Violence against 
civilians in this scenario serves the strategy of weakening the local cohesion and 
ensuring better access to local resources and control. 
The urgency of an armed conflict situation can further incentivise armed groups 
to use violence when facing a locality with strong customary institutions. Armed 
conflict shortens the time perspective of armed groups and therefore gives rise to the 
use of violence as a means to gain access to necessary resources (Koren and Bagozzi, 
2017). Co-opting or assimilating strong customary institutions is likely to require more 
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time and accommodation than responding non-violently to weaker customs and lines 
of authority. Therefore, in the interest of imposing the desired wartime order, armed 
groups are more likely to target strong customary institutions violently. 
The civil war in Sierra Leone exhibits these dynamics. On the one hand, the 
general weakening and corruption of customary institutions contributed to the 
grievances that led to the armed rebellion in the first place. Moreover, localities with 
internally contested traditional authority institutions saw escalation of local struggles 
during the armed conflict (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004). However, in 
terms of the violence committed by the state and rebel forces, areas with strong 
chieftaincy structures were disproportionally affected. As Raleigh and De Bruijne 
(2017) demonstrate, localities with strong traditional authorities experienced more 
violence than localities where the armed parties were able to co-opt local leaders and 
build stronger patronage networks. The rebel group Revolutionary Armed Forces 
violently targeted strong local chieftaincies while co-opting and assimilating those that 
were weakened by internal disputes. Similarly, the state focused its co-option efforts to 
those traditional authorities that had weaker local status and could be more easily 
assimilated into the state’s own patronage networks (Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017, p. 
1238). Hence, while strong customary institutions mitigated local conflicts, they also 
attracted one-sided violence by armed groups. 
Aside from being more difficult to co-opt, strong customary institutions can 
appear threatening from the perspective of armed groups and thus attract violence to 
weaken the perceived local threat. In their interactions with external armed groups, 
civilians often exhibit strategies beyond compliance and exit/escape, including some 
level of active resistance against violent actors (Arjona, 2016a; Krause, 2018). The 
stronger the local institutions are, the better capacitated civilians are to act collectively 
 148 
and to mobilise resistance against an armed group (ibid.). Pre-empting future resistance 
or responding to actual resistance, an armed actor may choose to resort to targeted one-
sided violence that weakens the collective action potential on the ground.  
Ample evidence exists on the mobilisation potential of customary institutions. 
Within the field of electoral studies, traditional leaders are found to shift election results 
via mobilisation for their allied parties (de Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018). 
Mobilisation for protest movements and revolutions has also benefitted from existing 
customary structures. In a conflict context, localities with strong existing institutions 
are better capacitated to organise early warning mechanisms and respond rapidly to the 
changing conflict dynamics; ‘social cohesion affords civilians greater chances to 
overcome fear, break the “law of silence” and revive communication, and implement 
collective strategies for protection’ (Kaplan, 2017, p. 9).  
While this capacity to organise collective action is beneficial for local cohesion 
and resilience during war and can contribute to communal peace, it presents a 
threatening scenario from the perspective of an armed group. This is because it invokes 
the possibility of active resistance either now or in the future (which the armed actor 
will want to have control over). Therefore, even without any actual resistance taking 
place, the armed group may choose to target the locality violently in order to weaken 
the existing institutions and prevent any future challenges against its interests.   
In sum, I expect that the strength of customary institutions in an area signals both 
the prospects of co-opting the local structures to the advantage of the armed group and 
the resolve of civilians to organise collective resistance against the armed group. In 
localities with weaker customary institutions, armed groups have less to worry in 
regard to mobilisation against their interest and they likely find local actors more 
willing to cooperate and share governance authority. By contrast, in areas with strong 
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customary institutions, violence that targets these structures can be used as an 
instrument to neutralise local concurrence and enforce rule. This leads to the theoretical 
hypothesis. 
 
H1: The stronger the customary institutions are – in the sense of local legitimacy and 
efficiency – the higher the rates of violence against civilians by state and non-stated 
armed groups will be. 
 
If the mechanisms described above are in place, one should expect violence 
against civilians in areas of strong customary institutions to especially target local 
leaders and elites. Traditional authorities are critical junctures in customary institutions 
as they enforce rules and norms and act as intermediaries between locals and external 
actors. Hence, targeting these actors should inflate a heavy toll on the locality and 
weaken its institutions in general; reducing mobilisation potential and making it easier 
for an armed group to seize control. There is some anecdotal evidence that supports 
this line of argument. For example, in South Sudan, the government forces have 
allegedly targeted and killed traditional leaders within communities suspected to 
support the rebel forces. The reasoning behind these acts of violence is believed to be 
weakening of the social structures in place (Sudan Tribune, 2014). Similarly, in 
Nigeria, Boko Haram has reportedly targeted local traditional chiefs and replaced these 
with their own local strongmen (Zenn, 2012). The explicit targeting of customary 
leadership in order to make a locality more vulnerable as a whole and to gain access to 
resources is reported also in the case of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
(Nantulya, 2017).  
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While these examples show the explicit targeting of customary institutions, they 
do not inform us about the relative strength of these institutions before the violence 
took place. Moreover, violence beyond the explicit targeting of leaders can also serve 
a strategy to weaken customary institutions as it exposes the failure of the local 
structures to protect and provide security. In order to test the theoretical argument 
presented here, a systematic empirical analysis is required.  
 
4.6.Research design 
This chapter’s theoretical framework requires an empirical approach that captures both 
violence against civilians in a disaggregated level of analysis and variation in 
customary institutions across small geographical units. Therefore, I adopt an empirical 
approach that uses the geographically fixed PRIO-GRID cells as the spatial units of 
analysis. The PRIO-GRID vector network consists of spatial cells the size of 0.5 x 0.5 
decimal degrees (approximately 55km x 55km at the equator) and covers all terrestrial 
areas in the world (Tollefsen, Strand and Buhaug, 2012). The choice of PRIO-GRID 
cells as the unit of analysis is motivated by three reasons. First, the fixed nature of the 
units facilitates replication of analysis over time and across studies. Second, the size of 
the grid cells enables the capturing of meaningful variation in the strength of customary 
institutions within subnational administrative areas, closer to the actual communities. 
The alternative strategy, using subnational administrative boundaries, would result in 
considerable variation in the size of the spatial unit as well as often too large units to 
capture variation in the strength of customary institutions. Third, while the inherently 
apolitical nature of the grid cells can be seen as a problem for capturing the influence 
of political institutions, it can be an advantage in studying non-state governance 
structures. Customary institutions and the communities adhering to these do not 
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perfectly overlap with administrative areas but cross state-induced boundaries. The 
following sections describe the main variables of interest before turning to the results 
of the analysis.  
 
Independent variable 
I capture my main explanatory variable of interest, the strength of customary 
institutions, by focusing on the institution of traditional authority. As previously 
outlined, traditional authority is a pivotal customary institution that is instrumental for 
social cohesion and bonding social capital in communities (Jordan, 2015; Mengisteab, 
2017b).74 The role of traditional authorities in fostering intra-communal cooperation 
and collective action, and as intermediaries between locals and external actors makes 
them particularly suitable as indicators of customary institutions that shape civilian 
agency during armed conflicts (Goist and Kern, 2018; Wig and Kromrey, 2018).  
Data for traditional authority strength come from the Afrobarometer (2019) 
survey rounds 4 and 6, collected in the years 2008 and 2014. Afrobarometer surveys 
examine public opinion in over 35 African countries with each round capturing 
attitudes around the themes of governance quality, development, and democracy. 
Rounds 4 and 6 include a focus on the quality of different governance institutions. 
Specifically, I use two indicators that appear in both these survey rounds. The first 
indicator measures the respondent’s experience in contacting traditional leaders in the 
past year.75 I use this measure to capture the perceived effectiveness of traditional 
                                                          
74 The institution of traditional leadership can be recognised and codified in the state’s constitutional 
framework, yet it remains customary to the extent that its legitimisation derives from non-state, 
customary codes of conduct (Ubink, 2008; Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2016). 
75 The question asks: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons 
about some important problem or to give them your views: Traditional Leaders? 
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leadership with a higher value indicating higher perceived gains in contacting a 
traditional leader in an important issue. The second indicator measures the respondent’s 
trust towards traditional leaders. This indicator is seen to capture whether the local 
traditional leaders enjoy legitimacy among their subjects in an area. Both questions are 
coded along a scale from 0 to 3 with 0 signifying none/not at all and 3 often/ a lot.  
I use Afrobarometer’s newly geocoded versions and its geographic point 
estimates in aggregating the responses to the PRIO-GRID level. At the grid-cell level 
I take the mean value of the two survey indicators to designate the strength of 
traditional authorities. The resulted independent variable is normally distributed with a 
mean value of 1.37 (round 6) and 1.29 (round 4) and standard deviations of 0.38 (round 
6) and 0.43 (round 4).76 Figure 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the variation in the strength of 
customary institutions measured as traditional authority strength across grid-cells in all 
available countries in round 6 and more closely in Nigeria. 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 See the Appendix A4.1 for a descriptive statistics table for all variables and correlation measures for 
the independent variable across survey rounds. 
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Figure 4.1. Variation in traditional authority strength based on Afrobarometer round 6 
 
Figure 4.2. Traditional authority strength in Nigeria, as in Afrobarometer round 6  
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The Afrobarometer is the only available data source to capture the strength of 
customary institutions across countries in a geographically disaggregated level. 
However, there are some concerns with relying on these survey data. First, a major 
limitation of the Afrobarometer data is that the included countries are not randomly 
selected and the surveys systematically exclude some countries, such as Somalia and 
DRC, that are historically among the most conflict prone countries. This is unfortunate 
as it would be interesting to test the theory in these contexts where the state actor is 
particularly weak, and the role of informal institutions can be even more accentuated. 
A second challenge is the inherent nature of the Afrobarometer surveys that measure 
individual perceptions, which are then used to capture a latent variable of customary 
institutional strength. The respondents’ perceptions can vary according to a multitude 
to idiosyncratic and systematic factors, thus introducing measurement error or bias (see 
Wig and Tollefsen, 2017). A problem arises, if some respondents feel pressured to 
overestimate the strength of local institutions of fear for repercussions from the 
authorities. In order to investigate these concerns, I examine the respondents’ beliefs 
about who sent the survey to be conducted. On average, the most widely held view is 
(correctly) that a research organisation sent the survey, alleviating concerns that 
respondents would be politically pressured in their answers. Furthermore, while 
respondents who believe a government agency sent the survey have rated their 
institutions slightly better, this difference is substantially small and statistically 
insignificant (results reported in Appendix A4.2). 
A third challenge has to do with the level of measurement. The Afrobarometer 
survey are stratified and randomised at the village level and the Afrobarometer’s own 
spatial unit of analysis is considerably smaller than the PRIO-GRID cells. Aggregating 
the measures on the PRIO-GRID cell level ensures an increased number of respondents 
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per unit than if the Afrobarometer spatial units were used. The average number 
(median) of respondents per grid-cell in round 6 is 16.77 However, as the surveys were 
not originally conducted on this level of spatial disaggregation, the representativeness 
and the variance across the spatial units can cause concern.  
 
Dependent variable 
In order to measure the outcome of interest, one-sided violence (hereafter OSV) against 
non-combatants during intrastate armed conflicts, I use the Armed Conflict Location 
and Event Data Project (ACLED) and their violence against civilians category (Raleigh 
et al., 2010). One-sided violence refers to physical violence committed by an organised 
armed group that deliberately targets and injures unarmed civilians (ACLED 2017; Eck 
and Hultman, 2007; Melander, Backer and Dunford, 2017). This type of violence 
should be differentiated from instances where civilians are harmed as a result of battle 
events between armed groups and where violence does not directly and deliberately 
target civilians (Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Croicu and Sundberg, 2015). This 
difference is crucial as the interest here is to examine how the customary institutions 
influence vulnerability of an area towards brutalities against the civilians, thus 
implying an intent in civilian victimisation.  
I use ACLED’s geocoded event data on state and rebel committed violence 
against civilians and create measures of counts of OSV-events in a given grid-cell. 
ACLED codes all severe and physical attacks on civilians (e.g. shooting, torturing, 
raping, kidnapping) and does not have a threshold of fatalities for an event to be 
included in the data. This operationalisation is preferred over the use of fatalities-based 
data, as it captures a broader range of civilian victimisation that customary institutional 
                                                          
77 As a robustness tests I drop all grid-cells that have <15 respondents from the analysis to avoid 
observations with particularly high standard deviations. See Appendix A4.10.  
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strength can influence. For example, the ACLED dataset covers attacks by the Boko 
Haram in Nigeria where the armed group kidnapped civilians (irrespective of whether 
these attacks resulted in immediate fatalities). In order to make sure that the violence 
against civilians occurs within a context of a civil conflict, I restrict my focus to 
countries that have experienced active armed violence by state or non-state armed 
groups within the post-survey years, using the Uppsala Conflict Database’s threshold 
of 25-battle related deaths in a conflict-dyad. 
Finally, due to the Afrobarometer surveys being available for only two specific 
years (2008 and 2014) and partially for different countries, a cross-sectional over-time 
analysis is not feasible. Hence, I take the survey years as starting points in which the 
independent variables are measured and examine the geographical patterns of violence 
against civilians in the following years. The measure Rebel-OSV captures the count of 
all OSV events committed by organised non-state armed actors in the post-survey years 
in a given grid cell. Whereas, Government-OSV refers to the number of OSV events 
by the government forces in a grid cell.78  
As a result of these coding decisions, I have two datasets composed of all grid 
cells in sub-Saharan Africa that store information on the strength of traditional 
leadership structures and that are located in countries that have experienced active one-
sided or intrastate armed violence during the post-survey years. Accordingly, the post-
2014 data consists of 786 grid cells in 10 countries while the post-2008 sample includes 
524 grid cells in 7 countries. Table 4.1 shows the number and percentage of grid cells 
that have experienced OSV-events in the post-survey years. 
  
                                                          
78 As a robustness test, I re-run the main models for round 6 data using the UCDP’s Georeferenced Event 
Dataset and its one-sided-violence category for rebel and state actors. The models are reported in the 
Appendix A4.8.  
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Table 4.1. Number of grid cells experienced at least one OSV-event in the post-survey years 
Type of OSV Post-2008 Post-2014 
Rebel 72 (13,7%) 68 (8,7%) 
Government 138 (26,3%) 128 (16,3%) 
Total number of grids 524 786 
    
Control variables 
I include the following variables in the empirical analysis in order to control for any 
confounding factors. The geopolitical location of the locality will likely influence both 
the relevance of customary institutions and the spatial patterns of OSV. Customary 
institutions are particularly salient in more rural and peripheral areas where the state’s 
presence tends to be weaker. Simultaneously, non-state armed groups presence tends 
to be stronger in areas with a greater distance from a country’s political and economic 
centre. In order to control for these geopolitical dynamics I include a variable 
measuring the average time (in minutes) it takes to travel to a nearest urban centre 
(Uchida and Nelson, 2009). I also control for the share of the agricultural land area 
within a grid cell (Bontemps, Defourny and Van Bogaert, 2009), as this can influence 
both the relevance of customary institutions as well as the rationale of armed actors to 
use violence against civilians.  
Aside from the geopolitical dynamics, population density can influence both the 
independent and the dependent variable in that more densely populated areas tend to 
experience more armed violence (Fjelde et al., 2017) and have better grounds for 
institutional development. I construct a variable population density by dividing the total 
local population by the land area of a grid cell. In addition, to measure the potentially 
intervening influence of the state’s local economic capacities, I include a measure of 
nightlight emissions, using the DMSP OLS night-time light data (Elvidge et al., 2014). 
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All of these covariates are accessed at the level of the unit of analysis through the PRIO-
GRID database. 
Furthermore, I control for ethnic affiliation of the local area with either the 
government or politically excluded groups, using the GeoEPR dataset. These data 
recodes geographical areas of all politically relevant ethnic groups and allows 
identification of groups that hold political power in a specific time period – in this case 
the survey year (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Cederman, Weidmann and 
Gleditsch, 2011). Previous literature suggests that armed groups use OSV strategically 
to target areas affiliated with their opponents. Hence, non-state armed groups are more 
likely to target areas affiliated with the government’s ethnic support base while the 
government troops are more likely to victimise areas that are potential support bases 
for the rebels, i.e. areas of politically excluded groups (Fjelde and Hultman, 2014). The 
affiliation of an area with a conflict side can intervene in the relationship between 
customary institutional strength and OSV in two ways. First, areas affiliated with the 
government can benefit from better state public goods provisions which can 
systematically influence the perceived strength of the traditional authorities. Second, 
customary institutional strength can mediate the influence that affiliation has on OSV. 
Specifically, one could expect that areas affiliated with an armed side and that have 
strong customary institutions attract disproportionally OSV as a means to weaken the 
enemy’s local institutions. The variable government constituency takes the value 1 if 
the settlement area of a group that holds a monopoly, dominant or senior position in 
the government intersects with a grid cell, and zero otherwise. The measure excluded 
groups captures the number of politically discriminated or excluded ethnic groups 
whose settlement area intersects with a grid cell.  
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In addition to the above, it is important to consider the possible endogeneity of 
post-survey level OSV and survey time traditional authority strength in regard to past 
violent events. In order to do this, I include a measure of time (in years) since a given 
grid cell last experienced OSV. Following Carter and Signorino (2010), I include 
squared and cubed versions of the variable measuring time dependency.79 Moreover, I 
consider past battle-events (e.g. deadly armed events between the government and a 
rebel side) in a given grid-cell. Finally, I control for the spatial dynamics of OSV by 
including a mean of OSV-events by the respective armed sides in the adjacent 
neighbourhood cells.   
 
4.7.Empirical results 
Table 4.2 presents the main regression models estimating one-sided violence in the 
post-survey years of Afrobarometer round 6 and 4. I use a negative binomial regression 
estimation method to account for the dependent variable being 1) a count variable, 2) 
overly dispersed with high number of zeros and some high counts, and 3) inherently 
dependent on itself (an area experiencing an event is likely to experience more events 
in the same measurement period). Models 1-3 estimate counts for post-round 6 years 
while models 4-6 are based on round 4 data. Countries that have experienced active 
one-sided or intrastate violence in the post-2014 period (and have data on the 
independent variable) include Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Cameroon, Burundi, 
Burkina Faso, Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan. Countries included in the round 4 sample 
are Mali, Senegal, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Madagascar, and Mozambique.  
                                                          
79 Furthermore, in the Appendix A4.9 report models estimating traditional authority strength as a 
function of past events of violence against civilians by state, rebel, and militia groups. The results (mostly 
non-significant) alleviate endogeneity concerns with regard to the specific findings in this study. 
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Table 4.2. Estimating violence against civilians in sub-Saharan Africa  
 Post-2014 years (round 6) Post-2008 (round 4) 
 
Model 1 
All-
OSV 
Model 2 
Rebel-
OSV 
Model 3 
Gov-
OSV 
Model 4 
All-
OSV 
Model 5 
Rebel-
OSV 
Model 6 
Gov-
OSV 
Traditional authority 
strength 
0.508† 1.294** 0.241 0.445† 0.676† 0.572* 
 (0.276) (0.500) (0.319) (0.258) (0.381) (0.272) 
(log) Agricultural area 0.192* 0.296† 0.156 0.047 0.043 0.083 
 (0.096) (0.170) (0.109) (0.099) (0.132) (0.100) 
(log) Time to nearest urban 
centre  
0.286 0.533 -0.034 -0.815* -0.667 -1.006*** 
 (0.231) (0.355) (0.265) (0.324) (0.440) (0.244) 
(log) Nightlight emissions 0.692** 0.855** 0.541* 1.182*** 1.268** 1.057*** 
 (0.232) (0.331) (0.242) (0.253) (0.427) (0.209) 
(log) Population density 0.047 -0.128 0.165 -0.256* -0.262 -0.141 
 (0.138) (0.176) (0.150) (0.129) (0.177) (0.141) 
Civil war events -0.005 -0.115 0.025 1.795* -6.633* 2.572** 
 (0.080) (0.094) (0.086) (0.878) (3.036) (0.838) 
Government constituency -0.090 -0.471 0.138 0.156 0.307 0.094 
 (0.241) (0.347) (0.286) (0.326) (0.435) (0.337) 
N of excluded groups -0.107 -0.544 0.195 -0.412 -1.037 -0.298 
 (0.247) (0.464) (0.276) (0.349) (0.871) (0.341) 
All neighbour events 0.228***   0.183***   
 (0.047)   (0.037)   
Neighbour rebel OSV-
events 
 0.344***   0.352***  
  (0.076)   (0.105)  
Neighbour gov OSV-events   0.239**   0.150 
   (0.076)   (0.093) 
Constant -2.771† -5.315* -1.653 5.413* 3.618 4.839** 
 (1.516) (2.421) (1.725) (2.119) (2.832) (1.724) 
Ln alpha 0.859*** 1.155*** 1.084*** 0.814*** 1.852*** 0.490* 
 (0.192) (0.243) (0.209) (0.169) (0.217) (0.235) 
Observations 485 485 485 447 447 447 
Log pseudolikelihood 
-
463.611 
-178.511 -383.259 
-
567.960 
-304.701 -433.369 
Source for the DV: Armed Conflict Location and Event Database; clustered standard errors; time since 
last OSV plus polynomials not reported; †p<0.1, *p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001. 
 
 
The results give modest support to the theoretical argument. As expected, the 
strength of traditional authorities is positively correlated with incidents of violence 
against civilians across the two data samples.  According to model 1, which estimates 
all violence against civilians committed by state or non-state armed actors in the post-
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2014 years, the odds for a grid cell to not experience any violence against civilians drop 
from 82% to 76% when moving from a relatively weak customary institutional context 
to a locality with relatively strong traditional authority institutions (from the 10th 
percentile to the 90th percentile of traditional authority strength). Similar correlation, 
albeit equally significant only at the 90% confidence level, is seen in the post-2008 
model.  
However, there are considerable differences in the relationship between the main 
independent variable and the two types of armed actors committing one-sided violence. 
Specifically, while the trajectory for government-OSV is also that of violence-
inducing, the results are not statistically robust across models. Based on model 6, which 
estimates government-committed violence against civilians in post-2008 years, the 
strength of traditional authorities is significantly and positively correlated with the rate 
of violence. However, when analysing Afrobarometer round 6 data (model 3), 
traditional authority strength does not seem to have any influence on the spatial 
distribution of government-OSV in areas included in the analysis.  
With regard to rebel-committed OSV, model 2 shows a highly significant and 
upward influence of traditional authority strength. Model 5 points to a similar direction, 
albeit with substantially and statistically weakened confidence. Overall, and while 
rebel-OSV is rare in general, non-state armed groups appear to target areas with strong 
customary institutions. Based on model 2, the probability of a grid cell to not 
experience any deadly violence against civilians drops more than 6 percentage points 
(from approximately 97%) when increasing traditional authority strength from its 10th 
percentile to 90th percentile level. This is a considerable effect in comparison to the 
other covariates. For example, an increase in the average neighbourhood OSV from 
zero to 2 events (mean neighbourhood OSV-events being 0.35 events) decreases the 
 162 
probability of not having any rebel-OSV by roughly 4 percentage points. Figure 4.3 
illustrates the marginal effects of traditional authority strength on predicted counts of 
rebel-OSV events, based on model 2. 
 
Figure 4.3. Marginal effects of traditional authority strength on predicted count of rebel-OSV, 
based on round 6 data. The x-axis presents the empirically observed values of the independent 
variable. 
 
In terms of the control variables, both types of OSV take place in more 
economically developed areas, as captured by the nightlight variable’s positive 
coefficient. Violence against civilians also appears to be strongly spatially clustered 
and dependent on past incidents of civilian victimisation. The post-2008 models show 
a negative correlation between the distance to the nearest urban centre and acts of OSV; 
implying that rural areas are on average safer from violence than urban contexts. 
Notably, the round 4 data also suggest that past civil war events (battles between the 
government and non-state armed groups) bear different implications for OSV 
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committed by the different armed sides. In general, the models capture rebel-OSV 
better than government-OSV. 
The main results here lend support to the argument that rather than ubiquitously 
violence-mitigating, customary institutions can also attract certain types of violence, 
particularly violence against civilians that is committed by organised armed groups. 
Yet both the substantive and the statistical differences in the results in relation to the 
different types of armed parties require further interpretation. According to the 
analysis, non-state armed groups use violence against civilians in areas with stronger 
traditional authority institutions, while the government’s use of OSV is not as clearly 
related to the strength of customary institutions. Moreover, the results also differ 
between countries and timeframes included in the analysis (between rounds 4 and 6). 
Differing levels of dependencies on local institutions might help to explain the 
observed variation. In particular, the government side could be less dependent on local 
customary structures in its access to necessary resources and therefore less influenced 
by the strength of these. Moreover, the government side often uses violence as a 
repressive measure against potential opposition. The rationale for this can be lower in 
so called hinterland areas where strong customary institutions are often located (Herbst, 
2000; Mengisteab, 2017b) and the government’s general presence is weaker. Instead, 
non-state armed groups that are dependent on local compliance for their resources may 
find strong chieftaincies with high social cohesion a more serious challenge that 
complicates co-option of local institutions and renders access to local resources more 
uncertain. Thus, rather than negotiating with the local authorities, non-state armed 
groups can become invoked to use more violence in these areas (Raleigh and De 
Bruijne, 2017).  
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Descriptive evidence available in the ACLED data80 links non-state armed 
groups in the sample data to atrocities that explicitly target customary institutions in 
areas where these are perceived strong. For example, in Kenya Al Shabab is reported 
to have targeted customary leaders in two localities with higher than average customary 
institutional strength. Similarly, in Kolofata and Mora municipalities in Cameroon, 
Boko Haram has targeted chiefs and their family members when terrorizing the civilian 
population. Several villages in Mali and Burkina Faso that are situated in grid cells 
with higher than average traditional authority strength have also seen explicit targeting 
of chiefs and other local elites. In fact, investigating the post-2014 data sample and all 
rebel-committed acts of OSV shows a considerable share of events explicitly 
mentioning the targeting of local customary authorities (15%). Furthermore, comparing 
these events in which customary actors are explicitly specified as targets with events 
without their naming suggests a significantly higher customary institutional strength in 
areas where customary leaders have been targeted.81 This gives further support to the 
hypothesis as it links the violence committed by non-state armed groups with 
customary institutions in areas where they are strong. While this does not yet capture 
any causal mechanism, anecdotal evidence suggests that the implications of targeting 
customary leaders are that of weakening of the civilian capacities and gaining control 
over an area. 
The type of non-state armed groups perpetrating OSV in the two data samples 
should also be considered as this can influence the relationship between armed actors 
and civilians. While there is considerable overlap between the data samples in regard 
to the active rebel groups, there are also some notable differences. Specifically, Islamist 
                                                          
80 See the notes column in the datasets (ACLED, 2017). 
81 See Appendix A4.11.  
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armed groups, such as Boko Haram, AQIM, and Al-Shabaab, are particularly 
prominent in the post-2014 data sample. Albeit portrayed as traditional and patriarchal, 
these groups do not only strive to overthrow regimes in power but also pursue a 
radically different order to the extent of local institutions. Strong customary 
institutions, such as traditional leadership structures, can seem fundamentally 
threatening and of little use to these groups (Lia, 2017). Rather than trying to co-opt or 
co-exist with existing institutions, these groups can be especially inclined to 
deliberately target localities with strong customary rule in order to weaken any 
available alternatives to their own structures.  
 
Alternative explanations, model specifications and robustness 
The empirical findings here point to a positive relationship between the strength of 
customary institutions and civilian victimisation committed by non-state armed groups 
in particular. However, this found correlation does not explicitly capture the theorised 
mechanism and should be subjected to alternative explanations. The observed variation 
in the two data samples also point to some differences across time and countries that 
should be examined. Aside from alternative explanations, the specific 
operationalisation of the key variables is subject to active decision-making by the 
author and should be tested against alternative ways to grasp the variables.  
One concern with the measure of customary institutional strength is the possible 
endogeneity of the variable with past violent events on the one hand and the general 
quality of local state institutions on the other hand. With regard to the latter, traditional 
authority strength might be endogenous to the strength of local state institutions.  
Indeed, Logan (2009, 2013) finds that these two types of local institutions correlate 
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positively with one another. With regard to the former, localities that have experienced 
higher levels of past one-sided violence might have a stronger sense of social cohesion 
and community as a reaction to violent actors, which can influence the way people 
perceive their authority institutions. In other words, the measure of traditional 
leadership strength might reflect the coming-togetherness of an attacked community. 
Therefore, the subsequent levels of violence would be explained by violence 
dependency rather than the theorised mechanism. While I control for the past one-sided 
violence by rebel and state forces, there are other types of civilian victimisation that 
might influence both traditional authority strength and rebel and state OSV.  
In order to test the relationship between past violence and customary institutional 
strength more directly, I first estimate the level of traditional authority strength as a 
function of rebel, state, and militia past violence against civilians and other covariates 
that can influence the independent variable. The models (reported in the Appendix) 
find little evidence for an argument that past violence would significantly correlate with 
higher levels of traditional authority strength, hence alleviating our concern for the 
erroneous measurement of customary institutional strength. Furthermore, including a 
measure of militia violence against civilians, which is often related to rebel and/or state 
forces and their strategies, does not significantly change the interpretation of the results.  
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Table 4.3. Coefficients for traditional authority strength and local state strength in models 
estimating OSV by rebel and state forces in post-2014 and post-2008 years 
 Post-2014 years (round 6) Post-2008 (round 4) 
 
Model 7 
All-
OSV 
Model 8 
Rebel-
OSV 
Model 9 
Gov-
OSV 
Model 
10 
All-OSV 
Model 11 
Rebel-
OSV 
Model 12 
Gov-
OSV 
Traditional authority 
strength 
0.850* 1.365* -0.016 0.715* 1.106* 0.601* 
 (0.433) (0.669) (0.511) (0.289) (0.475) (0.306) 
Local state strength -0.352 -0.267 0.558 -0.576† -0.886† -0.104 
 (0.426) (0.793) (0.688) (0.325) (0.496) (0.388) 
Constant -1.424 -5.139* -2.131 5.828** 4.497 4.894** 
 (1.433) (2.406) (1.817) (2.094) (2.827) (1.769) 
       
Ln alpha 0.959*** 1.125*** 1.030*** 0.791*** 1.825*** 0.487* 
 (0.204) (0.257) (0.228) (0.166) (0.213) (0.236) 
Observations 630 485 485 446 446 446 
Log-pseudolikelihood 
-
527.466 
-178.311 -382.056 -566.114 -303.040 -433.176 
Source for the DV: Armed Conflict Location and Event Database; clustered standard errors; other 
covariates not reported in the table; †p<0.1, *p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001. 
 
Moreover, in order to make sure that the findings are not driven by the quality of 
the local state, I employ data capturing the strength of the local state. The variable is 
constructed similarly to the independent variable using the corresponding 
Afrobarometer questions concerning local council/councillors. As Table 4.3 illustrates, 
including this measure strengthens the correlation between traditional authority 
strength and rebel-OSV. Interestingly, the added measure of local state strength is itself 
negative correlated with OSV-events, yet this relationship is not statistically robust.  
Thus far, the analysis has operationalised the independent variable as the mean 
of the perceived trust towards and salience of traditional authorities based on the 
Afrobarometer survey indicators. In order to scrutinise the robustness of the 
independent variable, the Appendix reports models using the mean values of the 
individual indicators instead of the joined measure. The results based on round 6 survey 
data imply that while both indicators have a violence-inducing direction, the indicator 
capturing the effectiveness of traditional leaders performs better. However, round 4 
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data show a somewhat different picture as the generally weaker relationship appears to 
be more driven by trust in traditional leaders. While both indicators seem individually 
relevant for the outcomes, the variations across data samples indicate interesting 
differences across countries under analysis.  
In order to control for these country-specific dynamics, I conduct two additional 
tests. First, I report the post-2014 models with country-fixed effects in the Appendix. 
This strengthens the correlation between traditional authority strength and rebel-OSV. 
Second, I construct a cross-sectional over-time (two time points) dataset consisting of 
the available grids for countries included in both survey rounds (Kenya, Mali, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda). The more robust results with round 6 data suggested 
that new countries included in the post-2014 sample (Niger, Burkina Faso, Cameroon) 
might be particularly influenced by the hypothesised relation between customary 
institutional strength and rebel-OSV. Therefore, I re-run the models focusing solely on 
the countries that appear at both survey rounds and allow measurement of the 
independent variable in two time points. The results support the general findings in 
terms of customary institutional strength and rebel-OSV, improving confidence in the 
found relationship.  
Finally, in order to expand the geographical coverage of the analysis, I re-run the 
main models for the post-2014 sample but this time extrapolate data from round 4 if 
data for the main independent variable are missing for survey round 6. The results, 
which are reported in the Appendix, support the correlation between traditional 
authority strength and rebel-OSV. Moreover, the results report a positive and 
significant relationship between the independent variable and government-OSV. While 
these results should be approached in caution (the correlation between round 4 and 6 
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measures of traditional authority strength is moderate), they give further support to the 
main findings of the study. 
 
4.8.Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how the strength of customary institutions influences spatial 
variation of one-sided violence during civil conflicts. Empirically it has analysed the 
strength of traditional authority structures at the local level and its implications for one-
sided violence committed by non-state and state armed forces. Two theoretical 
propositions can be considered as explanations for a systematic relationship between 
these two variables. First, customary institutions can be argued to make communities 
more resilient and better protected from violence in general. On the other hand, strong 
customary institutions can also be argued to appear threatening and more difficult to 
co-opt from the perspective of armed groups and thus attract violence in specific 
localities. I have argued that when it comes to acts of violence against civilians, it is 
the latter mechanism that takes prevalence (without disputing the generally pacifying 
influence of customary institutions). 
The empirical results are modestly supportive of the argument and suggest that 
the more trusted and salient traditional authorities in a locality are, the more vulnerable 
that locality will be towards one-sided violence. Specifically, one-sided violence by 
non-state armed groups appears to take place in localities with strong customary 
institutions. This relationship between violence against civilians by non-state armed 
groups and strength of customary institutions is robust under multiple control variables, 
different operationalisation of the key variables, and model specifications. However, 
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the relationship between violence against civilians committed by state forces and the 
strength of customary institutions is not robust.  
The empirical analysis corroborates the findings of previous research on the 
significance of existing local institutions in shaping the conduct of armed groups vis-
à-vis the civilians. Furthermore, the results support the focus on customary institutions 
as social structures that shape the interaction between armed groups and civilians at a 
local level. It is notable that the influence of local customary institutions is robust to 
the inclusion of existing local state institutions, which themselves do not appear to have 
similar influence on the rate of violence against civilians. As the anecdotal evidence 
illustrates, non-state armed groups explicitly target customary leadership when 
resorting to the use of violence against civilians. Examples outside the data samples 
support the argument that the targeting of local chiefs and other social leaders is done 
to seize necessary control and secure access to local resources (Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 2004; Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017).  
This chapter contributes to a more empirically nuanced understanding of how 
existing civilian institutions influence wartime realities of armed groups and civilians 
across conflict zones and how this shapes the strategic use of violence against civilians. 
However, there are important caveats to keep in mind. First, the non-state armed groups 
prevalent in the data sample are mostly of a specific type that is less prone to building 
governing structures upon existing local-level institutions and are more prone to be 
hostile towards existing local institutions. For example, in Nigeria, Niger, and 
Cameroon, Islamist groups account for most OSV. These groups tend to be 
revolutionary with regard to their aims for future order. For them, strong customary 
institutions can appear as concrete obstacles and threats to the ideal form of control and 
governance. Hence, these groups can be more inclined to target strong customary 
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institutions violently (rather than take advantage of them) than groups with aims of 
gaining power within the current political system (such as in Colombia).  Further 
research attention should be paid to the interaction between the strength of customary 
institutions, the type of rebel groups, and the violent and nonviolent local outcomes 
that follow. 
Furthermore, the lack of data to measure the independent variable over time on 
the one hand and to test the theorised relationship more directly on the other hand has 
constrained the empirical scope of this chapter. Measuring changes in the strength of 
local customary institutions would allow for a closer examination of the dynamics 
between violence and strength of local institutions. Moreover, while the anecdotal and 
descriptive data suggests that customary institutions are explicitly targeted in areas with 
locally strong traditional authorities, more systematic data that disaggregates the targets 
of violence against civilians would help us better understand the strategic use of 
violence. Finally, the focus on traditional leadership structures as an example of 
customary institutions has overlooked many other forms of institutions that may induce 
different local capacities and reactions from armed groups. While traditional leadership 
structures represent an all-encompassing community-level institution that can be 
identified across contexts, their hierarchical structure and their quasi-formal role in 
many contexts can render them particularly threatening from the perspective of external 
non-state armed groups. A better theoretical and empirical understanding of the types 
of local customary structures of civilians at the outset of violent conflicts would help 
to further asses how existing local institutions shape local resilience and vulnerability 
towards armed violence.  
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4.9.Appendices 
A4.1 Descriptive statistics of included variables 
 
Round 6 data: 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
All-OSV 786 1.584 9.95 0 191 
Rebel-OSV 786 .709 6.555 0 127 
Gov-OSV 786 .875 7.37 0 187 
Traditional 
authority 
strength 
630 1.369 .378 .325 2.531 
(log) 
Agricultural area 
784 3.324 1.25 0 4.613 
(Log) Time to 
nearest urban 
centre 
784 5.477 .519 4.075 7.692 
(Log) nightlight 
emissions 
784 .315 .547 0 3.096 
(Log) population 
density 
784 4.098 1.26 -.934 8.023 
Civil war events 786 .183 1.402 0 26 
Government 
constituency 
786 .341 .474 0 1 
N of excluded 
groups 
609 .187 .456 0 3 
Time since OSV 786 13.897 6.734 0 18 
Time since 
OSV^2 
786 238.416 134.208 0 324 
Time since 
OSV^3 
786 4203.744 2512.72 0 5832 
All neighbour 
events 
784 1.08 4.298 0 42.75 
Neighbour rebel 
events 
784 .487 2.932 0 42.375 
Neighbour gov. 
events 
784 .593 3.108 0 38.25 
Local state 
strength 
630 .971 .323 0 2 
Militia-OSV 786 .557 2.083 0 20 
 
 
Round 4 data: 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
All-OSV 524 1.832 7.574 0 115 
Rebel-OSV 524 .981 6.139 0 106 
Gov-OSV 524 .851 3.379 0 60 
Traditional 
authority 
strength 
513 1.289 .432 .2 2.875 
(log) 
Agricultural area 
524 3.334 1.328 0 4.612 
(Log) Time to 
nearest urban 
524 5.41 .521 4.102 7.692 
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centre 
(Log) nightlight 
emissions 
524 .274 .536 0 3.174 
(Log) population 
density 
524 4.128 1.299 -1.031 7.899 
Civil war events 524 .004 .062 0 1 
Government 
constituency 
524 .454 .498 0 1 
N of excluded 
groups 
457 .112 .348 0 2 
Time since OSV 524 10.181 3.697 0 12 
Time since 
OSV^2 
524 117.3 51.427 0 144 
Time since 
OSV^3 
524 1381.147 654.335 0 1728 
All neighbour 
events 
524 1.377 4.098 0 48.125 
Neighbour rebel 
events 
524 .708 3.49 0 44.125 
Neighbour gov. 
events 
524 .669 1.318 0 17.25 
Local state 
strength 
523 1.038 .372 .143 2.25 
Militia-OSV 524 .267 1.284 0 17 
 
 
Pearson’s correlation shows moderate and statistically significant correlation between 
the measures of traditional authority strength across the two survey rounds, r=0.415 
(p<0.000). Shapiro-Wilk normality test shows that data for traditional authority 
strength in round 6 is normally distributed while the measure for traditional authority 
strength in round 4 shows some non-normality (p>0.05).  
 
 
A4.2 OLS-regression of traditional authority strength and beliefs of the origin of the 
survey82 
Who sent this survey? Traditional authority 
strength (Round 6) 
Traditional authority 
strength (Round 4) 
Research group -0.003* -0.007† 
 (0.001) (0.004) 
Government 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Politicians -0.011† 0.015† 
 (0.006) (0.008) 
Don’t want to tell 0.028 -0.010 
 (0.020) (0.044) 
Don’t know -0.008* -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
No one 0.008 0.001 
                                                          
82 All models in the Appendix have robust standard errors reported in parentheses; †p<0.1, *p<0:05, 
**p<0:01, ***p<0.001. 
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 (0.019) (0.045) 
Other -0.003 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 1.549*** 1.680*** 
 (0.042) (0.043) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 630 653 
R2 0.263 0.389 
  
 
A4.3 Models including local state strength and militia OSV events 
 Round 6 data Round 4 data 
 
All-
OSV 
Rebel-
OSV 
Gov-
OSV 
All-
OSV 
Rebel-
OSV 
Gov-
OSV 
Traditional authority 
strength 
0.850* 1.365* -0.016 0.715* 1.106* 0.601* 
 (0.433) (0.669) (0.511) (0.289) (0.475) (0.306) 
Local state strength -0.352 -0.267 0.558 -0.576† -0.886† -0.104 
 (0.426) (0.793) (0.688) (0.325) (0.496) (0.388) 
Militia violence lagged 0.024 0.029 0.067 -0.039 -0.108 0.015 
 (0.029) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.080) (0.032) 
Agricultural area, log 0.131 0.290† 0.155 0.021 -0.002 0.080 
 (0.097) (0.163) (0.111) (0.095) (0.134) (0.099) 
Time to nearest urban 
centre, log 
0.036 0.526 -0.012 -0.829** -0.723† -1.004*** 
 (0.213) (0.348) (0.274) (0.313) (0.435) (0.242) 
Nightlight emissions, log 0.808*** 0.805* 0.524* 1.174*** 1.365** 1.032*** 
 (0.230) (0.336) (0.251) (0.273) (0.510) (0.225) 
Population density, log -0.029 -0.148 0.168 -0.251† -0.260 -0.145 
 (0.125) (0.182) (0.153) (0.131) (0.180) (0.143) 
Civil war events -0.007 -0.122 0.008 1.717† -5.460* 2.542** 
 (0.094) (0.098) (0.087) (0.891) (2.588) (0.846) 
Government constituency 0.038 -0.436 0.197 0.231 0.441 0.100 
 (0.222) (0.366) (0.295) (0.311) (0.428) (0.333) 
Time since last OSV -0.422† -1.281** -0.309 -0.515† -1.103* 0.115 
 (0.253) (0.318) (0.259) (0.299) (0.497) (0.221) 
Time since last OSV^2 0.046 0.126* 0.035 0.073 0.186 -0.049 
 (0.038) (0.050) (0.039) (0.069) (0.118) (0.048) 
Time since last OSV^3 -0.002 -0.004† -0.001 -0.004 -0.009 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) 
Neighb. OSV 0.255***   0.178***   
 (0.062)   (0.034)   
N of excluded groups  -0.544 0.246 -0.281 -0.836 -0.279 
  (0.457) (0.284) (0.340) (0.831) (0.348) 
Neighb. Reb-OSV  0.351***   0.341***  
  (0.079)   (0.094)  
Neighb. Gov-OSV   0.193*   0.154† 
   (0.086)   (0.091) 
Constant -1.424 -5.139* -2.131 5.828** 4.497 4.894** 
 (1.433) (2.406) (1.817) (2.094) (2.827) (1.769) 
Lnalpha 0.959*** 1.125*** 1.030*** 0.791*** 1.825*** 0.487* 
 (0.204) (0.257) (0.228) (0.166) (0.213) (0.236) 
Observations 630 485 485 446 446 446 
Log pseudolikelihood 
-
527.466 
-178.311 -382.056 
-
566.114 
-303.040 -433.176 
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A4.4 Individual indicator models 
 ROUND 6 data ROUND 4 data ROUND 6 data ROUND 4 data 
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A4.5 Cross-sectional over-time models (traditional authority strength measured in 
2008 and 2014, dependent variables in 2009-2014 and 2015-2017 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All-OSV Rebel-OSV Gov-OSV 
Traditional authority strength 0.513† 0.921* 0.456 
 (0.293) (0.464) (0.286) 
Local state strength -0.714* -1.066† -0.622† 
 (0.334) (0.555) (0.355) 
Agricultural area, log -0.103 -0.268† 0.119 
 (0.105) (0.149) (0.098) 
Time to nearest urban centre, log -0.844** -0.647 -0.981*** 
 (0.261) (0.499) (0.220) 
Nightlight emissions, log 0.910*** 0.852*** 0.820*** 
 (0.176) (0.255) (0.167) 
Population density, log -0.231† -0.277† -0.084 
 (0.121) (0.154) (0.144) 
Civil war events 0.788† 0.733 0.517 
 (0.463) (0.525) (0.540) 
Government constituency 0.139 0.163 0.257 
 (0.226) (0.321) (0.251) 
Time since last OSV -0.356** -0.602** -0.120 
 (0.127) (0.221) (0.120) 
Time since last OSV^2 0.034† 0.062* 0.007 
 (0.017) (0.030) (0.017) 
Time since last OSV^3 -0.001† -0.002* -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Neighb. OSV 0.164***   
 (0.035)   
Neighb. reb-OSV  0.314***  
  (0.074)  
Neighb. gov-OSV   0.176*** 
   (0.052) 
Constant 5.715** 4.398 4.187* 
 (1.873) (3.146) (1.726) 
    
Lnalpha 0.884*** 1.686*** 0.711** 
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 (0.158) (0.209) (0.247) 
Observations 842 842 842 
Log pseudolikelihood -704.336 -335.251 -554.027 
 
A4.6 Round 6 models with data for the independent variable extrapolated from round 
4 (if data missing for grid cells in round 6)  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All-OSV Rebel-OSV Gov-OSV 
Traditional authority strength  0.829*** 1.488*** 0.643* 
 (0.228) (0.387) (0.288) 
Agricultural area, log 0.154† 0.221† 0.185† 
 (0.081) (0.122) (0.101) 
Time to nearest urban centre, log 0.172 0.382 -0.134 
 (0.208) (0.316) (0.233) 
Nightlight emissions, log 0.745*** 0.630* 0.763*** 
 (0.215) (0.292) (0.227) 
Population density, log -0.019 -0.093 -0.032 
 (0.123) (0.151) (0.137) 
Civil war events 0.009 0.011 -0.021 
 (0.031) (0.043) (0.047) 
Government constituency -0.058 -0.720* 0.162 
 (0.224) (0.306) (0.256) 
N of excluded groups -0.175 -0.563 0.006 
 (0.231) (0.418) (0.268) 
Time since last OSV -0.473† -1.293*** -0.391 
 (0.252) (0.286) (0.240) 
Time since last OSV^2 0.052 0.122* 0.049 
 (0.038) (0.049) (0.036) 
Time since last OSV^3 -0.002 -0.003† -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Neighb. OSV 0.214***   
 (0.044)   
Neighb. reb-OSV  0.253***  
  (0.065)  
Neighb. gov-OSV   0.280** 
   (0.092) 
Constant -2.204 -4.360* -1.113 
 (1.405) (2.204) (1.536) 
Lnalpha 0.925*** 1.264*** 1.171*** 
 (0.178) (0.210) (0.204) 
Observations 609 609 609 
Log pseudolikelihood -570.813 -259.501 -437.874 
 
 
A4.7 Including country-fixed effects (round 6 data) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All-OSV Rebel-OSV Gov-OSV 
Traditional authority strength 0.691* 1.767** 0.621* 
 (0.332) (0.646) (0.290) 
Agricultural area, log 0.148 0.364† 0.075 
 (0.116) (0.187) (0.114) 
Time to nearest urban centre, log 0.008 0.626 -0.316 
 178 
 (0.198) (0.433) (0.230) 
Nightlight emissions, log 1.046*** 0.846† 0.744*** 
 (0.180) (0.471) (0.166) 
Population density, log 0.017 0.108 0.208 
 (0.120) (0.203) (0.128) 
Civil war events 0.099   
 (0.069)   
Government constituency -0.668**   
 (0.243)   
Time since last OSV -0.653*** -2.035*** -0.478*** 
 (0.137) (0.364) (0.130) 
Time since last OSV^2 0.083*** 0.221*** 0.065** 
 (0.022) (0.055) (0.020) 
Time since last OSV^3 -0.003*** -0.007** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Neighb. OSV 0.103**   
 (0.040)   
Constant -0.893 -7.033* -0.870 
 (1.284) (2.923) (1.663) 
Lnalpha 0.530* 1.911*** 0.247 
 (0.221) (0.277) (0.244) 
Observations 630 630 630 
Log pseudolikelihood -504.461 -207.041 -401.831 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES 
Source for the DV: Armed Conflict Location and Event Database; clustered standard errors; †p<0.1, 
*p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001. 
 
A4.8 Round 6 models with alternative outcome variables (UCDP one-sided-violence 
deaths by state and non-state armed groups): 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Both rebel and state OSV Rebel-OSV State-OSV 
Traditional authority strength 1.114 3.253** -0.187 
 (0.693) (1.005) (0.790) 
Agricultural area, log 0.541** 3.810*** 0.087 
 (0.199) (0.808) (0.182) 
Time to nearest urban centre, log -0.719 1.799† 0.417 
 (0.474) (0.940) (0.534) 
Nightlight emissions, log 0.031 -0.626 -0.419 
 (0.740) (0.563) (0.741) 
Population density, log 0.410 0.134 0.755† 
 (0.307) (0.415) (0.408) 
Civil war events -0.019 -1.131*** 0.251 
 (0.333) (0.283) (0.677) 
Government constituency -0.382 0.367 -0.966† 
 (0.593) (0.840) (0.551) 
Time since last OSV -0.602** -2.100*** -0.166 
 (0.206) (0.331) (0.273) 
Time since last OSV^2 0.033 0.193*** -0.006 
 (0.022) (0.035) (0.026) 
Time since last OSV^3 -0.001 -0.005*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Neighb. OSV 0.093***   
 (0.024)   
Excluded groups  -1.599** 0.489 
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  (0.605) (0.589) 
Neighb. reb-OSV  0.159***  
  (0.041)  
Neighb. gov-OSV   0.265† 
   (0.147) 
Constant 0.752 -25.438** -4.736 
 (3.009) (8.362) (3.632) 
    
Lnalpha 3.095*** 3.644*** 2.993*** 
 (0.211) (0.308) (0.300) 
Observations 630 485 485 
Log pseudolikelihood -344.127 -134.898 -196.248 
 
 
The outcome here is the count of best estimates of civilian deaths caused by one-sided 
violence by state or formally organised non-state armed actors, as coded by the UCDP 
Georeferenced event dataset (Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Croicu and Sundberg, 
2015). As with the main models, I use negative binomial estimation method to consider 
the overdispersion of the outcome variable.  
 
A4.9 Estimating traditional authority strength  
 
 
 Round 6 Round 6 Round 4 
 
traditional authority 
strength 
traditional authority 
strength 
traditional authority 
strength 
Time since last OSV-
event by rebel or state 
actor 
-0.004†  0.004 
 (0.002)  (0.004) 
Militia OSV -0.003 -0.013 0.028*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) 
Agricultural area, log 0.014 0.015 0.079*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Time to nearest urban 
centre, log 
0.078* 0.077* -0.043 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.040) 
population density, log 0.002 0.004 -0.158*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) 
nightlight emissions, log -0.279*** -0.274*** -0.103** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.036) 
OSV-events by state and 
rebel actors in 2010-2014 
 0.003  
  (0.002)  
Constant 1.047*** 0.974*** 1.888*** 
 (0.227) (0.223) (0.271) 
Observations 630 630 513 
Log pseudolikelihood -208.055 -208.436 -218.881 
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A4.10 Dropping all grid cells with fewer than <15 respondents (round 6 data) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Both rebel and state 
OSV 
Rebel-OSV State-OSV 
traditional authority 
strength 
0.714 1.488* -0.149 
 (0.540) (0.665) (0.408) 
Agricultural area, log 0.072 0.150 0.220† 
 (0.093) (0.186) (0.114) 
Time to nearest urban 
centre, log 
-0.229 -0.110 -0.091 
 (0.247) (0.544) (0.286) 
nightlight emissions, log 0.782** 0.675† 0.535† 
 (0.298) (0.390) (0.284) 
population density, log -0.040 -0.056 0.077 
 (0.138) (0.209) (0.168) 
civil war events 0.061 0.081 0.013 
 (0.082) (0.121) (0.068) 
government constituency 0.267 -0.488 0.518 
 (0.272) (0.420) (0.327) 
Time since last OSV -0.419 -1.282*** -0.372 
 (0.294) (0.322) (0.270) 
Time since last OSV^2 0.053 0.142** 0.046 
 (0.044) (0.050) (0.041) 
Time since last OSV^3 -0.002 -0.004** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
neighb. OSV 0.199***   
 (0.056)   
excluded groups  -0.760 0.316 
  (0.656) (0.311) 
neighb. reb-OSV  0.207*  
  (0.092)  
neighb. gov-OSV   0.215** 
   (0.072) 
Constant 0.090 -2.220 -0.801 
 (1.578) (3.403) (1.797) 
    
Lnalpha 0.903*** 1.157*** 1.059*** 
 (0.243) (0.432) (0.215) 
Observations 437 338 338 
Log pseudolikelihood -412.080 -126.033 -307.601 
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A4.11 Test of equal variance (t-test) for traditional authority strength in rebel-targeted 
areas, grouped by whether targeting explicitly names traditional authority or not 
(round 6 data) 
 
 diff.  
Traditional authority strength -0.210† (-1.77) 
N 45  
†p<0.1, *p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001. 
 
  
Group Obs Mean St. error St. deviation 95% interval 
No explicit 
targeting of 
TA 
35 
 
1.309521 .0557638 .3299033 1.196195–
1.422847 
Explicit 
targeting of 
TA 
10 1.519386 .1048088 .3314344 1.282292–
1.75648 
N 45 1.356158 .0504106 .3381645 1.254562–
1.457753 
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5. Conclusion 
This thesis has engaged in a theoretical and empirical effort to better understand the 
role of traditional governance in peace and conflict dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The three preceding chapters have each focused on specific conditions and systematic 
variation in traditional governance structures that I argue give rise to differences in 
hybrid governance and therefore shape peaceful and violent outcomes within countries.  
The first chapter examined how different types of state–traditional governance 
interactions influence the prospects for countries’ intrastate peace. The key findings of 
this chapter demonstrated that a concordant interaction in which the state recognises 
and accommodates traditional governance can mitigate the risk of intrastate conflict 
amid limited state capacities. Overall, the chapter identified four approaches that the 
state can take vis-à-vis traditional governance structures. On the one hand, the state can 
exclude traditional authorities from the constitutionally recognised realm or leave them 
without any substantive role by recognising them solely symbolically. These 
approaches constitute discordant interactions that make coordination between the state 
and traditional governance difficult and give little incentives to traditional authorities 
to actively support the state. On the contrary, in concordant interactions the state 
outsources some form of authority to traditional governance structures either as 
separate entities in charge of specific functions (institutional multiplicity) or as an 
integral part of the state’s governance hierarchies (institutional hybridity). I argued that 
the latter in particular facilitates governance coordination and gives traditional 
authorities higher stakes at maintaining the state stable. Besides pointing to the 
pacifying effect of institutional hybridity, the empirical findings demonstrated the 
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significance of colonial history in conditioning the role of traditional governance 
alongside the state. 
In the second chapter, I zoomed into municipalities in South Africa in order to 
examine how internal aspects of state-recognised traditional authority structures 
influence local protests. The chapter presented new spatial data on contested and 
uncontested traditional authority structures in South African municipalities and 
employed a mixed methods research design to test the theoretical argument. I 
deliberately chose a country that is characterised by institutional hybridity, e.g. in 
which the state has recognised and incorporated traditional authorities into the state 
realm, and that I had found to strengthen intrastate peace. Rather than expecting the 
effects of institutional hybridity on intrastate peace to trickle down unchanged to the 
local level, I argued that we need to consider the internal cohesion of the recognised 
traditional governance structures. Specifically, I proposed that internally contested 
traditional authority structures contribute negatively to the accountability and 
credibility of the local government. Contested traditional authority structures change 
the rationale of incumbent traditional leaders, render it easier for the local state to co-
opt them, and provide opportunities to mobilise against the current incumbents. The 
results of the statistical analysis supported the hypothesis and showed that 
municipalities with contested traditional authority structures have experienced 
considerably higher protest levels than municipalities with more cohesive traditional 
authority structures. Notably, this finding remained robust when expanding the analysis 
to cover municipalities without any traditional governance structures in place. The 
qualitative evidence also alluded to a slightly different mechanism linking traditional 
authority contest to governance-related protests. Namely, the lack of clarity over 
rightful authorities can lead to difficulties in implementing development and 
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governance interventions and thereby lower governance efficacy, which increases 
motivation and opportunities to protest against local government. Overall, these 
findings challenged the idea that competition over authority positions automatically 
increases accountability of political leaders towards their subjects.  
In the last chapter, I switched my attention from low-level contentious politics to 
countries with armed violence. The role of customs and traditions can become further 
attenuated in these contexts as the limited state’s legitimacy is fundamentally 
undermined. Building on the wartime governance literature I argued that the strength 
of customary institutions matters for how civilians are able to maintain social cohesion 
and provide governance even amid a civil conflict (Arjona, 2016b; Kaplan, 2017). 
However, rather than ubiquitously protecting a locality from violence, strong 
customary institutions can in fact attract violence against civilians. Traditional 
authorities that are considered legitimate and efficient by their subjects signal local 
autonomy and capability to mobilise collectively, which can appear threatening from 
an armed group’s perspective. They can also render it harder for such an armed group 
to gain access to local resources. The empirical analysis, which leveraged spatially 
disaggregated Afrobarometer survey data to measure the strength of traditional 
authorities, showed rebel groups to target areas with strong traditional leaders. 
Descriptive investigation of rebel groups’ acts of one-sided violence further pointed to 
considerable explicit and deliberate targeting of traditional leaders in areas with higher 
than average local perceptions of their trustworthiness and salience. On the other hand, 
governments’ acts of violence against civilians were not robustly linked to the strength 
of customary institutions.  
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Contribution 
The main findings in this thesis contribute to the study of peace and conflict in 
particular and political science more broadly in three ways. First, the thesis expands 
theoretically and empirically the study of governance institutions and conflict 
vulnerability. All three chapters have demonstrated that traditional governance, a form 
of governance that derives its legitimacy from non-state, context-specific customs, has 
a non-trivial influence in shaping within-country peace and conflict dynamics in the 
contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. The first chapter makes a novel contribution in this 
regard by demonstrating that this influence is not confined to the immediate 
communities adhering to traditional governance but that it carries all the way up to 
national-level politics and intrastate peace. The second and third chapters contribute to 
a growing body of research highlighting the de facto political influence of locally 
embedded socio-cultural institutions. This point was formulated clearly by one of the 
participants to a focus-group discussion in Amadiba, a traditional administrative area 
in Eastern Cape, South Africa: 
 
They [traditional leaders] maintain peace in the community, they ensure that there is 
peace. They demarcate the land, give people sites on where to build their houses. 
(Focus-group participant, June 2017). 
 
Beyond showcasing the relevance of traditional governance for peace and 
conflict dynamics, this thesis has strived to develop a more nuanced theoretical 
understanding of this relationship. For example, the second chapter demonstrates that 
rather than the presence of traditional authority structures per se explaining systematic 
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variation in local protests, it is the variation in the internal structural cohesion of 
traditional authorities that matters. Moreover, the theoretical model developed in the 
first chapter is a novel attempt to capture nuances in the institutional interaction 
between different governance realms in hybrid polities and to investigate their 
implications for a specific outcome. While the focus here has been on the outcome of 
intrastate peace, the typology can serve to study the implications of hybrid governance 
structures for other societally critical outcomes. For example, acknowledging and 
categorising different types of discordant and concordant interactions between state 
and non-state governance structures may help to understand variation in efficiency of 
development projects or outcomes of mobilisation efforts.  
Second, the thesis contributes to the study of elite interactions and processes of 
co-option, which are closely linked to the themes of leadership accountability and 
legitimacy. This thesis proposes that accommodation of regional and local non-state 
authorities, such as but not limited to traditional authorities, can mitigate challenges 
against the state by enforcing inter-elite alliance and reducing incentives to mobilise 
against the state. However, the state’s act of outsourcing governance functions and 
authority to non-state elites, as previously argued by Boone (2014, 2017), can 
simultaneously serve to decentralise political conflict and channel grievances toward 
local elites. The second chapter has provided interesting insights on this by exploring 
how the internal aspects of local leadership structures matter for the outcome of 
institutional hybridity at the local level. In addition to this, the third study provides a 
model on how the legitimacy and efficiency of local leadership influence co-option 
opportunities of external armed actors. Together these findings suggest that the state 
and other external actors face a steeper hill in co-opting local elites when these are 
internally cohesive and locally legitimate. Linked to this, the findings contribute to a 
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more nuanced understanding of leadership accountability in the case of hereditary 
authorities: in the absence of regular competitive elections among authority candidates, 
competition (for example based on the interpretation of customs) over an authority 
position can in fact reduce accountability rather than strengthen it, as conventionally 
theorised. This is because the uncertainty over the future of one’s authority position 
incentivises a leader to maximise private gains in the short term rather than to strive to 
accommodate the interests of the subjects.  
Third, the findings here highlight the active agency of civilians and their local 
forms of organisation and authority. Civilians are not passive receivers of development 
interventions or mere victims of armed conflicts, but their social networks and 
governance institutions mediate the shape and outcome of these processes. This thesis 
has shed light on some important institutional and internal aspects in traditional forms 
of governance that shape the resulting collective capacities at the local level. In 
particular, the last chapter demonstrated how the strength of traditional authority 
institutions influences wartime governance. However, the argument is more 
generalisable and calls for systematic focus on different forms of civilian agency when 
studying political processes. For example, the insights gathered in this thesis can 
benefit research on resilience, e.g. capacity to cope and adapt in the face of growing 
environmental stress and natural catastrophes. Traditional governance structures and 
other communal institutions are often important in constituting local resilience in 
vulnerable areas. However, based on the findings of this thesis, one should pay 
attention to the role of these institutions vis-à-vis the state and their internal structural 
cohesion and legitimacy among their subjects when assessing their likely contribution 
to the coping and adaptive capacities of communities.  
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Policy implications 
In addition to its academic contribution, this thesis carries important policy 
implications. Governments, international organisations, and non-governmental 
organisations design their conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and development efforts 
on the basis of an understanding of the key beneficiaries, political authorities, and 
interlocutors that should be considered in order to achieve the aimed outcomes. 
Notably, policies aiming at increasing the legitimacy of international interventions and 
enabling local ownership of the efforts have translated into more attention to traditional 
and religious leaders and other actors defined as part of the civil society (von 
Billerbeck, 2016). Traditional leaders are called upon to facilitate peacebuilding efforts 
and to change harmful cultural practices (European Peacebuilding Liason Office, 2017; 
European Commission, 2018; The World Bank, 2018). While this thesis recognises and 
applauds the importance of considering the role of traditional governance structures 
when designing peace or development operations, it also warns against a one-size-fits-
all or a romanticised approach to the role of traditional governance. Specifically, the 
theoretical models and empirical analyses here have alluded to three tangible aspects 
to be kept in mind when considering traditional authorities and other customary 
institutions: their formal role and relationship to the state, their internal structural 
cohesion and the implications of this on their contemporary role, and their relationship 
to their constituents, particularly their legitimacy among these. In general, the thesis 
serves to sensitise the policy community to the political nature of traditional authorities 
and the power relations embedded in local governance structures.  
Notably, neither the policy implications nor the academic contribution outlined 
above should be considered tied to the region of sub-Saharan Africa. As discussed in 
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the introduction, forms of traditional governance maintain their relevance around the 
world (Holzinger et al., 2018). Existing research demonstrates the substantive 
influence that tribal and indigenous governance structures can have on development 
and conflict outcomes for example in the contexts of Latin America and South East 
Asia (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Ruiz-Euler, 2014; Jochem, Murtazashvili and 
Murtazashvili, 2016; Klick, 2016). Furthermore, the rights of traditional or indigenous 
communities and their governance structures are recognised in political processes 
within and beyond these regions. For example, the Colombian peace agreement in 2016 
reaffirmed the consulta previa policy, which demands the state and private companies 
to consult ethnic and indigenous communities prior to any action in issues concerning 
their land.83 This consultation policy, which originates from the Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention of the International Labour Organisation in 1989 (No. 169), has 
been accused for becoming a tool to co-opt certain traditional leaders willing to 
advance the cause of the state and private companies without proper consultation with 
the communities (Betancur, 2014). The theoretical and analytical models developed in 
this thesis seem highly relevant in this and any other political context that is portrayed 
by hybrid governance and policies of empowering or exclusion of traditional authority 
structures. 
 
Limitations and way forward 
This thesis has studied the role of traditional governance in peace and conflict 
outcomes, exploring multiple aspects in traditional authority structures and their 
institutional context that can be identified to vary systematically. I have theorised 
                                                          
83 See section 73 in the Final Agreement (2016).  
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around three particular dimensions – institutional context, internal cohesion, and 
strength – and presented novel ways to empirically capture these dimensions and their 
relation to intrastate conflict, violence against civilians, and more low-intensity 
protests. Nevertheless, there are some major caveats in this study that should be 
acknowledged, as well as important future research avenues that can be identified. 
First, all three chapters have mainly relied on observational data and quantitative 
analysis that does not directly test the causal mechanisms theorised in the chapters. All 
chapters have explored anecdotal case evidence in order to scrutinise and strengthen 
the level of confidence in the theoretical mechanisms. In addition to this, the second 
chapter used primary qualitative evidence to discuss the plausibility of the theorised 
mechanisms. Yet, thick descriptive qualitative data or experimental research design 
would help to trace the theoretical chain from specific traditional governance 
conditions to the outcome and exclude alternative theoretical mechanisms explaining 
the correlations. Indeed, the qualitative interview data collected for the second chapter 
exposed plausible alternative mechanisms linking contested traditional authority 
structures to increased protest rates via lowered governance efficacy. While I remain 
confident in the plausibility of the main theoretical arguments presented in this thesis, 
future research should focus more explicitly on how changes in the formal role and type 
of traditional governance structure create a change in governance outcomes and 
whether without these changes the outcome would look considerably different. 
Another methodological and theoretical limitation in this thesis concerns over-
time dynamics. The first substantive chapter captures variation over time in state–
traditional governance interaction. Yet the second and third chapters measure cross-
sectional variation in traditional governance in specific time points. While all chapters 
control for past violence and try to separate the influence of traditional governance 
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from the processes that shape it, better empirical capturing of over-time changes (or 
continuities) in the studied dimensions of traditional governance structures would 
arguably strengthen the study. Specifically, it would allow us to better identify how 
over-time changes in traditional governance structures influence peace and conflict 
outcomes and vice versa. Furthermore, it would allow us to build a more 
comprehensive view on the nature of traditional governance and its stability versus 
change over time.  
Linked to the above, this thesis has focused rather implicitly on the consequences 
of colonial and pre-colonial politics for contemporary forms of traditional governance. 
The first chapter discussed and found empirical support for the argument that colonial 
legacies matter for how traditional governance structures influence contemporary 
societies. The second chapter also built on the assumption that internally contested 
traditional authority structures often derive from disruptive colonial and interventionist 
politics. However, I have challenged the idea that contemporary traditional governance 
structures would be prisoners of their past and that using indicators that derive from 
the pre-colonial period would suffice in understanding their contemporary role. While 
I stand by the theoretical arguments put forward in this thesis, future research should 
explore why and to what extent we observe considerable path dependence in the 
capacities of traditional governance structures in particular and local governance 
capacities in general. For example, the strength of oral narratives and story-telling 
around constituting historical moments might play a role in constructing continuity in 
communities adhering to traditional rule.  
Finally, there are several aspects that have not been at the core of the present 
thesis but deserve attention. Others have shown the influence of traditional leaders in 
contemporary party politics (de Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018). Beyond their 
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mobilisation power, traditional leaders have sometimes a more direct role in party 
politics as members of political parties or as political candidates themselves. For 
example, as alluded to in the first chapter, the involvement of chiefs in the electoral 
competition in the pre-war Sierra Leone further alienated them from the people and 
contributed to the rural grievances. Future iterations of the typology of state–traditional 
governance interaction should consider policies concerning the participation of 
traditional authorities in electoral competition. Moreover, while this thesis has shown 
hybrid governance structures to influence armed conflict processes in general, there are 
some types of conflicts in which the role of traditional governance structures should be 
given particular attention. Specifically, traditional governance structures can be highly 
influential in conflicts over land and when parties mobilise around ethnic or tribal 
identity. Traditional leaders often have vested interest in questions related to land use 
as they administer the use of communal land. Competition over land resources is 
projected to grow as climate change and economic interests render fertile land scarcer. 
In this light it is pivotal to investigate the formal and de facto governance hierarchies 
around the use of land and examine how these contribute to inducing or preventing land 
related conflicts. Similarly, asking questions about the role of traditional leaders in 
violent and nonviolent uprisings in which ethnic identities are politicised could help us 
understand mobilisation dynamics and the relationship between traditional authorities 
and armed or nonarmed group leaders.  
Lastly, future research should look more closely into the transformation and 
adaptation of traditional governance structures. This issue is particularly important in 
the face of democratic consolidation and at least partially climate change-induced 
changes in rural livelihoods. The first chapter suggested that traditional governance 
structures become less important for intrastate peace in consolidated democracies. On 
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the other hand, examples from Malawi and Ghana show that traditional authorities can 
adapt to changing socio-political environments and needs (Tieleman and Uitermark, 
2018; Walsh et al., 2018). When and how traditional forms of governance are able to 
adapt to changing environment and what happens when they fail to do so are important 
questions to ask when trying to understand governance hybridity and its consequences. 
Answering these and other questions concerning the contemporary role of 
traditional governance is important as chiefs and other customary institutions continue 
to exercise de facto powers and often de jure authority around the world. The insights 
gathered in this thesis will hopefully serve to understand, categorise, and measure 
different constellations of traditional and other non-state governance structures 
alongside state institutions. This will help to better grasp the complex governance and 
power dynamics that give rise to or prevent critical societal outcomes such as violent 
conflict or durable intrastate peace.   
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